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
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The WMR Commission on the International Communist Movement and Exchanges of Party Experience continues publication of answers to this question: How are the sister parties

restructuring their activity in the face of rapidly changing national and world realities? Below are answers from the leaders of the Norwegian and the Lebanese Communists.

TAKING STOCK OF THE TOTALITY OF CONTRADICTIONS

Kaare Andre NILSEN

Chairman, Communist Party of Norway (NKP)

It is hard to find another period in world history when social progress has been so rapid as in the closing stages of the 20th century. But the economic and political sources of wars, oppression and exploitation are still potent enough to cloud the future and to inflict immense sufferings on the people. Under the impact of this contradiction new problems keep arising in society, while old ones appear in a different light, as do the ways and prospects of social development. People are looking at the world anew.

The demands of the present period have immensely increased the responsibility falling on the champions of social progress, and above all on the Communists, for making a correct assessment of the processes proceeding in the various countries and throughout the world, and for formulating the right strategy and tactics. There could be very serious consequences for any communist party trailing in the wake of events and failing to perceive the new developments in due time. That is why we in Norway seek to renew our political line and to correct past mistakes.

The need to face the truth in assessing the phenomena of the modern world also applies to our view of capitalism. We have often produced an apocalyptic picture of capitalist society, stressing its incurable antagonisms, sores and defects, but it is not right to oversimplify the real world. *It is important to see the world in all its complexities, diversity and vividness, and to avoid presenting a black-and-white picture of development.*

After all, we find evidence that even gripped by the general crisis, capitalism has reserves for boosting the productive forces. Despite the presence of an army of unemployed, it is capable of spiritually enslaving a sizable section of the working people by providing

them, especially in the most developed countries, with relatively high incomes and social protection. Revolutionary consciousness is not at all lowered by a sober view of today's capitalist society. On the contrary, it fortifies the revolutionary consciousness because it helps to understand the causes behind the unfavourable factors for the revolutionary movement.

Capitalism as a world system has not lost its capacity to manoeuvre and to adapt to the new conditions, but that does not in itself eliminate the antagonisms which undermine its existence. Evidence of the weakening of the world counterrevolution comes from the establishment of socialism over vast territories of the globe, the victories of the national liberation movements, and the successes in the working people's class struggle. But this historical trend does not entitle us to fit all the facts of the real world into the framework of some single scheme. *Correct assessments helping correct action in a concrete situation can be made only by analysing the whole set of phenomena in their development.*

The lifetime of capitalism has been prolonged, and the time perspective for building socialism has also been lengthened. I think the communist parties have underestimated the objective factors and overestimated the subjective factors, including their own role. The communist party and the communist ideology have to adjust to new conditions.

It seems that the epoch we have characterised as the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism will be a longer period, with the two systems living side by side. The future is likely to be marked by important progress in peaceful coexistence and the transition of both systems to a peacetime economy. This will

change either systems with capitalism and socialism acquiring new characteristics.

Old slogans and values will have a new content. There will be a diversity of forms of public ownership, greater democracy and a more perfect freedom of expression and human rights. Human rights, ecological ethics and an extension of democracy must be *included in our strategy for socialism which starts by influencing the processes within the capitalist system.*

I think the communist parties both in socialist and capitalist countries will, in principle, have to assume the role of a "constructive opposition" within their systems, discussing things like the type of socialism needed, or the type of alternative programmes possible under capitalism. Both systems have been affected by the Cold War. The climate of confrontation has impaired their powers of tolerance. Now the door is being opened to enable a broader recovery of the missed opportunities regarding the democratic forms of intercourse.

As a communist party operating in a developed capitalist country, we have to be highly self-critical of our practices, especially since our last upswing in the first half of the 1970s. In a period of rapid changes in telecommunications and mass tourism, also involving large sections of the working class, we have tended to idealise the conditions in socialist countries. To a rather well-informed population we conveyed the image of a last-ditch group of the "faithful" who refuse to see what any child could see.

Theoretically and programmatically we were "perfect dialecticians". We stressed that socialism is a system in continuous development and that socialism will be built upon national traditions. But in our agitation and also in our propaganda we had a tendency to express ourselves in a way which made the masses suspect we were going to borrow models from other countries, a kind of "fully-fledged and ready-made socialism".

I think it is dangerous for the ruling communist parties to idealise their present-day socialism as if it were the ultimate result of development. That is bound to lead to stagnation. From our experience we can also draw the conclusion that it is death for a communist party in a capitalist country like Norway to be seen as some sort of uncritical "megaphone" diffusing the self-interpretations of other communist parties. If we stay within the dialectical method, we must stress that *today's existing socialism will in the future be some other and—it is to be hoped—better socialism.* There is no doubt that our party defended some things that ran counter to the true development of socialism. Naturally this has spoiled our reputation among the masses.

We tend to forget that the *value of theory lies in a precise reflection of all the contradictions.* If we fail, for

instance, to identify the substance of the relations between the United States and Western Europe and lose sight of the activity of our "own" capitalists, concentrating attention only on the "scheming of US imperialism", we shall have to speak once again of our mistakes a few years hence. The ruling circles of the West European countries have their own self-seeking ambitions which could hamper the building of a common European home.

Marxist thinking has never stood still; it has developed in the various countries, even if with varying intensity and consistency. But we would be deceiving ourselves if we failed to see that it lags behind the demands of the epoch. Our theoretical quest has sometimes been decades late in assessing some of the new phenomena and problems. Under the pretext of keeping theory "pure" there has been a slide down into dogmatism and a brand of thinking which implies a fitting of the facts into ready-made schemes, a vitiation of ideals and principles, and a doing of violence to the reality.

At its 19th Congress in 1987, the NKP gave a clear and unambiguous response to the various calls for "renewal" to be achieved by abandoning the class principles and by acting in a crudely pragmatic and time-serving way. The congress stressed that the fundamental principles of Marxism still *hold good.* The party intends to be guided by them in the future as well, steadily developing and amplifying them through analysis of present-day realities and new conclusions.

The congress reaffirmed its class stand by unanimously adopting the new Principled Programme of the Communist Party of Norway, in which innovation goes hand in hand with continuity: it preserves the theoretical Marxist-Leninist basis, the characterisation of our epoch and its basic contradictions, the assessment of capitalism and socialism as social formations, the anti-monopoly strategy of the Communists, and so on.

Our programmatic document definitely reiterates the NKP position based upon proletarian internationalism. We are sure that there is a compelling need for unity of action by the Communists now that the "borders are opening up", literally and metaphorically. Communist parties are doomed if they close in upon themselves within the national framework. That is why Marx's call "Workers of all countries, unite!" has never been more pertinent than it is today. *We can and must strengthen the international communist movement and enhance its role in world development, while invigorating relations and contacts between all contingents of the working-class movement and other progressive, left-wing and democratic forces,* primarily in removing the danger of war and in solving global human problems.

I think that there are now better conditions for practising internationalism, with Communists no longer

monopolising the truth, but instead keeping an open mind with regard to people holding other positions and inclining to other ideological platforms. Among the Communists themselves it is also widely recognised that we do not have and do not need any "world champions" with regard to Marxism-Leninism or the building of socialism. There is no reason to deal in blows which hamper more intense and broader cooperation among Communists and the left forces.

The document—a new programme, as regards our choice of form, and partly also in content and structure—is also a reflection of the important changes that have occurred in the country and the world since the early 1970s. It takes account of the rapid advance of the scientific and technical revolution and of its social consequences, of the changes in the structure of the working class, in the mechanism of capitalist exploitation, the monopolisation of industries, the growing concentration of capital and its expansion beyond the national borders.

We state that the technological explosion and the attendant processes in Norwegian society have had a remarkable effect on the structural composition of the working class, and have also led to a reduction in the political activity of the industrial proletariat, our traditional base. That is not to say that it is no longer of interest for the Communists: it continues to be the most significant section of the working-class movement because of its numbers, its place in production, its potential for self-organisation and collective defence of its interests. The NKP is above all a party of the working class, though this does not, of course, imply less attention to other strata of society.

The record has shown that even small communist parties, acting with skill, if not with numbers, are capable of playing a marked role in the life of their countries. The Norwegian Communists are one of the important forces rejecting the "social partnership" policy in the country. The daily activity of the Marxist-Leninist party prevents the ruling circles from dragging the working class into the morass of opportunism.

I should like especially to note the urgent need for *the communist party's systematic participation in developing both the traditional mass movements—the anti-war and working-class ones—and the new social movements.* Norwegian Communists have many views, positions and demands in common with other democratic forces in the country. We do not seek to control these movements, but we also refuse to be dissolved in them. Being aware that fragmented action fails to yield any tangible results, we call for cooperation with all the healthy forces in society, primarily the young people, the future of our movement.

Last year we started to build up a new broad alliance—a "red-green coalition"—which is to unite the four parties comprising the left wing of the Norwegian

politics with left Social Democrats and people participating in various democratic movements. So far we have made the first steps. It is necessary to work with patience, because it is an extremely difficult process, even within the Communist Party. But we are unanimous that its policy and priorities must be to restore the left unity of the "red" and the "green" forces.

The *struggle for peace* opens up much scope for joint action. The antiwar movement has now acquired global human proportions and has risen over and above class distinctions and ideological differences. Preservation of peace is the basic prerequisite for the solution of all the other social problems. However, while it does not abolish the laws of social development, it puts an imprint on the forms of struggle for socialism and the relations between states within the two social systems. That is the angle from which one should regard the idea of a coalition of the forces of reason and realism written into our Programme.

Here, we think, the NKP faces two main tasks. On the one hand, we are cooperating with various groups and trends whose political and ideological views often differ markedly from our own; we are seeking to make the peace movement as broad as possible, and these efforts have yielded results. There is a growing conviction among the peace supporters that they cannot do without the Communists, particularly in solving the numerous organisational problems.

On the other hand, we believe that it is necessary to intensify the anti-imperialist tenor and militancy of the peace forces, which have recently shown signs of less vigorous activity. The peace movement tends to fight better and with more energy in "bad" times, rather than otherwise. It is vital that public opinion should remain active even when some positive results have been achieved.

In this context, it is especially important to explain through concrete examples who is to blame for tram-melling the incipient process of disarmament aimed at ridding the world of the danger of a disaster. *People do not spontaneously gain a correct view of the international situation*, and it is up to the Communists to provide well-considered arguments.

One will find similar developments in the trade union movement, where the NKP has been working for unity with the Social Democrats and the Socialists. We have many tasks and interests in common, but when it comes to formulating an alternative to the government's economic policy, it turns out that the Social Democrats and the left-wing Socialists are not always capable of proposing any new ideas, apart from reformist recipes.

The pure reformist concept has difficulties because of objective factors in the development of capitalism. The economic base for the reformist and pure social democratic version of capitalism was the long period

of growth after World War II. It gave room both for accumulation, investments and new jobs, as well as real income growth for the workers and social security (the "welfare state"). At the same time, it enabled the extension of cheap credits to fishermen and farmers. The result: a relatively stable labour market, and higher productivity, which also added growth to the growth.

In short, economic development was strong enough to finance the big class compromise between capital and labour and between industry and the primary sectors. From the second half of the 1970s through to the 1980s, there has been a dramatic change in the circumstances. For a long period the conservative forces have been on the offensive, with the entire working-class movement, including the Social Democrats, on the defensive. It is clear, therefore, that here again the *Communists are necessary* because they have a scientifically-grounded anti-monopoly strategy, with constructive ideas for solving many national problems.

This largely explains the monopoly bourgeoisie's hatred of the revolutionary party of the working class, and the bourgeois mass media's attempts to undermine its influence and to oust it from political life by accusing the Communists of being an incompetent group of people closed in upon themselves in their own "shell".

But why should people who actively work day to day in many public organisations be called sectarians? This work has a very wide spectrum: the trade unions; the struggle for peace and women's rights; cooperatives; sports, youth, ecological and other movements. In all these the Communists selflessly give of their energies, knowledge and experience for the benefit of the working people, and here they enjoy great respect. So there is no reason at all to accuse us of living in some "little narrow party world".

The problem, I think, is a different one: the *prestige of the party does not correspond to the prestige and influence of individual Communists in their daily activity*. The other difficulty is that there are still very few of us in Norway. Our most important problem is to deploy the efforts, energies and time of our cadres correctly. Every Communist has to choose between fulfilling party functions and working in public organisations, but it is an especially hard problem for us because, we will have to admit, our party is numerically very small. The reasons for this are several.

In the early postwar years, the NKP had 35,000 members and a solid group in the Storting (Parliament), but it subsequently missed the historic opportunity of becoming a truly mass, strong and militant organisation. The party suffered considerable losses, and its membership and influence declined in the atmosphere of the Cold War started by imperialism, the overall climate of intolerance of different views, the

authoritarianism in the international communist movement, and the sharpening inner-party struggle.

Under the influence of the destructive spirit of Stalinism, the CC General Secretary and 170 of its most prominent members were expelled from the NKP on unfounded accusations that a Norwegian-Trotskyite-Titoite group had been formed. The NKP CC decided last April to invalidate all the expulsions from the party and the main resolution decided upon by an extraordinary congress in 1950.

All the processes in the countries of existing socialism have also had a strong influence on the positions of the communist party. People clearly saw the lag of some socialist countries behind the requirements of the present in economics and living standards, and in the deep democratisation of society, the overcoming of the working people's alienation from the means of production, and the involvement of the people in management, which Lenin had urged. As a result of the stagnation in the USSR—and other countries—the example of existing socialism largely dissipated the attractiveness of socialism produced by the Great October Revolution and the victory over fascism, which had stimulated the enthusiasm of Communists throughout the world.

So long as socialism is incapable of providing a high living standard comparable with that of the most developed countries of the West it will not become sufficiently attractive for millions of working people. What is more, socialist society should be able to massively involve the people in affairs of state and provide a more full-blooded political, social and cultural life than it is in the West.

We have to state with regret that for objective historical reasons and particularly because of the gross errors and miscalculations socialism has failed to acquire these features. It has failed to display its advantages to the fullest extent or to demonstrate its capacity to surpass capitalism in many vital areas.

That is why perestroika in the Soviet Union and in a number of other socialist countries is a source of hope. We believe that the success of these revolutionary transformations will in the long run have a beneficial effect on the working-class movement, making the new social system and socialist ideas more attractive and helping the communist parties of the West, including our own party, to consolidate their influence and regain the support of the masses. Millions of working people will once again look to the values of a system which guarantees not only employment and satisfaction of spiritual and material wants, but also a life without upheavals, without the fear of being incinerated in a nuclear war.

Among the objective difficulties there is the NKP's inability to analyse in-depth the new aspects of capitalist development promptly enough. It failed to

find and offer the masses slogans that would anticipate events instead of trailing behind them, and so the party's electoral positions remain extremely weak, gaining no more than 0.5% of the votes in parliamentary elections.

How can we find a way out of what is, frankly, an alarming situation? Firstly, we believe it important to analyse the new processes in Norwegian society, and to identify the place the Communists now have in the working-class movement, in the rapidly changing world of labour that has never been more diversified, with an unprecedented pluralism of interests, views and human motivations.

I think it is time to give up the Stalinist thesis that we have been "seasoned into a special breed of men". After all, Marx and Engels stressed in their *Manifesto of the Communist Party* that "the Communists do not form a separate party ... they do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement".² We do have an image of our own, but we make no claim to exclusiveness or to the possession of the ultimate truth. This is an approach which, I think, would help us to escape marginalisation.

It is an approach which has helped our party in the past few years to grow stronger and consolidate its positions in the popular movement, and at the same time to attract a wider circle of new friends and supporters. However, *despite some progress we have not yet risen to a qualitatively new level*, either in terms of mass influence or in our inner-party life. We shall have to adopt new criteria, unlike those of the past, which will have to be tested on more difficult subjects. This applies to the leading cadres and to all the other Communists, who have to become imaginative and responsible participants in the collective struggle, instead of being sideline observers carrying out instructions.

There are now especially high demands on organisational, political and ideological work capable of assuring the party of popular support. Again and again we ask ourselves this question: do the working class, the other working people, women and youth, all the progressive forces believe that their interests are expressed in our proposals, slogans and actions?

Our calls must accord with party strategy, on the one hand, and must be understandable to the masses and meet their interests, on the other. But it is important to *engage in constant, frank and unbiased dialogue*, even with those whose ideas run counter to our own. This is also an element of new thinking, a realistic and democratic method of influencing public opinion.

Generally speaking, the urge to voice the requirements of society does not mean that the Communists seek to set themselves above society as a supreme

and infallible judge. *We seek to make democracy the rule in the life of party members, in their public and political work, and to make greater openness a law of our struggle.*

In this context, much attention is being given to the questions of inner-party life, such as a steady improvement in the quality of party members; the enlargement of its ranks, mainly from the working class; the style of leadership of central and local organs; the growing role of primary organisations and their independence and activity; and the greater ideological maturity of Communists. Party life, in our view, is enriched through meaningful ties with all those who take an interest in the NKP struggle. These must be daily contacts, not just those established occasionally during major political campaigns.

There is a rejuvenation of cadres within the NKP. It is not right that effective party work should on the whole be determined by the age of its leaders. What is more, difficulties tend to arise whenever young comrades without adequate theoretical and practical training have to be hastily promoted. In the light of our own experience and that of the sister parties, we have decided to start training talented young people with initiative to enable them, when the time comes, to take over from us—unlike my own generation, which made it when already in the forties. This helps to ensure the *natural continuity of the revolutionary traditions of the communist and working-class movement in the new and shifting conditions.*

The strategy of renewal implies more profound ideological work, which to some extent suffers from narrow pragmatism and abstract theorising. We believe that the duty of party intellectuals is to help raise all party members to their own level, while the latter should always strive to advance theoretically and ideologically. We urge communist scientists boldly and creatively to enrich Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, concentrating on an all-round study of the trends and prospects in the development of modern Norwegian society with an eye to our national characteristics. We are prepared to cooperate with all left-wing and progressive circles of the intelligentsia and to join them in openly discussing meaningful problems with a common sense of responsibility for the country's future.

¹ See the articles by Dimitros Christophias (Cyprus), K.P. Silva (Sri Lanka), Saifuddin Ahmed Manik (Bangladesh), Rene Urbany (Luxembourg) and Ken Douglas (New Zealand) in: *WMR*, No. 12, 1988; and Nos. 1, 6, 7, 1989.

² Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.497.

A REVOLUTION IN CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICS

Georgi HAWI

General Secretary, CC, Lebanese Communist Party (PCL)

We in the Lebanese Communist Party believe that new political thinking goes beyond the sphere of interstate relations. It has a global character and signifies a view of human problems and of the revolutionary movement differing from that of the past. According to Communists this view is not outside the Marxist conception; moreover, it represents a true understanding of it in the context of the modern realities. Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma or a set of classical texts, but a *scientific method* for comprehending the objective laws of social development. Dialectical materialism helps to see a world in flux, a world evolving beyond that described by Marx, Engels and even Lenin.

When we speak of the realities of our day we have in mind above all that ours is a nuclear age. Mankind has markedly deepened its scientific knowledge, but has also created weapons of mass destruction capable of destroying civilisation. Everyone knows that there was no atomic bomb in Lenin's day and I am sure that if he were alive today, his main concern would be to block the use of nuclear weapons and to prevent situations arising in which the future of life on Earth might depend on the will of this or that leader, whether capitalist or socialist, or on the ever-present possibility of technical error. Everyone has learnt much from the Chernobyl disaster, which not only caused great damage to the Soviet Union, but also affected other countries. What if the same thing were to happen in a nuclear arsenal?

The concerns of states belonging to different social systems, and of political parties, whatever their orientation, are not confined to the issues of war and peace. A wide range of problems exists that worry everyone: the destruction of the environment, hunger and many other challenges with which the real world has confronted mankind, whose duty it is to make more active use of science and technology to improve human life.

It is true that we thought about these things before, but in this age of growing integration and interdependence those who really want to save civilisation and ensure social progress must find a way to cooperate and to compete, not in the making of weapons of destruction, but in the production of food and consumer goods.

The new realities compel a fresh look at revolution. Let us recall that hitherto the major breakthroughs towards socialism have in one way or another been connected with wars. World War I hastened the growth of the contradictions which led to the October 1917 Revolution. World War II, through the rout of Nazism and the victory of the antifascist coalition and the peoples involved in the Resistance movement, led directly or indirectly to the formation of the socialist camp. Later on, in different circumstances, there were the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions, and the emergence of socialism-oriented states. But 1917 and 1945 remain the major milestones.

Today we have the very opposite situation. The *existence and the ultimate victory of socialism are organically connected with the preservation of peace*. If, in speaking of such a victory, we have in mind the forcible destruction of capitalism, then we must ask ourselves whether capitalism is likely to accept such a defeat while it has nuclear weapons and a powerful war machine. Of course not. It will use every means to avoid defeat, and this implies that it will seek to prevent such a victory for socialism.

This obvious logic has led us, Communists, to conclusions which may seem bitter in their shattering of illusions about a swift and easy success for the revolution in any country. The illusion was based on one misinterpreted idea: the description of our epoch as one of worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism, an idea (often carried to an absurdity) which caused some to suggest that the internal factors leading to a revolution were of no consequence given the changed alignment of forces in the world and the role of the socialist camp.

This idea will be found in the writings of some Marxist theorists who ignore the need for an organised working class and its party to carry out the revolution, and claim that they could be superseded by the external factor. Indeed, there was even a tendency to regard this factor as involving increased aid to the revolutionary forces, up to and including direct armed intervention.

It is true that this sometimes enabled the revolutionary forces to consolidate themselves in the face of the counterrevolution, but we believe that the importance

of any outside aid should not be exaggerated, because there is *no substitute for the maturing of internal prerequisites, both subjective and—especially—objective*. Nor is the situation improved by the existence of a common border between a country in revolution and a socialist state, as Afghanistan well showed.

Was there a move to "export" revolution, while imperialism was being condemned for exporting counterrevolution? I think there was, with the result that regional conflicts became more hazardous, creating great tensions and pushing the world to the brink of war.

The struggle in any given country for radical economic and social transformations, even for a socialist revolution, is closely connected with the international balance of forces, but we see this connection above all as a chance for the socialist countries to help the socialism-oriented peoples in restructuring their national economy, making rational use of raw material resources and advancing economic and social development. However, the potential of the USSR and its allies turned out to be limited. Illusions concerning this potential were based on what we later learned to be often unrealistic statistical data about the successes of socialism.

The bitter truth is that world trade and exchanges are still controlled by imperialism.

While there are important positive changes in the political sphere, the very opposite is happening in the economy. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, together with the USSR and other socialist countries, do constitute a majority in the United Nations on many issues, mainly on peace, decolonisation, and so on, but the West continues to be economically the more successful.

That is why, I think, the socialist countries were unable to give those young states which decided to break with capitalism enough economic and social assistance to rid them of their dependence. What is more, their dependence has been growing, and even the socialist states themselves are in a sense hostages to the world market in terms of credits, technology, and the prices of raw materials and finished products.

Moreover, there are also the obligations undertaken by the socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union, in defending the gains of socialism and the forces of national liberation. These entail vast defence outlays. In other circumstances these resources could have been used both to raise the Soviet people's living standards and to help the Third World.

With the intricate tangle of various factors, it is impossible to regard the revolution as an *isolated phenomenon* or to oversimplify the combination of internal and external conditions, their maturity and effectiveness. Oversimplification leads to adventurism and tends to produce pseudo-revolutionary programmes

in which voluntarism substitutes for scrupulous consideration of reality.

I should not like to create the impression that this is a call to damp down the revolutionary spirit. That is impossible. Today particularly, Marxist-Leninists act with a clear awareness of what is possible and what is not, what steps pave the way for revolution and what the conditions are for it. External domination of a people, like class oppression within a country, cannot be regarded as the status quo, but the *factors which make it possible to change the state of things require the most thorough and considered appraisal*.

New political thinking helps us see the world as it is, to understand the laws of social development already discovered by mankind, and also to formulate new ones in the light of worldwide experience, and the experience of socialism and the revolutionary process. The advance in scientific techniques, communications and information technology, and access to computerised statistics all help towards the discovery of new patterns, which are not necessarily at odds with what Marx and Engels created, but which may go much farther and utterly differ from classical schemes.

Under the impact of socialism, the capitalist system is wrestling to prolong its existence. Since the October Revolution, the bourgeoisie has tried to preserve its class domination by using different methods of exploitation, economic instruments and modes of social regulation. *In the face of the challenge posed by the socialist countries, and as a result of the struggle by its own working class, capitalism has managed to adapt itself to the new situation.*

Lenin defined imperialism as the highest and last stage of capitalism. Without questioning this definition, let us stress, however, that it would be an oversimplification to regard a "stage" as something limited to a number of years. The general crisis of capitalism was aggravated by the victory of the October Revolution and then by the collapse of the colonial empires, but in the changed situation ideologues, politicians and economists managed to orient development to the new realities.

Instead of slowing down scientific and technical progress, as the old dogmas envisaged, capitalism has developed it to such an extent that it has forged far ahead in the competition with socialism. As a result, one of the main postulates which we studied in our student days, and by means of which we tried to convince others that our doctrine was right, has turned out to be invalid.

Meanwhile, in many socialist countries there was a slowdown not so much in basic research as in the application of its results to production because of a dogmatic approach and resistance on the part of the administrative-command system, so that science,

without stimuli and the chance to test in practice moved into a state of stagnation too.

We state that *perestroika in the USSR, which is based on new thinking, is a genuine revolution within the revolution*. It does not cry halt to Marxist-Leninist precepts, but to the superficial, dogmatic, one might almost say catechistic approach to the building of socialism. We stress that enough mistakes have been made and that it is time to admit that along with the great fundamental achievements there are many things that need to be drastically reappraised. *This means radical structural changes*, and not simply a search for ways to direct economic and social development more effectively with the same traditional methods.

We do not pretend that all the problems have been solved, but we do believe that they have been correctly formulated. Knowing a problem means starting to solve it. There seem to be people for whom this knowledge goes against the grain, who are not prepared to promote solutions. That is why we believe that democracy, glasnost and everything that stimulates creative quest among intellectuals, workers, peasants and other social sectors is absolutely necessary. Only in this way is it possible in time (with the emphasis on time) to find true solutions or, rather, a more faithful approach to the truth, which is always relative.

New thinking is an integral part of perestroika, an approach to socialist construction on the basis of realism and historically founded enthusiasm, full democracy and true humanism. We can claim to be Communists only when we are the most resolute champions of democracy and humanism.

By democracy I do not mean simply the natural right of the writer, the worker and every other citizen freely to express their views, but above all the means for mobilising the people, bringing out and using their potential to create a system they will treat as their own. Socialism has not yet succeeded in overcoming human alienation either from the means of production or from the state. Despite the collective character of ownership, property has not become *one's own* for everyone. Although the working class and its party are in power, people do not feel that it is they who are running the country.

That, in my view, is the most complicated problem perestroika has to solve, and the solution will have to be found by all the Communists, those who are in power and those who are fighting under capitalism for a radical transformation of society.

Bourgeois liberal democracy is limited because it is confined to the formal trappings of human rights without posing the problem (or incapable of solving the problem) of providing the material wherewithal for enjoying human rights. It is our view that *genuine*

democracy for the people differs both from that which existed in the socialist countries, and from that which exists in the West. It would certainly be unproductive to reproduce at a lower level the system of Western democracy, which has its own specifics and its own historical roots.

The question we have to ask ourselves is how we can help people to become true masters without reproducing the capitalist order, which is exploitive and fundamentally at odds with our basic idea that man must not be exploited by man.

It will not be easy. All the more important then, having recognised the crisis (the word does not frighten me) of socialism which has existed up to now and whose signs are well known, to withstand the temptation of taking the line of least resistance and attempting to resolve the crisis by importing ready-made prescriptions from the West, whether in economics, social policy, democracy or forms of social administration.

Thus we see here two main dangers. The first lies in minimising the depth and importance of the crisis and in confining oneself to admitting only those mistakes, violations, and difficulties which can be dealt with using the old methods. The other danger would be the tendency to use the crisis to introduce capitalist-type solutions which reality has already punctured. We are worried about this because such recipes pose the danger of regress.

We believe that the working class and all the other working people of the Soviet Union, who have experienced the brutal realities of capitalism and exploitation and lived through the harsh school of war, will be able to find ways of accelerating progress on the basis of realism and revolutionary traditions. When speaking of the socialist world as a whole, there is a desire to avoid the danger of extremist solutions that could lead to a departure from the basic patterns of development of this most humanistic system. After all, the forces of counterrevolution have not disappeared. Once they have access to property and the right to set up political parties, they could, with the support of external reaction, pose a grave threat, especially if the working-class party were to lose its militancy and capacity to mobilise the masses and fail to head the initiatives in the economic, social, political and ideological spheres.

We are also convinced that new political thinking is working a radical change in international relations. This does not mean simply a handful of peace initiatives, but a *new conception of the struggle for peace*. We are all engaged in the struggle for peace, and not just to show that the Communists are the most fervent champions of peace while the capitalists want war, and that one day the court of history will hand down its verdict in our favour. Such an approach offers noth-

ing in the face of the menace of a thermonuclear disaster. The task ahead lies not in arguments over principles, but in *gaining a convincing victory for peace before the end of this century.*

That is the main difference between the Soviet proposals to the international community being made now by Mikhail Gorbachov, and those made in the past. It is no longer a matter of scoring propaganda points with some initiative which is bound to be rejected by the other side. Moreover, the USSR has welcomed certain Western proposals and readvanced them in such a form as to make the former US President Ronald Reagan rise to the challenge and take the long and very hard way to peace.

That was a result of struggle, the success or failure of which depends on the forces that can effectively be mobilised on the basis of well-considered and realistic proposals. These are put forward with a knowledge both of what is truly possible and what admits of no agreement on the part of imperialist circles. This very possibility arises also in intense and skilful struggle. We shall certainly be disappointed if we rely solely on the good will of the Western leaders and put our trust in their good intentions.

The struggle for peace in the spirit of new thinking is becoming a daily task for all the peoples, but if we are to win we must bear in mind as much the dynamism of sincere and realistic peace initiatives as an alignment of forces favouring peace. Otherwise, imperialism will always find a way of rejecting, directly or indirectly, the peace proposals and provoking the emergence of fresh hotbeds of tension fraught with danger for the international community.

The balance of forces lies not only in the quantity and quality of weapons, of which there are already enough in the nuclear arsenals to destroy life on the Earth many times over. This has to do with a policy of alliances, above all unity within the socialist community, and its relations with the national liberation movement, with the progressive forces in the West, and with all those who want peace.

The policy of alliances must be open, but it is based on the formulation of certain priorities, has its limits, is not neutral socially, and proceeds from the fact that the issue of peace can unite much broader sectors of the public than are prepared to involve themselves in social or political struggle. The main thing, I feel, is the ability to keep old friends while acquiring new ones, and not to sacrifice traditional friendships for the sake of the illusion of winning new political space.

Finally, in acknowledging peace to be of the utmost importance for mankind as a whole, we draw attention to the burning problems now facing most people on the planet. War is hated because it brings death, but this is equally true of hunger, which daily destroys tens

of thousands of lives. *Hunger is a vital issue, more people dying of it than in all regional conflicts.*

Mikhail Gorbachov was quite right when he said at the Moscow meeting of representatives of parties and movements in November 1987, and then in his UN speech, that disarmament truly meets the interests of the Third World peoples. The vast resources and funds being wasted on weapons could be used for development, but *the immediate concerns of the Third World should not be ignored either: the hunger, the grinding debt, the social backwardness, and the humiliating dependence.*

When we speak of an interdependent world, we should not forget that in international economic relations there is a steadily growing dependence of the developing countries on the monopolies. Statistics show that the poor are becoming ever poorer, and the rich, ever richer, i.e., instead of closing, the gap is widening. This cannot fail to worry all those who fight for peace, because as long as there is hunger, discrimination, and suppression of the national aspirations of the peoples yearning to preserve their political independence and freedom, *world peace will always be in jeopardy.*

What then is the way out? I fully agree with the ideas Mikhail Gorbachov expressed on this score when he met the Chinese public in Beijing on May 17. We are unwaveringly in favour of a New International Economic Order, and like the Soviet leader we believe that *the only just and common-sense solution will be found in the collective promotion of development.* As Communists committed to the international solidarity of the peoples, taking part in this noble endeavour is both a conviction and a duty.

Consequently, Lebanese Communists do not want to simplify anything when assessing new political thinking, which applies both to the internal and external aspects of Soviet perestroika, as well as to international relations, to life in other countries, and to the condition of the peoples, including our own.

How is our concept of new political thinking being expressed and how is it being realised in Lebanese conditions?

Since the outbreak of the civil war, incited by reactionaries seeking to block the country's road to harmonious development, the Communists and their allies have striven to act for the progress of our society and to rally all the forces wishing to see our homeland a united democratic Arab state independently determining its future and cooperating with the Arab world. In 1976, the patriotic movement led by the late Kamal Joublatt proposed a programme of phased political, economic and social reforms, but reaction countered by escalating the civil war and forcing the most repugnant forms of intercommunal strife upon the country.

At its 5th Congress in 1987, our party took account

of the interrelated factors preventing a radical solution to the problem and offered a way out of the impasse based on the idea that the Lebanese crisis is *part of the general crisis* affecting all the Arab countries, the development of which, despite the differences between them, is interconnected.

In the light of this organic interconnection between internal and external, subjective and objective factors, and between the revolutionary processes in each country and in the Arab world as a whole, the PCL announced its readiness for positive cooperation on the basis of possible projects for a settlement. It also called for the convocation of a *national congress* of all the Lebanese patriots for the purpose of ending the civil war.

The party announced that it was not making reconciliation conditional either on the fulfilment of the entire working-class programme at the stage of the national democratic revolution, or even on a phased democratic reform. The main thing, the Communists emphasised, is to *liberate the country, to prevent its divisions hardening, to provide democratic guarantees for continued political struggle for all-round reform*, without reducing it to meagre and lop-sided measures, and to work out a realistic and objective programme as the basis for any comprehensive dialogue.

Unfortunately, in response to the proposals of the PCL and the patriotic movement, the reactionaries launched a counteroffensive. This caused further strife between the religious communities and an escalation in aggressive operations by Zionism in the South, leading in turn to the assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1987, an attempt to form a "splinter government", and preparations for the election as the republic's president of a man who would again steer Lebanon towards a position as the second element in the Camp David plan, a course which would meet the objectives of the United States and Israel and finally block the way to reform. When they failed to insinuate their man into this post, they saddled us with Michel Aoun's military government.

Recently, the Communists and their allies have voiced support for the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Arab states which were approved and confirmed by their summit meeting in Casablanca in May 1989. In so doing, we were guided not only by our conviction that the formula "let the guns do the talking" is futile, but also by the fact that these decisions contain a number of positive elements.

Firstly, they reaffirm the internal Lebanese nature of the conflict, which General Aoun claims to be a liberation struggle by the people against Syria.

Secondly, they stress the need for a *political set-*

tlement through constitutional changes because that is the only chance of moving towards a settlement. It is now clear that the multid denominational system is no longer capable of keeping alive the state entity known as Lebanon, and that the independent political existence of the country is impossible without the preservation of its Arab identity. These are the two crucial realities.

Thirdly, these decisions point to the paramount importance of the problem of the Israeli occupation and demand sustained struggle for the fulfilment of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south of Lebanon to the international boundaries between the two states.

Fourthly, the decisions are directed against attempts to internationalise the conflict being made by the forces supporting General Aoun, and also—under pressure from the Right—by France. We believe that *international assistance ought not to supersede the efforts being made by the Arab countries and the Lebanese parties themselves*. International assistance is necessary in ensuring the withdrawal of the occupation forces from the south of Lebanon and in supporting the Arab initiative in our country.

Consequently, recognition of the inevitability of the reform in Lebanon, the vital importance of ending the Israeli occupation, and the correct determination of the line along which international intervention is required—all help us to see the decisions of the League of Arab States as a step towards a resolution of the crisis.

The stand taken by the reactionaries, who reject any settlement based on the abolition of the multid denominational system, is identical with Israel's policy both in detail and in its entirety. Israel seeks to establish in the region a number of "mini-states" on the religious principle, and refuses to recognise the right of the Arab people of Palestine to establish an independent state of their own, despite all the concessions on the part of the PLO.

We firmly believe, therefore, that a struggle must be carried on to shape a correlation of forces in Lebanon and in the Arab world by which a settlement can be effected in the country and in the region for the *benefit of the peoples and for peace in the Middle East*.

In defending ourselves, we quite naturally respond with force to the use of force by the enemy, but we have been working hard for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, something that would be encouraged by an international conference on the Middle East under the aegis of the UN with the participation of all interested parties. The idea for such a conference has been gaining ground in Lebanon, the Arab world and in the world community. We believe that it is in complete accord with the concept of new political thinking.

West European Integration and the Working-Class Movement

THE DEMOCRATIC DIMENSION OF A EUROPE OF THE TWELVE

Claude RENARD

President, CC, Communist Party of Belgium (French-Speaking)

The prospective creation of the EEC's single market in 1992 also raises the question of a political Europe. After three direct elections to the European Parliament, one can hardly speak about this Europe without mentioning the fact that the parliament's present status is becoming flagrantly anomalous as far as the logic of democracy is concerned. This logic calls for a fully-fledged European Parliament in control of its executive bodies and with clearly defined powers. But whatever the importance of the institutional aspects of this new entity, to us they are secondary compared to the issue of the strategic choice the Left will have to make.

I agree with the Italian Communist Pietro Ingrao who said in a recent interview that European reform will be on firm ground only if it relies on an effective movement to enhance the right of people to intervene in decision-making on issues of concern to them. This requirement has been a constant in the political action of the Left since it began to perceive its activities in strategic terms, to organise mass movements and to set them political objectives. The opposite camp has also had a constant—the fear of popular intervention. For example, one of those who drew up the Belgian Constitution in 1830 (regarded at the time as a model of liberalism) said that it was good only because the people agreed not to implement it fully. Rejection of such a passive attitude was one of the motive forces behind the birth of the left forces in many European countries, which helped many institutional reforms get under way.

This, I believe, offers us guidance in our search for a left strategy because any necessary innovations in countries with long-established democratic traditions are inconceivable without reliance on the long and rich *collective experience* inherent in this tradition. I am not pretending that the Left has any monopoly as far as respect for democracy is concerned. But the Left has transformed it into a major value of our civilisation—a value without which the future political Europe would be simply a kind of institutional veneer concealing an increasingly dehumanised single market and a society

being divided into two parts. We can prevent this from coming to pass.

It is far from certain that European integration automatically favours the Right's political victory. After all, the incorporation of Spain, Portugal and Greece into the European Community would have been impossible without the removal of the brutal dictatorships that ruled these countries. One can expect a similar course of developments with regard to Turkey. It is true that right-wingers are often ahead of the Left in long-term forecasts and planning. The Right wields enormous power in economic and financial decision-making. But the question is whether, with socioeconomic difficulties worsening, the Left can offer its own relevant solutions to them and have them prevail.

We also have to turn to historical traditions for guidance because we cannot see any major common demands being advanced today that would rally workers together within the entire European Community. This is why the debate within the Left revolves around the choice between saying "yes, but" or "no, but" to integration.

It is worth recalling in this connection that 1989 is the centenary of the Second International. When it was being formed, Western Europe was far from considering any, even limited, abolition of borders. Yet an international organisation of workers did develop because it relied on a series of common demands (first and foremost, for an eight-hour workday), politicised and internationalised in the course of the struggle waged by the expanding working-class and democratic movements, although conditions differed considerably from country to country.

We are now witnessing the gradual formation of a "European space" in which national borders are supposed eventually to disappear. But despite the fact that national trade union programmes feature several similar demands (such as a 35-hour workweek) and that certain interesting results have been unquestionably achieved by the trade unions, the internationalisation of the struggle is proceeding slowly

and with difficulty. The Left is sure to lose the battle for the future of Europe and for its own future if it fails to counter the political economy of finance capital with its own political economy of labour based on a real social movement (reminiscent of the spirit in which Marx wrote about the 10-hour workday bill in Britain).

Just as the social aspects of integration cannot be separated from the economic ones, the socioeconomic aspects cannot be interpreted in isolation from politics. It follows that for all its essential importance, trade union action has its limits. This is why I cannot agree with those who say that "social Europe will be a creation of the trade unions". Within Western Europe there is not a single commonly significant social gain that has been won (or could have been won) solely within the framework of the relationship between the employers and the trade unions. In such cases the odds always favour the employers. Only political decisions in support of trade union action made it possible to overcome obstacles. I believe this will remain valid in the future too.

The Left obviously has to make some progress in order to be able to influence political decision-making—the "levers of power". To a degree, the phrase relates to a past period: today, keys on a keyboard would be a more apt simile. We should therefore activate every contact and extend the scope of the matters to be agreed on in an effort to draw up a common and up-to-date strategy of democratisation, not least in the economic sphere.

This democratisation involves an adaptation of the economic mechanism to the interests of the Community's people, nations and regions. These interests are of fundamental importance to the prospects for the creation of a more balanced development model. The Vredeling Directive project (on certain ways of informing and consulting with workers at transnational enterprises)¹ showed how the demands of workers and of the democratic forces could be combined at the West European level with parliamentary intervention. Even the failure of the project proved instructive: in 1984 *La Revue Nouvelle* said with good reason that "capital always responds aggressively to the provisions of the Vredeling Directive since the EEC has a real capacity for community law, as well as bodies to enforce it. Such decisions also furnish an example for the future."

But the community's legislation will not have a leg to stand on unless the democratic forces can bring pressure to bear on the decision-making centers of the EEC and have them respect the logic of universal suffrage which will tend to stall as long as important bridges between the elected Parliament and the

European political decision-making bodies are absent.

It would, of course, be a mistake to believe that the present concept of a single market will lead directly to a new Europe finally reconciled with itself. In effect, this concept envisages the free play of market forces and defies the rate of profit. Consequently, it calls for socioeconomic and political mechanisms which will tend to reproduce, on a larger scale, those essentially imperialist phenomena that so often in the past led to conflict between European nations. But there also exist new means with which to curb dangerous trends and prevent them reaching a fundamentally new level and leading to the establishment of the "United States of Europe" which Lenin criticised in his time.

Among these means is the popular will for peace, which is now connected more than ever before with the awareness of the vitally important "war or peace" alternative. This is why, instead of dismissing the popular aspiration for a united Europe as naive, we should rely on it in order to offer new perspectives and the prospect of a less fragmented development to the pacifist movement, which contributed so much to the successful conclusion of the INF talks.

I therefore regard it as quite significant, for example, that the mass demonstration for peace held in Brussels on April 16 was aimed not against a particular base in Belgium (such as the Florennes base where US missiles were stationed in 1985) but against the attempts to dodge the Soviet-American INF accords and plunge Europe into a new round of the arms race by "modernising" tactical weapons.

A political approach to security and its priority over a military approach implies a choice in favour of a 12-nation Europe, not the West European Union, as a political framework for a specifically European effort towards disarmament and all the generous ideas associated with it.

This shows the degree to which the search for a common democratic orientation (worked out and specified as thoroughly as possible) offers guidance to the European Left and promotes left unity. When peace movements again rally together against an attempt to resume the arms race, they revert to the dominant ideas of vigorous, active democracy: peace is a cause for the people, before it ever becomes the province of politicians and generals.

¹ For more detail see: Jan Debrouwere, "Transformation, Not Negation", *WMR*, No. 3, 1989.



RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND COOPERATION

An International Roundtable with Senior UN Officials and Jurists from Eastern Europe

■ **How do you evaluate the socialist countries' contribution to international cooperation on humanitarian problems?**

Jan MARTENSON. I would like to start off by making a general point concerning the theme of this roundtable discussion, "Human Rights in a Socialist State". I consider human rights universal. They have no special political or geographic face, although, as we know, they are exercised differently in different countries. Rights and freedoms are indivisible. This is my first comment, the second and most important being that we are witnessing a new and inspiring approach to human rights in the socialist states. I judge this not only by the interest shown in our meeting, but also by the fact that the United Nations recently organised the first East European seminar on "administration of justice and human rights" in the USSR.¹ What we saw and heard was very encouraging.

Oleg KHLESTOV. I am in absolute agreement with the need to stress the universality of human rights and freedoms. They really are an important part of life both in the world community and in each particular state. But even though I share this point of view, I remain a realist. There exist different philosophic, political, religious and other views on humanitarian issues, and human rights violations have not been eliminated. In fact, whole areas of the world still lack a proper understanding of these rights in their entirety. The point is that the international community should use the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (40 years old this year) to adopt a common standard. I think that the states party to international treaties, in particular the covenants on economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights² (of which there are more than 50) are trying increasingly to act on just this basis of the universality and indivisibility of human rights and freedoms. The Soviet Union, for its part, is doing all it can to ensure that these supreme values are properly respected in international relations, as well as in legislation and in judicial practice.

You may recall that when these international treaties were being drawn up the socialist states were the ones who insisted that economic and social rights be given as much attention as political and civil rights. Inasmuch as all rights are now seen by the world community as equally important, credit for this obviously goes to the socialist countries.

Fausto POCAR. As I was preparing to come here, I also wondered why in fact human rights under socialism should differ from those in any other kind of society? I couldn't find

any answer. Human rights have to be a civilised standard for all. Of course, a society may feel it has to concentrate on one particular aspect, as was formerly the case anyway. But it is gratifying to see the many changes in international relations now: all states now seem likely equally to respect and comply with any component part of the human rights package.

■ **This optimism is undoubtedly well-founded, although no one here is out to assert that socialism**

"Human Rights in a Socialist State" was the theme of a roundtable discussion held in Moscow by the WMR's Commission on Socialist Construction and attended by Jan MARTENSON (Sweden), UN Undersecretary-General for Human Rights and Director-General of the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva; Fausto POCAR (Italy), Vice-President of the UN Human Rights Committee; Angel JAMBAZOV, Bulgaria's Deputy Minister of Justice; Hipolit STARSZAK, Poland's Deputy Procurator-General; and Professor Oleg KHLESTOV, Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Association of the USSR.

Here is a slightly abridged record of this discussion, which was conducted by a WMR staff member.

Is in any way superior with regard to human rights. Do you perceive any obstacles to East-West cooperation in this field?

POCAR. That's very difficult to answer, because it's not just a question of human rights. The hurdles to closer and better cooperation are obvious. Nevertheless, we now know they can be overcome. Closer cooperation is possible in the near future.

■ *Can the 1988 Moscow East European UN human rights seminar be considered a sign of such cooperation?*

MARTENSON. Yes, I think it was very useful. In principle, there is absolutely no reason why similar cooperative efforts should not continue, despite certain obvious differences of opinion. We at the UN are always keen to expand East-West links in this exceptionally important field.

■ *One more question concerning universality. What briefly, are the chief objectives of the world campaign for human rights which the UN has decided to conduct this year?*

MARTENSON. The legal infrastructure in the field of human rights is basically achieved and established. Now is the time for the values developed by international law to become a reality for all. It is not enough simply to have the required normative tool or the mechanisms for assistance and control. In every country people should acknowledge the following: that everyone has inalienable rights and freedoms; that every state is required to follow universally accepted humanitarian norms; and that, in addition, the UN exists to ensure their effective implementation. This is the goal of our campaign: to achieve public consciousness of human rights problems in each state and throughout the world. In trying to achieve this, we also want to alert international opinion to the violations of fundamental rights that are still occurring. The UN, comprising sovereign states, cannot compel anyone to fulfil their commitments. But an informed public opinion can exert considerable influence here.

Angel JAMBAZOV. I think that a major clarification is in order. We have agreed that human rights cannot be regarded as something peculiar to East or West. Signatories to the Universal Declaration or to the Covenants are fully committed to common principles. So I think it would be better to talk not so much about East-West humanitarian cooperation as of *allround interaction* among the UN members in the search for how best to implement the Declaration and Covenants. It is clear that each country acts in accordance with the achieved level of development and its national specifics. Nevertheless, those who support the Universal Declaration must bring their constitutions and current legislation into line with the international charter and then cooperate on this basis.

■ *This brings us straight on to the realisation of the principles of the Universal Declaration. What can be said of this process, particularly in the countries where perestroika is under way?*

MARTENSON. I think that we have all been witnessing the changes in this field as well; they are the result of perestroika, and we must decisively welcome them and we are looking forward to the transformation of words into deeds.

POCAR. Let's take a closer look at some aspects. Firstly, public opinion now appears to be acquiring a new role in the socialist countries. Secondly, legal practice has itself changed. I don't just mean the independence of judges, but also the review of the functions of the Soviet legal profession. It is encouraging that the USSR has adopted a law on the procedure of appeal to the courts against illegal actions by officials encroaching on citizens' rights, a sure sign of the growing weight of judicial protection. This, I think, is of paramount importance for the exercise of human rights and for protection under the law. Furthermore, I was greatly impressed when I heard that the USSR and other East European countries were going to sign the optional protocol³ to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, something which, as far as I know, Hungary has already done. As we see, great new opportunities are opening up...

Hipolit STARSZAK. Perestroika in the USSR, and Poland's socialist renewal since 1981, are creating broad opportunities for the affirmation of human rights and freedoms. *This is new political thinking at work.* By combining socialism and democracy, we are conducting a search for unity on popular key issues. It is important that the state should not be a means by which one part of society dominates the other sections. Instead, it should turn into an organisation for all citizens. Such changes are occurring in Poland now. It is against the background of today's shifts that I think we should examine the problem of human rights and freedoms.

■ *We would like to hear an expert opinion on a socialist rule-of-law state, the current favourite idea of some East European countries. How does this influence, in particular, the furtherance of worldwide respect for human rights and freedoms?*

MARTENSON. In theory it's all very simple. If a state, to whichever system it may belong, accedes to a certain international agreement, it must adapt its national commitments accordingly. However, this was not always so. Therefore, I repeat that what we see in the socialist world or hear from your jurists suggests an incipient process aimed at harmonising internal legislation with international norms. This is a very necessary measure, and a highly encouraging sign for all.

JAMBAZOV. My observation is that many people view the *rule-of-law state* as one where the law reigns supreme. I find this understanding rather strange. Any

state is founded on law. But which law? This is the question. Active law-making is currently under way in Bulgaria. The new socialist model, approved in 1987, presupposes our society becoming self-governing. Hence the task to make all the laws as democratic as possible, uphold human rights and freedoms and create reliable instruments for their exercise. But an exclusive reliance on law could be a dead end. After all, statute may be undemocratic, in which case should we insist on its infallibility? *Democratic legislation* is the first priority, then proper enforcement. This would mean creating an authentic rule-of-law state.

MARTENSON. Here I also think it very important that all national legislation should be brought into harmony with international norms. But it is even more necessary that they be given effect. Laws unenforced are just scraps of paper.

■ *Could you give us a firm idea of what is now being done to realise the idea of a rule-of-law socialist state, including the adaptation of internal legislation to international?*

JAMBAZOV. Provisions have been introduced into the Constitution of Bulgaria, as well as into the civil and penal codes, which fix the pre-emption of international acts when national legislation, justice or legal protection might diverge from them. In other words, we base our rights and freedoms legislation on internationally recognised standards, fully meeting our commitments. I perceive this as a direct link between the construction of a socialist rule-of-law state and the expansion of humanitarian cooperation in the world community.

STARZAK. The restructuring processes in Poland have gone deep: to a large extent our perestroika is already *institutionalised*. This does not mean, however, that fundamental rights and freedoms are not going to be expanded in the future. On the contrary, reforms are continuing. The Basic Law itself is being changed. The electoral system has been fundamentally renovated. The Sejm (Parliament) has been formed differently, and a Senate—the upper chamber—has been created. Influential opposition forces are now constitutionally a part of the highest organs of power. Pluralism in Poland has become a fact. Laws have been adopted on the freedom of the creation and activity of public organisations and on the principles for relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, with complete freedom of conscience provided. New agencies have been created and are in operation: the Constitutional Tribunal, to ensure that normative documents issued by government departments correspond to the Basic Law of the country; the Supreme Administrative Court, to examine lawsuits against illegal decisions taken by the state apparatus; and the State Tribunal, to try senior government officials if they violate the Constitution. The Commissioner for Rights of Citizens, answerable only to the Sejm, has been functioning for more than a year now. It has been legally fixed

that any citizen at his discretion may freely leave for another country or return home. Radical changes to the criminal and civil codes are also being prepared.

Under socialism, man is the *supreme value*, an axiom reflected in Polish law. The principles of legality, humanism and democratism, and political pluralism form the basis of our state. Without legal guarantees, i.e., appropriate legal means, the interests of the individual would be unrealisable.

KHLESTOV. Legislative acts with constitutional implications, designed to reform the state administration, the electoral system and the legal system, have recently been passed in the Soviet Union, and further laws aimed at confirming and guaranteeing human rights and freedoms are in the pipeline. The adoption of legislative acts on trade union rights, on young people, on voluntary societies and associations, on the press and other mass media, and on openness in the activity of state agencies and public organisations, to mention but a few, undoubtedly will serve to deepen the self-government of the people. In this way the normative base of Soviet democracy is being expanded. Our country is streamlining the legislation with a view to its democratisation and liberalisation. We are correcting the sad aberrations and distortions of the past.

A reliable indicator of the level of democracy in a country is its attitude to international human rights acts. The USSR is a party to almost all the relevant world treaties and agreements. Unlike previously, we now actively support the creation of an international control mechanism that would facilitate the implementation without hindrance of international agreements, including those in the sphere of human rights. The Soviet Union is showing maximum good will. It is prepared for cooperation and, if you like, for criticism from its partners. Naturally, we reserve the right to express our own honest opinion within a constructive dialogue. We believe, for example, that many humanitarian problems are resolved better in the USSR and a number of other socialist countries than in the West. Justice and humanism, at work and in society, are basic facets of socialism. People in the USSR critically assess what has been achieved in the human rights area and are looking for what can be done to improve the situation. At the same time we recognise that an independent look at our affairs may benefit us.

I would add that our legislation is not only being brought increasingly into conformity with international norms, but also rests on the primacy of the latter.⁴ I must admit that there are still not infrequent instances in our country when this provision is not applied in full, but we are aware of these deficiencies and are taking necessary measures. In particular, a special organ, the Constitutional Supervision Committee, has been created to ensure that all legislative acts, including those issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet, correspond to the Basic Law.

As a whole, the socialist states engaged in perestroika are all trying to promote an atmosphere of openness,

glasnost, and to approach critically all that is obsolete or hinders progress. A society which is renewing itself and constructing a rule-of-law socialist state *creates new opportunities for more effective cooperation* on humanitarian issues the world over.

POCAR. If I understand you correctly, the USSR will have a supreme control authority to check how civil, penal or any other laws conform to the Constitution?

KHLESTOV. Yes, the entire legal process.

POCAR. That is, this body will supervise the observance of constitutional requirements which also include international norms, from the Universal Declaration, for example?

KHLESTOV. Yes. And if a national law does not meet the established international norms, the latter will preempt.

JAMBAZOV. Bulgaria is carrying out a cardinal reform in the humanitarian sphere. In this sense, the year 1989 holds a special place. The heart of this process is the expansion of civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights, along with the strengthening of the material and legal guarantees for their exercise. Acts have been adopted on the basis of which self-governing organisations and bodies have been created, and the bureaucratic apparatus at the centre and in the localities has been abolished. National legislation is being brought into full conformity with our international commitments in the area of human rights.

■ **Could you comment on the attempts still observable among the Western critics of socialism to divide and even to counterpose the rights and the duties of a socialist citizen?**

POCAR. This is, of course, a very complex relationship. I would say that the state's first duty must always be to protect human rights. On the other hand, it can restrict the individual legislatively by imposing certain duties in order to secure the rights of other members of society and to ensure that the balance of rights and duties reflects the actual relationship between people. But the rights of a citizen may be qualified by virtue of his/her duties *towards society as a whole*, not to the state as such. The problem, consequently, is to avoid imposing any duties on the individual simply in order to satisfy the interests of state authority. This, I think, is the essence of the matter.

JAMBAZOV. First of all, rights and duties must be well balanced. Certain duties, including those established in law, are envisaged as a safeguard for the rights of all other members of society. For example, in order to guarantee the rights of those around you, the law demands that you refrain from committing crimes. Consequently, it is the state's duty to determine the balance between rights and duties. The state also assumes certain obligations, national sovereignty and certain government functions, for example. This cannot be considered from

the viewpoint of a correspondence between the rights and duties of an individual.

■ **Are you saying that some restrictions on human rights may be "acceptable" when the interests of society demand this?**

JAMBAZOV. I would not like my words to be interpreted as a justification for restrictions.

KHLESTOV. You need a dialectical, coherent approach here.

POCAR. Yes. Genuine personal rights must fit in with the interests of society.

STARSZAK. In any event, a counterposing would be unproductive. This, I think, applies both to the whole range of fundamental rights and to the correspondence between rights and duties.

We in Poland attach great importance to international control over the observance of fundamental rights. They have become in essence a subject of international regulation within certain limits, and thus can no longer be placed exclusively within the purview of the state. But, understandably, attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of a country on the grounds of protecting human rights (which, unfortunately, we often see) deserve only to be most resolutely condemned.

■ **Might it be concluded that the only acceptable approach to humanitarian issues in East-West relations is one that is constructive rather than confrontational, one that conforms to the realities of the modern world?**

POCAR. Confrontation is a way of avoiding problems. Needless to say, cooperation is preferable for our work. In fact, it's the *only way to realise human rights and freedoms in the world*. I believe that only through comprehensive international cooperation is it possible to ensure the universality of fundamental rights. Confrontation imperils them, besides which it creates different interpretations of the concept and undermines the existing international mechanism of monitoring and control. Whenever we transform international norms into national norms, we lend them a certain intonation. Nevertheless, the principle of universal human rights and freedoms must not be infringed upon. The spirit of cooperation we now all feel in world affairs is distinguished by the fact that it favours this principle.

By the way, I am happy to note that there has been no confrontation in the UN bodies made up of independent experts, for example in our Committee on Human Rights, nor is there any. Therein is the basis for successful cooperation in the humanitarian field.

MARTENSON. Let me stress in this connection that the global issues facing mankind—international security, the environment, underdevelopment, the state of the developing countries' economies, and human rights and freedoms—are so enormous that we must give up con-

frontation because it solves nothing. As to fundamental rights, complexities arose here in the past because everything was too "politicised", even at the various UN forums. This certainly didn't help resolve anything. Therefore, I am confident that a constructive, pragmatic and realistic approach by all countries will create opportunities for progress.

KHLESTOV. I fully share this conclusion, because "politicisation", if we accept this term, did impede cooperation. But I am firmly convinced that the assertion of human rights cannot be insulated from the efforts towards greater international security or disarmament. Today's favourable international climate is very conducive to cooperation in all fields, including civil rights and freedoms. Yet we are still encountering the vicious practice whereby everything tends to be interpreted in terms of the so-called "threat from the East". Fortunately, this myth is gradually being demolished.

■ **Mr Martenson, as UN Undersecretary-General for Human Rights, how would you sum up our discussion?**

MARTENSON. This roundtable has confirmed in its own way that the present juncture is one of great hope and expectation as the practice of international cooperation, particularly between the two major powers, would appear to exert a steadily growing and beneficial influence in addressing some of the most crucial issues of our time. For the United Nations, new and promising

avenues for multilateral action have emerged. This undoubtedly underlines the wisdom of those who have always advocated a stronger role for the UN. I am speaking of its contribution not only to peace and international security, but also to the solution of economic and social problems, of the questions of culture and, last but not least, to the affirmation and establishment of human rights and freedoms everywhere.

It is very encouraging that the socialist countries have started to bring their national legislation and obligations on humanitarian questions into conformity with the international norms adopted by the United Nations. We are looking forward to the results of this process.

¹ November 21-25, 1988, Moscow.—Ed.

² The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, legally binding documents that were opened for signing in 1966. The United States of America still has not ratified them.—Ed.

³ This document enables citizens of signatory states who have exhausted all internal recourses to law, to lodge complaints with the Human Rights Committee which has been set up by the UN in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.—Ed.

⁴ In February 1989 the USSR accepted the binding jurisdiction of the UN International Court on six major covenants earlier adopted by the world community.—Ed.

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THE BASIS OF STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s

Academician Otto REINHOLD

member, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED); rector, Academy of Social Sciences, SED CC

The 7th Plenary Meeting of the SED Central Committee in December 1988 decided to hold the party's 12th Congress in Berlin from May 15 to 19, 1990. Its job will be to sum up the GDR's social development, and to decide, in the run-up to the congress, how we should conduct our social strategy and shape our socialist society in the 1990s and beyond. This will naturally involve much research and forecasting.

SED policy is based on the fundamental idea that in our society there is a *unity of continuity and renewal*. By continuity we mean consistent pursuit of the strategy adopted in early 1970s, whose aim, in accordance with the party Programme, is further progress of developed socialist society in the GDR. This is expressed in the continuity of the party's leading role and the tasks of social development which pivot on the unity of economic and social policy, and the integral connection of scientific, technological, economic and social progress. This means converting the economy to *intensive* extended reproduction through the utmost use of high technology and fundamental social elements.

However, continuity is possible only if there are ever new prerequisites for its existence: a strong national economy, which is the material basis of our policy, as well as social, spiritual and political conditions, including those in the sphere of general education, which are required to put into practice our strategy in the 1990s. Consequently, we regard *dynamism* as a *necessary factor of continuity*, which is unthinkable without change. Here we are

guided by our concepts of what a socialist society is all about.

The SED Programme formulates this concept in very explicit terms reflecting, in the first place, our view of socialism, which does not strive for some consummate ideal, but is, on the contrary, in a state of continuous development and transformation for the attainment of success. The Programme says that the formation of a developed socialist society is a historical process of profound political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual change, which does not proceed of its own accord: it is realised consciously, something that can be done only under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The greater the scale of social change, the more important it is to be clear about the kind of socialist society we want to build and how we are to shape the various spheres of our life. The SED has always given much attention to elaborating the concept of our development and has clearly formulated its conclusions in its Programme. We want to create a new system in which every scientific, technological and economic advance invariably leads to an improvement in working and living conditions which every working person can see and feel.

I think that life has shown the *conjunction of economic and social policy* to be the central question throughout the socialist world both in the positive and in the negative sense. Wherever such an organic connection has not been established, there have been stagnation, contradictions and crises.

The unity of economic and social policies is the basis and source of the invigoration of the motive forces of socialist society, making for a unity of will between party and the people and so guaranteeing political stability. We regard this as an unconditional imperative which brooks no departure. It is another matter that one has to keep identifying the new conditions in which this state can be sustained.

Let me summarise by saying that the modern image of socialism is determined by three essential elements: immutable principles and general laws; ideals and values which spring from these principles; and the concrete conditions and modes in which these factors can be set in motion at every historical stage of social development.

Accordingly, two main conclusions can, I believe, be drawn from a comparison of our concept with those of the CPSU and other fraternal parties. Firstly, never before has there been such a common approach by the CPSU and the SED to the basic theoretical and strategic issues, above all to the struggle for disarmament, detente, security and peace through dialogue. But we also take an identical view of the chief directions of socialist construction. We believe, for instance, that the long-term historical task is to bring out to the fullest extent the advantages and motive forces, the potential and ideals of the new system. That is precisely the thrust of the policy which was adopted at the 8th SED Congress in 1971. Our parties are at one in their view that the link between economic and social policies is

definitely one of the *hallmarks of socialism*. We are also at one in our views of economic strategy aimed to intensify production and apply R & D results on a wide scale.

A comparison of the objectives and ideals of socialism, as formulated by the 19th CPSU Conference, and the relevant propositions of the SED Programme proves that, despite the different formulations, these documents are essentially identical. That is simultaneously the basis for *cooperation* between the fraternal parties in the various fields in coming to grips with their common tasks.

We regard another point as equally essential: each Marxist-Leninist party defines its own policy, naturally in the light of its own specific conditions. Here there are essential and considerable distinctions between the CPSU and the SED. What are these? One of the cardinal decisions of the 27th Congress and the 19th Conference of the CPSU is the acceleration of the economic and social development of society. Over the past decade, the GDR's national income has grown at an average rate of 4% to 5% annually, and great efforts are necessary to maintain these indicators to the end of the 1980s and beyond. If the SED were to decide to accelerate development, it would contradict the realities and would be reckless and infeasible. However, the 11th SED Congress in 1986 set the task of accelerating scientific and technological progress, especially as regards the application of high technology.

We find, therefore, that the SED and the CPSU have been defining their policies for the 1980s from different starting positions. Our objective is to maintain the present development trends in the future as well, while our Soviet friends set themselves the task of moving on from stagnation to dynamic development, that is, different situations suggest different tasks which will have to be tackled with different methods. That is why it is quite natural for the SED policy in this sphere to differ from that of the CPSU, and this obviously applies to the other spheres as well.

I think that there is now evidence of *two concepts* of scientific and technological progress in the socialist countries. One of these belongs mainly to scientists in Hungary, the Soviet Union and Poland, and the other, to those of the GDR and some other countries. Both proceed from the need to accelerate the pace of scientific and technological progress—the main source of increased economic efficiency—in order to blend economic and social policies. That will certainly require further development of socialist production relations. While there are no arguments here, there are differences of approach. Soviet and Hungarian scientists, for instance, believe that there is a need, first, to make great changes in the forms of ownership, to expand market relations and to extend socialist democracy in the hope that these changes will lead to faster scientific and technological progress and growing economic efficiency.

Our party has another concept whose starting point is a detailed analysis of changes in the productive forces. In my view, these are the crucial element of the social process as Marx saw it. That is why in elaborating our

economic strategy we concentrate on ascertaining which technologies may become crucial over the next few decades, and what kind of conditions need to be created for their faster development and efficient use. There are also other central questions. What does it mean, applying key technologies for the national economy of the GDR? What are the lines on which one should concentrate? What kind of restructuring do these technologies produce in the economy? What are the consequent changes in the character and content of labour?

It is in the light of such considerations that we seek to draw the necessary conclusions for administration, management and planning, better incentives, the shaping of commodity-money relations, i.e., for the further development of *socialist* production relations. Here we take account not only of our own experience but also of that of the industrialised capitalist countries. We find great changes in the structure and management system of the corporations, which are attuned to the probable trends in technological progress in the 1990s. That is also one of our premises. Our objective is to create powerful economic entities capable of efficient innovation and vigorous penetration of world markets.

There is another important matter. Soviet scientists, specialists and party workers have repeatedly asked whether we intend to introduce so-called lease relations into agriculture. We believe that this would quickly lead to lower farm productivity. The GDR's agrarian sector, which is small in comparison with that of the USSR, was from 1983 to 1987 producing an annual average per hectare yield of 4.5 metric tons of cereals, 22.7 tons of potatoes, 31.5 tons of sugar beet, 52.1 tons of root crops and 42.0 tons of feed crops. These figures alone show that once again we are in a different situation when compared to the USSR.

The present approach to agriculture in the Soviet Union, I believe, is certainly necessary. The objective is to increase and improve food supply as soon as possible, but I think that the lease system is a definite constraint on the application of advances in science and technology.

Let me give an example from my own country. Over the past three or four years, the GDR's agriculture has made a breakthrough along these lines. We have found that agricultural producer cooperatives are incapable on their own of applying the results of research and new technology to any great effect. That is why we have decided to set up cooperation between cooperatives, state farms and industrial enterprises to create better conditions for the use of R & D results.

Agriculture is one of the leading sectors, with a steadily growing output. Because 90% of the foodstuffs are produced by agricultural producer cooperatives, we have been studying how best to organise and use this form of ownership and labour, how to develop new forms of cooperation, and to apply scientific and technological advances on a wider scale and with greater economic effect.

These examples show, I hope, that our *objective starting positions* on key aspects of social development are different from those in the Soviet Union. It is common knowledge that policy can be conducted successfully only if the basic conditions have been reckoned with.

The 7th Plenary Meeting of the SED Central Committee formulated our attitude to the CPSU's policy and to the Soviet Union in clear and unambiguous terms.

Firstly, perestroika in the USSR, as reflected in the decisions of the 27th Congress and the 19th Conference of the CPSU, is certainly necessary, and not only because of the internal development of Soviet society. It is clear to every unbiased observer that over the next two decades the destinies of world socialism will largely depend on the progress of perestroika.

Secondly, we are supporting this process to the best of our abilities. One need only recall that our economic ties have been markedly expanded. Thousands of engineers and skilled workers from the GDR are working in the Soviet Union on major projects. We are putting through a joint programme for modernising the Soviet food industry and light industry. A large part of the modern hardware and technology this requires comes from the GDR. Perestroika in the Soviet Union is also supported by the fact that successful construction of a developed socialist society in the GDR, which lies along the most sensitive border in the world, has ensured political stability and dynamic economic and social development.

Thirdly, the SED fully supports the policy of the CPSU and its Central Committee, and this is expressed, in particular, in the fact that we publish all of Mikhail Gorbachov's speeches and important CPSU decisions. For its part, the CPSU supports the SED's policy. During their recent meeting, Erich Honecker and Mikhail Gorbachov stressed this accord with utmost certainty and clarity.

But this does not imply that the policy of one country can be transferred to others, or that we agree with everything that is being said in the discussions or publications in the press, which now and again express the views of individuals.

Fourthly, the CPSU and the SED recognise that there can be no single model of socialism for all the countries, and that the general laws of socialist construction always allow for specific conditions in each. That is not a new idea. This year, the GDR is marking its 40th anniversary. The history of the past decades has largely demonstrated our urge to take account of the country's specifics, even if we have not always fully managed to do so. Suffice it to recall, for instance, that the way in which the dictatorship of the proletariat was established and effected in the GDR differed from that in the other socialist countries. This also applies to the shaping of socialist ownership, its conjunction with the private property of artisans and craftsmen, to the multiparty system, to the policy of alliances, and to many other things. The building of socialism and the further development of new society in our country has always

been connected with a great many specific conditions, and we believe that four of these are especially important.

There is, firstly, the *actual development level of the economy and society*. The GDR has at its disposal a sizable material and technical infrastructure which has been modernised, and has also seen large-scale structural changes in many sectors over the past 10-20 years. We have also built up a substantial scientific potential, which was partially, even in the past under capitalism, connected with production. We have made great advances in education, with 90% of all those who work having completed vocational training, and almost 25%, a higher or secondary specialised education.

Let me add that over several generations the working class in the GDR has been accumulating experience, acquiring a high standard of shopfloor discipline, and other positive qualities. One of our great advantages lies in this marked distinction from the working class in many other fraternal countries where it has mostly existed for only one or two generations.

A second specific condition is the *long-standing traditions of the German working-class movement*, which are of tremendous importance for building a socialist society. This includes, for instance, the role of the trade unions and the cooperative movement, which had been active back in the 19th century, and which have always had close ties with the working-class movement. Since 1945, we have, naturally, relied on them and have developed both of these traditional trends in the new conditions. Accordingly, we have a great many cooperatives: agricultural, consumer, peasant, trade, credit, housing cooperatives and so on. In the history of socialist construction in the GDR, no attempts have ever been made either in theory or in practice to regard the activity of cooperatives as something secondary, or to limit it in any way.

The Communists' struggle against mass unemployment under the Weimar Republic is also among the historical traditions which now have an important role in developing our society. This has led us to the conclusion that socialism and unemployment are incompatible, and we cannot adopt a model of society allowing such phenomena.

Apart from the traditions stemming from past history, new ones have been formed since 1945, ranging from the multiparty system to the existence in the country of almost 200 civil organisations expressing the specific interests of individual classes, groups and strata. For 40 years now, for instance, we have had not only five parties in the GDR, but also trade unions, and organisations of young people, writers and artists, scientists, and women, and also some cooperatives nominating their own candidates in elections and forming groups in all the people's representative bodies. This means that the structures and forms which in some socialist countries are either now regarded as an essential element of socialist democracy or are being created anew, have long been traditional in our country.

The third condition is that the GDR lies, in a sense,

along the watershed between the two social systems, and the two military alliances, which is why our socialist society is being built in an atmosphere of broad international intercourse. Thus, in 1988, with an adult population of 12.8 million, we had 6.9 million people travelling to the FRG, West Berlin and other non-socialist countries, while 7 million citizens from capitalist countries visited the GDR.

Over a large part of our territory we receive broadcasts from 10-11 Western TV networks; besides, close to our borders there are 34 West German radio stations beaming their programmes to the East. Since this is certainly not being done for the purpose of strengthening socialism, our political stability at the interface of the two systems is of exceptional importance both for the GDR's internal development and for the balance of forces and peace in Central Europe. Support for such political stability under any conditions is, I believe, also central to building socialism in our country. This requires both dynamic economic and social growth, and political, ideological and theoretical work to meet these conditions and to identify any problems that may arise in due time, to respond with flexibility and to promote their solution.

The fourth condition is that the GDR *directly confronts the FRG*, economically the strongest country in Western Europe, with the largest military potential within NATO next to the United States—hence considerable political influence—and the highest living standards in Europe.

All of this suggests important conclusions. First of all, that the SED must pursue an economic policy laying emphasis on high growth rates, which is why ensuring dynamic development under any conditions is one of the central problems.

The FRG's economic potential will remain larger than that of the GDR in the future as well. It has long been clear that the international influence and attractiveness of the socialist system depend primarily on the extent to which it succeeds in transforming economic growth into advance along the way of social progress. In all the discussions with the Social Democrats, and especially with trade union leaders, the question keeps cropping up, is rationalisation possible without unemployment? One of the major strategic tasks of the fraternal countries, I think, is to demonstrate and prove that under socialism, automation, modernisation, technological change, etc., do not result in mass unemployment. The other advantages of socialism (high-level education and health-care systems, a steady solution of the housing problem, and achievements in culture) testify that the unity of economic and social policy not only meets the internal requirements of socialism, but is also of much international significance in the context of the competition with capitalism, especially that in the FRG.

Those were the considerations by which the 7th Plenary Meeting of the SED Central Committee was guided in defining the main directions of preparations for the 12th party Congress. In the 1990s, we intend to have national income grow at approximately 4% a year—this will enable us to balance economic and social policies, carry on ex-

panded reproduction and tackle other tasks. It is important to stress that this growth is socially oriented and is primarily determined by social objectives.

There is no doubt that success can be achieved only through further intensification, that is, through lower inputs in every sphere of production, because we have no other sources of growth. In the early 1980s, a set of organisational measures helped markedly to cut back inputs of raw materials, fuel and labour. We do still have untapped reserves, but they are no longer prerequisites for further progress. Our view is that the main means of intensification lie in modern managerial systems, informatics and high technology.

I think this is inseparably linked with environmental

protection. Although much has been done in this respect in the GDR, the relationship between the economy and the environment will be of paramount importance in the years to come. This means tying social reproduction to ecological requirements. A cut in energy inputs per national-income unit helps both to reduce outlays and safeguard the environment. A comparable two-fold benefit also results from closed-cycle technological processes.

In the run-up to the 12th SED Congress we shall also have to work out many other issues. We are sure that dynamic economic growth is the basis for the successful development of socialist society, while the perfection of every sphere of society in its turn creates favourable prerequisites for the country's economic growth.

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REALITY, NOT DOGMA

LI SHENZHI

Vice-President, Academy of Social Sciences,
People's Republic of China

The first Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in 30 years, held in May 1989, was a major international event. The exchange of views between the leaders of the two countries and communist parties on issues of world politics, fundamental questions of bilateral relations and prospects for their development, as well as the accords concluded during the summit are in concert with the long-term interests of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples, and they promote universal peace and security.

An interview granted by Li Shenzhi, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to a *WMR* staff member in Beijing opened with the following question:

■ **Does this mean that the Sino-Soviet relations of the 1950s will be restored?**

No, it does not. During the 1950s both China and the Soviet Union viewed these relations as "special". This, I believe, is the reason why they proved to be fragile. I think that, generally, a socialist country should maintain normal rather than special relations with other socialist nations and that high-sounding formulas such as "socialism is a big family" or "the fraternal alliance of the socialist countries" are untenable. In my view, China's ties, whether with the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, Burma or

the Philippines, display no fundamental differences (except in the economic sphere) and are based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Restructuring is the only thing that could be described as common to all the socialist countries. It is the only thing we all need badly today. This is where we should learn from one another and exchange our experience.

■ **But the socialist countries are united by a common Marxist-Leninist ideology.**

True, Marxism-Leninism is our official ideology. It is also true that socialist ownership of the means of production and planned management are dominant in the socialist economies. But we seem to have forgotten that alongside what is common there also exist distinctive aspects, that every country, whether capitalist or socialist, differs from others, and that a single, universal model is unacceptable.

Only thanks to the reform launched by Deng Xiaoping and his co-workers was innovation given the green light in practical activities and in academic research. I have to admit that our social scientists have so far made only a modest contribution to the scientific substantiation of the nation's social and economic renewal. The reason is that we were held captive by ossified, dogmatic thinking and by a point of view which made the socialist system appear infallible. In addition, at that time we simply had no opportunity to think freely or to express unconventional ideas which did not fit into the rigid framework of generally acceptable canons.

The ten years since the convocation in December 1978 of the historic Third Plenary Meeting of the 11th CPC Central Committee have been a decade of quest in all directions. Not a single section of Chinese society has

The interview was granted in May, 1989.—Ed.

been overlooked, not even the intellectual sphere. An intensive search produced a creative renewal of the situation in China. Today, we can say that new thinking is transforming our realities.

We have yet to develop a single, integral system of new attitudes and ideas. I myself see nothing wrong in the fact that sometimes we have to grope our way. How do we "ford a river without clutching at rocks", as the Chinese saying goes? By studying new phenomena thoroughly and by meticulously analysing the steps we have made and will make. Naturally, as we can see from our own experience, this is not easy: when the reform was being launched there was no integral guidance or leadership. I would say that we still have no such comprehensive ideological guidance. The question of how we are to proceed remains open. Many of those who took part in the events on Beijing's streets and squares thought democracy was the answer.

■ ***Finding one's way by trial and error, whereby losses alternate with gains, is not an exclusive characteristic of the Chinese model of socialism.***

I think upheavals and difficulties are in store for every socialist country that has mounted a restructuring effort. Social problems are exploding in Yugoslavia, and I expect cataclysmic developments to occur in other countries too.

Unfortunately, social scientists are not always successful in predicting the course of events, specifically the evolution of socioeconomic processes. Even if unconventional solutions to future problems are found in time, traditional methods of leadership prevent them from being applied boldly or without opposition.

■ ***"Socialism with a Chinese face" is a familiar phrase now. Could you explain what it means?***

Paradoxically, I doubt that anyone can give you a precise and exhaustive answer. But we are aware that the roots of this distinctive quality lie in the specific historical development of Chinese society, and were shaped by the state of the nation when the people liberated it. Today's specific features are simply a legacy of the past, a manifestation of old habits to which all of us are still captive. We must make the break, but you cannot change everything at one go. After all, it has been only a decade since that all-important Central Committee plenary meeting. Painstaking work and a creative quest are bound to bring out the distinctiveness of socialist development in China. I believe this will take another 20 or 30 years. The best is yet to come, as we and the world shall see.

■ ***During the period of the four modernisations China came up with many innovative ideas. In 1987, the 13th National Congress of the CPC advanced the concept of the "primary stage of socialism" in China. Could you tell us about this concept?***

I will not give you the official definitions as they can be found in the congress documents.¹ Let me share my per-

sonal reflections instead. I believe that a realistic attitude is of paramount significance. Every practical step is determined by our awareness of the extremely important fact that our socialism was born in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. A realistic assessment of China's current potential with due attention to all our economic, political, cultural and educational problems keeps us from lapsing into utopianism.² A sober and balanced approach based on a scientific analysis and scientific estimates has led us to the clear understanding that it is impossible for us to build communism in the foreseeable future. I would say that our objective is to build a society somewhat better than exists today. It must of course be an improved society, but we shouldn't expect an ideal society of abundance.

In several years' time the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China may be able to formulate new ideas and concepts that further match reality. This, to me, is progress. True, dogmatists hasten to brand this process as a "reversal" or "retreat", but I disagree with them wholeheartedly. Viewed from a realistic standpoint, this is, I repeat, progress: the concept of our restructuring is based on Chinese realities; this is why it is bound to produce good results.

■ ***What are the objectives of China's political reform? What are its achievements and problems?***

The objective of the political reform is to build a socialist society in a genuinely democratic way and in full concert with law and order. But can this be accomplished by a nation which is "fettered" as far as political rights and freedoms are concerned?

In their time, the founders of socialist theory put forward noble, lofty and attractive ideals. Socialism has indeed given people greater social security. This gain, guaranteed mainly in the form of daily bread and a roof over one's head, resulted from a critical attitude to capitalism. At the same time, our practice increasingly dissolved man in the collective. He was regarded less and less as an independent, creative and active personality and eventually he was lost in the sea of the masses. In the past, as the dictatorial rule gained strength in China, human freedoms were increasingly curtailed. My view is that if we want socialism to advance, we should therefore accord greater recognition to the value of every individual. But that will be an extremely difficult thing to do.

Political reform raises problems of fundamental importance. Our theoreticians, too, are working hard to solve them. All questions are raised the right way, but it is not quite clear how they should be tackled. Programmes have been drawn up, and some of them are very good, but how should we act to implement them and to attain the desired result? So far, there are more questions than answers.

■ ***Speaking in Beijing before representatives of the Chinese public about perestroika in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev said that our economic***

reform will not work if it is not backed by a radical transformation of the political system. He cited the main conclusion of the 19th National Conference of the CPSU—the need to combine socialism organically with democracy.

I think this demonstrates that there is nothing wholly distinctive about the problems of China's political reform

and democratisation. In any socialist country, economic reform will make no headway without political reform.

Our people undoubtedly need opportunities to express their attitudes and demands. So far, we do not have enough democracy or enough rights. When they expand, the reform of the political system in People's China will score its first success.

¹ "China is now in the primary stage of socialism," the CPC Central Committee said in its report. "There are two aspects to this thesis. First, our society is already a socialist society. We must persevere in socialism and never deviate from it. Second, China's socialist society is still in its primary stage. We must proceed from this reality and not jump over this stage... Because our socialism has emerged from the womb of a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, with the productive forces lagging far behind those of the

developed capitalist countries, we are destined to go through a very long primary stage. During this stage we shall accomplish industrialisation and the commercialisation, socialisation and modernisation of production, which many other countries have achieved under capitalist conditions."—Ed.

² By contrast, during the years of the Great Leap Forward, one could often hear the slogan: "Three years of tenacious work will bring about 10,000 years of happiness".—Ed.

* * *

A PERSONAL IMPRESSION

WHAT IS IN STORE FOR MONGOLIA'S TWO MILLIONTH CITIZEN?

The TV tower soars high above the ancient Buddhist temple as if challenging the intricate tracery of its tiered roofs; alongside is the satellite dish of the Orbita Space Communications Centre; block upon block of high-rise flats, which seem to have been transplanted from Europe, are surrounded by a sea of yurts, the traditional tents of the nomads; in a square, a girl in jeans is arguing with a young man in quilted robe and boots with turned-up toes (the footwear designed to spare Mother Earth); a rapt audience enjoys a concert of folk music (the guttural singing foreigners find so exotic) while outside in the street teenagers listen to the rock rhythms pounding out from a cassette player.

Such was the contrasting mix of ancient and modern we found in Ulan Bator, the capital of a country so remote that for many people it is still a land of mystery.

The socialist world, of course, knows a great deal more about Mongolia since it is also a member of the CMEA. Nevertheless, there was much to be learnt from our visit, organised in response to an invitation from the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) to see for ourselves how a new society is being

created without going through the capitalist stage of development. And bearing in mind that after the 1921 Revolution, almost everything had to be built from scratch because the country had no industry and no developed agriculture.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

At the Museum of the People's Revolution in Ulan Bator, we saw the first party document "Party Members' Oath of Allegiance", dating from 1920. The flowing lines enjoin party members "to put the interests of the poorest peasants above all else..., to fight for a happy life without man exploiting man". This task is also written into the present Programme of the MPRP, adopted by its 15th Congress in 1966, which also envisages a raising of material and cultural standards.

Definite changes have taken place in the country's social life in recent years. We saw documentary proof of this at the State Economic Planning Committee: between 1965 and 1987, average per capita income and basic take-home pay went up by 80% and 145% respectively, and the national income, by 90%.

The statistics appeared to be in order, but the reality, as far as we could tell, seemed somewhat different. We saw people queuing for meat in a shop in the capital, indicative of the fact that although Mongolia ranks third in the world for per capita meat production, consumption has decreased from over 100 kilograms per person per year to 89. This is still higher than in Britain, Sweden, Japan and some other developed countries, but remember that meat has been the Mongolian staple for centuries. A four-storey shopping centre, the biggest in the country,

had none of the fine carpets or high-quality woollen and fur garments one would expect to find in a country with such vast raw material resources.

Why has the social orientation proclaimed in the decisions of the 15th Congress in 1966 and other party documents still not been realised? A frank and honest answer was given at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1988. Over several decades, CC General Secretary Jambyn Batmonh told the meeting, distortions had occurred largely as a result of the subjectivist errors and miscalculations on the part of the state and party leadership and because of the Stalin and Choybalsan¹ personality cult. That may have been a bitter admission to make, but we think that it shows the party's strength and maturity and its faith in the people.

Mongolia followed Russia on the path of socialist construction, borrowing virtually everything from the latter, even when it was at odds with national specifics and long-standing traditions. Industrialisation and the mechanisation of agriculture, vital when taking a "short-cut" to socialism, pushed into the background the daily needs and concerns of the common people, even though under the new system economic growth is meant above all to serve human beings. In terms of living standards, the Mongolian republic unfortunately still lags behind the European members of the CMEA, and there is no sign that the gap is narrowing.

Population growth also tends to slow down the development of Mongolian society, B. Tsend-Ayuush, first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee, told us. The two millionth Mongolian citizen was born in 1988; 70 years ago the country had no more than 500,000. Forty-five per cent of Mongolians are under 16 years old—this in a nation almost doomed to extinction before the revolution because half the male population were monks sworn to celibacy. This is the reason why certain social problems relatively easily dealt with in the developed countries are often so intractable in Mongolia. Production and construction capacities are unable to keep pace with the growing needs of the population. Migration to the towns, where more than half the population already lives, has gone beyond reasonable limits. The job shortages in some aimaks² are also a matter for grave concern.

The party has become aware that society cannot maintain its fast rate of progress unless social problems are solved, and this is a key element of the new policy formulated by the 19th Congress of the MPRP in 1986, the purpose of which is to provide the conditions for the all-round development of the individual and to make every man and woman socially active and spiritually fulfilled.

We were told that, in contrast to former plans, the "human dimension" is elaborated in greater depth and detail in the Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the MPR for 1986-1990. The budget for the consumption fund, like funding for social and cultural projects, is to go up by roughly 25%. Wages are expected to rise by almost as much. Incidentally, the prices of basic

goods have not changed since 1959. We were pleased to learn that revenue obtained from cuts in defence and administration expenditure in 1988 have also gone towards improving living standards. In addition, this year one-third of capital investments (more than ever before) is going into the social infrastructure.

The shift to the human dimension continues...

THE PEASANT'S LOT IN THE SPACE AGE

When you see the boundless steppe and the foothills dotted with the occasional nomad tents, you get some idea of the formidable problems involved in health care, education, culture, trade, transport and communications. How are these problems to be solved? By using the immemorial methods of the nomads, or by turning to the experience of the developed countries, where agriculture has long since been industrialised? There is no easy answer, and that is why the MPRP has to be so thorough in working out and applying a flexible social and economic policy.

Formerly, the party's energies were concentrated on tackling economic problems. This was because Mongolia was striving to become an industrialised country, G. Miyeegombo, rector of the Higher Party School, told us. Now the situation is changing. The 4th Plenary Meeting of the MPRP in 1987, for instance, discussed in detail the needs and concerns of the rural working people.

The party considers the living conditions of the arats (peasants) to be a determining factor in the development of livestock-breeding, which continues to play a leading role. However, the flow of investments and technology into the countryside (in places four or five families share the use of a tractor or a car) has not resulted in increased output. The main reason, noted the Plenary Meeting, is that many of the problems connected with human beings as the chief factor in livestock-breeding have still not been solved.

What should be done in the next few years?

In order to find an answer to this question we went to Bayandelger somon.³

Housing, we were told in Ulan Bator, remains the country's most pressing problem. Almost 70% of the people live in yurts or wooden buildings—there was also a shortage of housing in the centre of the somon we visited. Although the emphasis now is on expanded housing construction in the rural population centres, this will scarcely affect the living conditions of the livestock-breeders. For most of the year the arats roam the countryside with their herds, staying in one place only in winter and spring. Why not make life easier during the harsh winter months at these nomad camps by building modern homes?

Such homes have already been built for the livestock-breeders of the Herlenbayan agricultural association, which lies on the territory of the somon. By the end of this

five-year period (1990), there will be about 30 of them, but there is a need for almost three times as many. Workers and specialists, materials and funds are still in short supply despite the fact that the association covers half the costs itself, chairman N. Namzhing explained. Other somons too are proceeding apace with the construction of modern houses. Nevertheless, most livestock-breeders continue to live in yurts.

After driving across the steppe for about an hour and a half, we eventually reached one of the nomad camps. Inside a yurt we saw beds, a trunk, low wardrobes, cupboards, a dozen or so well-thumbed books on the shelves, a pile of suitcases, and a sewing-machine. There was electric lighting and a portable TV set, not something you find in every Mongolian family.

"Is it easy to be an arat?" we asked our host, 45-year-old G. Badam, who answered frankly that it was not. He had to be out and about from morning till late at night. His eight children help him, all of them, even the smallest, comfortable in the saddle as they tend the herds. The older children go to boarding school in the centre of the somon and visit their parents only in the holidays. What are the other "delights" of nomad life? The basic necessities—a bag of flour, cereals, a brick of black tea, and sugar—are brought in once or twice a month by a trader. Other goods are purchased at irregular intervals. But the situation is changing. Priority is being given to the herdsman in the supply of scarce goods like carpets, sewing-machines, portable generators and motorcycles.

It is no easy task providing health care to the roaming arats, but each team has a medical attendant and a nurse, and there is radiotelephone communication with the centre.

Back in Ulan Bator we were told by the Minister of Health Chogijjavyn Tserennadmid that in comparison with the other CMEA countries Mongolia is not doing badly in terms of medical services.⁴ But at times the impressive figures do not match the reality. Although every year the state has increased expenditure on public health care (now almost 10% of the budget) there is still a shortage of doctors in the countryside. In order to correct this imbalance the number of students studying to be pediatricians and gynaecologists has been markedly increased; each hospital servicing a group of somons now has 5 to 7 doctors, this number is to be doubled; and the emphasis has been shifted to preventive medicine and regular health check-ups for the entire population.

At the somon we went to see a cultural centre, built some 20 years ago and now slightly dilapidated, which only has room for 140 people when three times as many want to use it. It also has a library of 10,000 books. In the evenings, young people naturally congregate at the centre's disco. Chairman Namzhig told us that they were unable to build a new centre on their own, and that the state would cover part of the cost.

We were able to gain an idea of what tomorrow's cultural life might be like in the countryside when we attended

a session of the People's Great Hural.⁵ Although the figures mentioned were impressive,⁶ speakers noted that there was a need for greater scope and more telling results. A lot of money is being spent on setting up in each somon a cultural centre equipped with library, reading-room, cinema, concert hall, and sports facilities as well as premises for amateur dramatics and technical workshops. The aim is to build or repair 300 such centres by the end of the next five-year plan period and provide the requisite personnel and equipment.

As we studied the proceedings at the session, we recalled our meeting with the arat Badam. He had told us that he had no sense of being isolated from the world: the radio was on from 6.00 a.m. until midnight; state television, launched more than 20 years ago, is also being developed, with relay lines now carrying several hours a day of TV from the national channel to 16 of the 18 aimak centres; within the next two years, all the population centres in the country will be receiving TV programmes from Ulan Bator.

But when will television reach every yurt? Mongolian communications engineers have decided to use outer space for this purpose. A communications satellite is to be sent into orbit in 1994 under the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA countries, and Mongolia is to use one of its channels on a commercial basis. The herdsmen are no longer satisfied with black-and-white pictures from a portable TV the size of a book, and most want a colour TV that could operate from a petrol-driven generator. Unfortunately, these facilities are not yet available in the shops.

At the nomad camps we found lighting generators made in Japan because CMEA countries do not produce anything as lightweight and reliable. The state expects to supply all the suri⁷ with such facilities in about 10 years. Portable generators, however, use up a lot of fuel and it occurred to us that it might perhaps be better, in view of the climate and other natural conditions, to use traditional sources of energy like wind, sun, water and biogas. We were told at the State Committee for Science, Technology and Higher Education that work along these lines is already under way.

The significance of the measures being taken by the party and the government to improve living conditions among rural working people was brought home to us when we learned the results of recent sociological studies. These show that the hardships of life in the steppe, the poor development of the social sphere, inadequate pay, and the simple desire to be among other people have led to a sharp decline in the prestige of cattle-breeding as an occupation. Only 3% of 16-18 year-olds polled were willing to work in a suri. What would persuade them to stay on the farm? A sense of duty? Every year thousands of volunteers come to work in the sector, but far from all remain. Nomad livestock-breeding is a centuries-old science that can only be learned gradually in close contact with Nature and by absorbing from older people a mass of knowledge

that is not to be found in books. Wages, perhaps? Successful arats like Badam can earn three times more than the average tractor-driver, but others earn very much less. It is possible for an individual to own a herd of some 75 to 100 head of cattle, and of course this provides no small supplement to one's income. The state also gives considerable support: over the past 20 years, procurement prices for livestock produce have been increased 7 times. But the budget also has its limitations: subsidies have to be provided not only for the production of meat and milk, but also for children's clothing, footwear, urban transport and even bathhouses (subsidies will rise by roughly 50% of the figure for 1988).

But it was made clear to us that even in these conditions one cannot hope to see an influx of young people. There is another way of doing this, and that is to stimulate initiative, enterprise and an urge to raise labour productivity and make livestock more productive. Ch. Purevdavaa, secretary of the somon party committee, told us that their emphasis was on helping people regain their sense of being masters of the land. As in many other associations, they were introducing cost accounting in teams and families, and arranging leasehold contracts, in the belief that a personal stake in the results of labour would help to overcome the entrenched alienation of men and women from property.

CHANGES AMONG THE WORKERS

At one time the colliery at Nalaih was the largest enterprise in Mongolia; in winter there were only 40 people working there. The country now has hundreds of factories and plants, and 20% of the workforce is employed in industry, which yields one-third of the national income. What changes have been taking place in the social sphere here? To see for ourselves we went to the mining town of Baganur.

The town is growing rapidly, with a population expected to double in the next few years. The builders are lagging behind, not least because the materials have to be brought in from hundreds of kilometres away. One way of solving the housing problem is to expand production through local effort using local materials. This is what the Baganur enterprise has been doing. A group of workers, trained in the building trade, have erected a five-storey house with 30 flats and another two houses will go up this year. Construction is also about to begin on individual two-storey houses for miners.

The population boom has also produced other problems, described to us by T. Hayanhyarvaa, a department head at the MPRP city committee. Subsidiary farming is being developed to improve food supply: next year the output of meat and meat products is expected to go up six-fold; potatoes and vegetables, three-fold; and milk supply is to be doubled. One important task is to develop the urban infrastructure. Among the new projects are a large school for 1,200 pupils, a modern medical complex,

and a nursery school for 280 children. These will be followed by a gym, a cultural centre and a hotel.

We visited the home of V. Hashhu, 40-year-old leader of a walking excavator team. He told us that highly-skilled miners were paid "as much as government ministers", and his well-appointed flat certainly showed signs of affluence: modern furniture, colour television and a capacious refrigerator.

"My parents were arats," he told us. "One of my brothers is a farm-machine operator, the second is a turner, the third is a policeman, and the fourth is doing his army service. My sister is a seamstress. I graduated from a technical college and became an electrician. Eight years ago I helped assemble a walking excavator. I liked the machine—it's powerful and reliable. I was fortunate to be sent to the USSR to learn how to operate it. I now lead a team. At first there were 16 of us in the team, half of them Soviet specialists who had come to teach us. When we got the hang of it, they went home."

Of the 1,200 people who work at Baganur, 135 have a higher education, B. Myagmarzhav, secretary of the party committee, who had also studied in the USSR, told us later. More than 400 of the workers came from vocational schools or from army service, while 200 are technical college graduates. On the whole, a competent lot. Unless there are good working and living conditions and facilities for recreation you can't really expect them to show a great deal of interest in their work. At the initiative of the party committee a programme for the social development of the work collective was drawn up and is now being put into effect.

We gained an overall picture of changes in the social sphere on our visits to enterprises in Ulan Bator. We were pleasantly surprised to find that a spinning mill had spacious rest and changing rooms, several surgeries, a gym with work-out facilities, a sauna and a dining hall. As at most other enterprises, the workers here pay only 60% of the cost of their meals, the rest paid for out of the mill budget. Since women make up 80% of the work collective the trade union committee has worked hard to set up laundry and dry cleaning collection centres, a shoe repair shop, a chemist's kiosk, a hairdresser's, and a shop.

Qualitative changes in the social sphere are, of course, impossible without deep changes in the content of labour, and here retooling is expected to have an effect. An intensification programme has been worked out on the initiative of the Communists. We asked Ts. Dorzhderem, the party committee secretary at the Wilhelm Pieck carpet factory about the merits of this programme for party workers, and how it affected the forms and methods of their activity:

"We began by trying to make every worker and engineer take an interest in making the programme a success," he said. "The party organisation defined the proposals for improving working conditions and production, and directed the Communists to fulfil them. The style of party work has also changed. Instead of the numerous meetings we used to have, we now try to solve the con-

crete problems affecting our workers in a business-like way."

We saw a similar picture everywhere. Our visits to industrial enterprises and our conversations there showed that considerable attention is now being given to social affairs.

What are the prospects? Chairman of the Council of Ministers Dumaagiyn Sodnom told us that national income was now four times as high as in the early 1960s, although it is still short of the level required for adequate consumption and accumulation funds. And export earnings do not yet cover the cost of hard-currency imports.

The country's economic potential, though very much larger than it was before the revolution, is still small and here, we were told, the Comprehensive Programme for the Scientific and Technological Progress of the MPR until the Year 2005, drawn up together with Soviet scientists, will have a key role to play. Its purpose is to raise the national economy to a new technological standard and to accelerate its growth. We noted that significantly increased food stocks, a wider range of consumer goods (along with

the automation of light industry), and greater building capacities were among the priority social tasks.

Will they make it? We believe so. Young Mongolians now have a minimum of eight years schooling, and subsequent technical training (paid for by the state) makes it possible to prepare skilled personnel swiftly and effectively. Twenty per cent of workers already have a secondary specialised or higher education. A nation with such intellectual potential is bound to be able to carry out restructuring in order to raise living standards and realise the ideals of socialism.

Whatever Mongolia's two-millionth citizen grows up to become—a cattlebreeder or a worker, a doctor or an engineer—he or she is sure to benefit from these changes.

DUONG NGOK KY
Communist Party of Vietnam

Alexander STROGANOV
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¹ Horloogiyn Choybalsan (1895-1952), party leader and statesman; Prime Minister from 1939 to 1952.—Ed.

² A large administrative division.—Ed.

³ A smaller administrative division than the aimak with an area of 140,000 hectares and a population of 2,600. There are about 360 somons in Mongolia.—Ed.

⁴ It now has 26 doctors (70% of whom are women), 82 auxiliaries and 112 hospital beds per 10,000 of the population.—Ed.

⁵ The supreme legislative body in Mongolia. Of its 370 deputies,

27.6% are workers, 28.1% peasants, and the others are office employees and intellectuals.—Ed.

⁶ In Mongolia, there is one cultural centre per 4,400 people, 1 film projector per 3,700 people, and one library per 2,100 people. Mongolia is ahead of the other CMEA countries in the size of theatre audience; it has almost 50,000 books per 10,000 citizens in its public libraries, also more than in many other countries.—Ed.

⁷ Primary agricultural unit, usually consisting of one or two arat families. There are 37,000 suri in Mongolia.—Ed.





50 YEARS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

WAS AN EARLIER ANTI-NAZI COALITION POSSIBLE?

Professor Alexander CHUBARIAN

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Much public interest in the genesis and prehistory of World War II has been aroused in connection with the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the most tragic and destructive conflict in human history. In many countries, the sizable body of literature dealing with these aspects is being added to at a high rate. But despite the hundreds of books, articles, documents and other items that have appeared, new questions are arising, a sharp debate is unfolding, and different, sometimes polar views and concepts are being advanced.

This sustained interest and continued debate stems from the significance of certain problems which remain topical to this day: why was the world drawn into the vortex of destruction? Could the war have been avoided? Was the dramatic course of events that led to it fatally inevitable?

Discussions of these problems have acquired new scope and depth against the background of Soviet perestroika and the critical reappraisal and renewal now typical of social sciences in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. International relations are no longer a subject off limits to a critical analysis; more and more is being said about the way Stalin's distortions of socialism affected foreign policy and about the mistakes the then Soviet leaders committed on the international scene.

In this article I would like to reflect on whether an anti-Nazi coalition could have been formed in the wake of Hitler's rise to power and what factors prevented its establishment.

In 1933, the situation in Europe and in the world changed radically. The Nazis' rise to power was threatening Europe with war. Earlier, in the autumn of 1931, the Japanese militarists had attacked China, and the first hotbed of a world war had been created in the Far East.

In 1934-1936, the circumstances were such that an anti-Nazi coalition could have been created. It was seen as a collective security system, a concept largely promoted by the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov. Work on this project was also conducted in Paris, Bucharest and Belgrade. In 1934, agree-

ments between the USSR and France, and the USSR and Czechoslovakia were concluded. These were major steps toward a possible antifascist alliance of European nations. Preparations were also under way for the conclusion of a multilateral "Eastern Pact".¹

Later, however, the situation took a turn for the worse. After Barthou was assassinated, French policy changed. Britain's position became the stumbling block to the efforts to set up a coalition against Hitler. London obviously wanted no agreement with the Soviet Union. Instead, it promoted a policy of "appeasement", one in which French leaders were becoming increasingly involved.

By making unilateral concessions, the "peacemakers" were trying to direct German aggression eastward and, ultimately, pit Germany against the Soviet Union. That was a grave strategic blunder, above all on the part of Britain's leaders, who believed that things would not get out of hand and that Hitler would not be able to do anything harmful to British interests. Meanwhile, Paris appeared to have forgotten the lessons of history and geography, shutting its eyes to the deployment of Nazi armies close to the heart of France.

The policy of "appeasement" can only be described as *immoral and unlawful*. Its essence was reflected with particular clarity in the Munich deal: as a result, without a single shot being fired, Hitler received part of the sovereign Czechoslovak Republic. This destroyed the system of blocs and pacts that had taken shape in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. The smaller countries realised they were defenceless.

Munich also seriously influenced the policy pursued by Stalin. He understood that the USSR was facing the threat of isolation and of a possible collusion of Britain and France with Germany. Munich then rebounded again on Western politicians in that it confirmed Stalin in his ingrained distrust of the West European democracies by furnishing him with additional arguments.

It is worth noting that besides an alternative in the sphere of government policy and diplomacy, an opportunity also existed for creating an *antifascist front among*

the European public since they had grown much more active by the mid-1930s. This upsurge was significantly encouraged by the decisions of the 7th Congress of the Comintern, which gave the green light to a united left front. This was followed by several major European congresses of writers, artists and scientists. A broad antiwar movement known as Amsterdam-Pleyel was founded. Figures of world renown—Romain Rolland, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Henri Barbusse, Alexei Tolstoy, Ilya Ehrenburg and many others—called for unity and warned of the danger from the "plague of brownshirts".

But the popular European movement failed to stop fascism. *Firstly*, there was no real unity on the left. Despite the Comintern decisions, the inertia of the previous years remained. The guidelines issued by Stalin in the mid-1920s and directed against any alliance with the Social Democrats were not fully repudiated. Although several communist parties worked hard to secure vigorous participation by the entire working class of Europe in the antifascist front, this objective was not attained. *Secondly*, the movement in fact involved only a thin layer of intellectuals, while the masses remained passive. *Thirdly*, large-scale purges in the USSR, which distorted the image of socialism and horrified intellectuals in other countries, were a serious obstacle to unity.

Furthermore, Stalin the theorist condemned "abstract humanism and pacifism", and this did little to promote unity with the antiwar forces of Western Europe. The pacifist movement itself was fragmented, some pacifists supporting the policy of appeasement, others simply remaining apolitical. Lastly, the experience of solidarity with the Spanish Republic did not become an effective example of a broad antifascist alliance.

Meanwhile, working in tandem with Italy, Nazi Germany was unswervingly implementing its aggressive programme. Now, some 50 years later, it is becoming increasingly clear that the international situation reached a critical juncture during the latter half of the 1930s. Fascism was a sinister and destructive force which threatened to deal an irreparable blow to the accomplishments of human civilisation and to exterminate millions of people. It was not only a threat to the USSR as a socialist state and to all Slavic nations, whose annihilation was proclaimed as a major objective in the Nazi programme; it was also a challenge to the Western democracies because it promised to destroy the statehood of dozens of countries and to enslave their people. By the end of the 1930s Germany had easily swallowed Austria, helped destroy the Spanish Republic and, in two moves, overrun Czechoslovakia (in October 1938 and in March 1939). Fascism was poised for the decisive lunge.

Such was the European situation in 1939. It was then that Hitler formulated the ultimate objective of the war, the preparations for which were in full swing: "(a) domination in Europe and (b) world domination for centuries".

As we can see from numerous documents, the decision to prepare for the invasion of Poland was taken

at Hitler's headquarters in April. Having occupied Klaipeda, the Nazis posed a direct threat to the Baltic republics.

British and French leaders felt that German policy was becoming increasingly unpredictable and that their own interests in Europe might suffer. In the spring of 1939 they decided therefore to resume their political and military talks with the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, British politicians were actively in contact with Hitler, still hoping to reach agreement on favourable terms.

A shift was also occurring in Soviet policy as economic and political contacts with Germany were stepped up. In May, the top officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs were replaced, thus heralding a change in Soviet foreign policy. Maxim Litvinov, who had tried hard to reach an accord with Britain and France, was removed and Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's docile minion, took his place. A purge began in which many prominent diplomats were arrested. This weakened the People's Commissariat considerably, robbing it of dynamism and initiative.

From the summer of 1939, the tripartite talks in Moscow between British, French and Soviet representatives, as well as the separate Anglo-German and the Soviet-German negotiations, developed in different directions.

A political and military agreement on the establishment of a united anti-Nazi front offered the best prospects. The Soviet Union did make such a proposal to the West, but nothing came of it. By sending third-rank representatives to Moscow who obviously did not have the necessary powers, London and Paris demonstrated their unwillingness to conclude the talks with a serious and large-scale agreement.²

In essence, Britain and France were putting their antagonism towards the Soviet Union above considerations of political expediency and above their national interests. Their inertia led them to pursue appeasement and obviously made them ignorant or unaware of the fact that Nazism posed a direct threat to their national survival.

The Polish government was also being awkward, rejecting a Soviet demand that Red Army troops be allowed passage through Polish territory even though dozens of German divisions had already massed along the Polish border.

Nor was the Soviet side prepared for broad compromise. For example, this not unreasonable demand for permission to send Soviet troops through Polish and Romanian territory was presented in a very peremptory manner.

Stalin and his aides underestimated the German threat; but they also had reason to mistrust Britain and France (particularly after Munich): there was ample evidence of these nations' reluctance to align themselves with the USSR, which in turn feared new accords between them and Germany.

The overall impression is that the participants in the Moscow talks obviously underrated the dangerous nature of fascism and the extreme gravity of the situation. Natural-

ly, it is much easier to analyse these developments and to draw conclusions with the benefit of hindsight. But even then it must have been clear that the Nazis could be stopped only by a joint effort involving mutual concessions and compromise.

The talks in Moscow ended in deadlock and the Soviet Union was faced with a very difficult choice since Germany was pressing increasingly for a pact. Documents discovered later confirm that by then Hitler had already decided to try and reach agreement with the USSR, and to launch his world domination strategy by attacking the West first. Only after that did he plan to undertake his main strategic task and move against the Soviet Union.

When history and its "blank spots" are discussed today, a great deal of attention is focused on the Soviet-German nonaggression pact of August 23, 1939. Scholars and journalists argue about whether it was necessary, whether there was any alternative, and reflect on its consequences for the USSR, Germany and other countries. One finds mutually exclusive views often being expressed quite categorically.

It seems to me that the pact itself and the consequences were affected to a great degree by the complexity of the prevailing international situation, its contradictory trends and the distinctive interconnection of domestic and foreign policies.

The thing to remember is that the pact was a *forced* move: as I've already mentioned, the Anglo-French-Soviet talks were bogged down; the Soviet Union was facing the short- and long-term prospect of isolation; and the Kremlin evidently could not rule out some kind of new agreement between Britain and Germany at the expense of the USSR. The Soviet-Japanese conflict in the Far East indicated that a war on two fronts was highly probable.

Judging by Western (mostly German) documents, Moscow hesitated before taking the final decision, but eventually Stalin gave the go-ahead, and the nonaggression pact with Germany was signed on August 23, 1939.

In itself, a pact of this kind was not unusual in international relations at the time. Britain and France had in effect concluded similar treaties with Germany in 1938.

Many Western historians claim that the signing of the pact gave Germany a *carte blanche* to attack Poland. But these are groundless assertions: we now know in detail that the decision to attack Poland was taken in Berlin in April 1939. We also know that in the course of the Moscow tripartite talks, August 26 was mentioned as the date of a possible Nazi assault. Polish and other documents confirm that Hitler delayed acting on his decision for a few days only because he was awaiting the outcome of the talks in Moscow and a clarification of Italy's position.

The pact itself would not have aroused such a stormy worldwide reaction either then or now. The real reason was that according to German documents and the extensive diplomatic correspondence of the period there was a secret protocol attached to the pact on "delineating the spheres of interests" between the USSR and Germany.

The controversy is compounded by the fact that the original has not been discovered, although the developments following the signing of the pact show that some sort of agreement had indeed been reached concerning the spheres of interest along the Narev, Vistula and San rivers. German troops were not to invade the Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia or the Baltic states, which were regarded as within the Soviet orbit.

However, the very fact that such an agreement existed (if it did) between a socialist country and a fascist regime is a blatant *departure from Leninist principles* and an immoral move. The pact adversely affected the international communist and democratic movement, and it caused confusion in the Comintern and among the popular masses, who saw the Soviet Union as the mainstay of the struggle against fascism.

All criticism of fascism soon disappeared from the Soviet press. Newspapers were full of articles about a new and friendly period in Soviet-German relations while Britain and France were denounced as aggressors. The impression was that Stalin and his aides were euphoric not only about having gained a reprieve from war, but also about long-term cooperation with Germany and the possibility of resolving many issues of world politics with German help. This process culminated in the Soviet-German treaty on friendship and borders of September 28, 1939.

Such was the contradictory course of events during those dramatic months. On the one hand, the pact of August 23 was clearly a product of the international situation that had taken shape in Europe after Munich. At the same time, it bore the imprint of Stalin's attitude to this situation. Having won time in which to prepare the country against an attack, the Soviet leadership failed to use this breathing space properly. The USSR signed the nonaggression pact, and then transformed it into a treaty of friendship. For more than 5 years, the Soviet government and public opinion had condemned fascism and Nazi ideology and practice. Then, all of a sudden, there was an about-face and possible cooperation with Nazi Germany.

After the signing of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact negotiations were broken off with those countries which had been the USSR's prospective partners in an anti-Nazi coalition. What was their choice of action?

On September 3, 1939, after the invasion of Poland by the German army, Britain and France, which had concluded treaties of alliance with it, declared war on Germany. That same day Australia and New Zealand joined them, and on September 10, Canada entered the war. But then what is known in history as the "phoney war" began. While Polish soldiers were resisting the Nazi onslaught bravely but in vain, British and French representatives decided, at a conference in Abbeville on September 12, not to render any military assistance to Poland, thereby reducing effective help to naught and abandoning their ally to its fate.

This policy, conducted up to the spring of 1940, has prompted some scholars and politicians not to regard the

initial period of hostilities as a war of liberation as far as Britain and France were concerned. Marxist researchers are still debating this contradictory issue. However, one thing is clear: *from the outset, Poland waged a just war of liberation, and the same is true of other countries attacked by Germany.*

Many historians are urging rejection of the previously widespread concept whereby the initial stage of the war was regarded as a clash between two imperialist groups, and the war itself as equally unjust on both sides.

Fascism and the German monopoly capital behind it were the main culprits in the global conflagration. This aspect should be emphasised since justified criticism of the policy of appeasement tended to obscure the fact that most of the blame for starting World War II rests with Hitler and his clique, not with Chamberlain or Daladier.

The liberation-oriented thrust of the Western countries' struggle against Germany does not, however, invalidate the need to single out its *different stages*, in particular, the "phoney war" period, when liberation-oriented trends were not apparent in British and French policy.

The most important lesson we should learn from the events of 50 years ago is that at critical junctures in history, when the human race is threatened with extinction, nations, political parties and their leaders *must demonstrate the political will and the resolve to rise above short-term and self-seeking interests.* They must be ready to compromise in order to rally together and avert any threat.

While upholding national interests, political leaders ought never to lose sight of *universal human interests.* This is particularly important today, when the defence of universal values and priorities and the struggle for global survival call for joint action by nations differing substantially in their philosophies and social systems. In tackling this historic task, we should see the events of 1939 as a warning which humanity cannot and must not forget.

It is worth adding that the tragedy was heightened by the split in the working-class movement and the confrontation between the Communists and the Social Democrats for which both sides were responsible.³ The record of those years shows that *the struggle for social progress, socialism and the protection of democratic values is valid only when organically linked with the protection of human life, universal human values and the accomplishments of civilisation. These are the objectives that can unite diverse political and social forces.*

Another lesson is that the interconnection between *politics and morality* should never be ignored. Legal and moral issues are becoming increasingly important in international relations. Violations of legal standards and disdain

for moral principles should be eliminated once and for all, since these things also contributed tragically to the outbreak of war.

This is why it is important to analyse in depth the inhuman essence of fascism and the terrible threat it posed to humanity. We would welcome any new research into the prewar policies of the Western democracies that is free from stereotypes and clichés. For example, the British and French position was not confined to the policy of appeasement, and many political leaders in these countries advocated joint antifascist action by different forces. In 1938, Winston Churchill said that the greatest danger to the British Empire came not from communism but from German Nazism, and that, for the time being, Britain and the Soviet Union were on the same path.

The absence of an anti-Nazi coalition during the 1930s enabled Hitler to start a war that cost the world more than 50 million lives, inflicted untold suffering on whole nations, and caused unprecedented destruction. But in the age of nuclear missiles, the price to be paid for political mistakes on the international scene is vastly increased and reaches its absolute limit. The lessons of the past can help us avoid a repetition of these mistakes, but there is no absolute guarantee against their recurrence or against new blunders.

Humanity is on the brink of an abyss. The practical implementation of new political thinking and a radical restructuring of international relations are essential if we wish to prevent a final precipitous fall. Recent developments prove that a turning point has been reached in international affairs. The most important thing now is to consolidate the positive changes that have occurred and to speed up the creation of a comprehensive system of international security—so that our answers to the formidable challenges and imperatives of our age *do not come too late.*

¹ A draft mutual assistance treaty involving the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania on resisting Nazi aggression. The idea of an "Eastern Pact" was advanced by the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in late 1933 and backed vigorously by the Soviet government.

² It is true that at the last moment—on August 19—a laconic telegramme came from Paris agreeing to the signing of a military convention, but it was worded in the most general of terms. The French move was, however, rendered useless by the British refusal.

³ For more detail, see Ulrich Perzinger, "A Contemporary Look at Historical Facts", *WMR*, No. 6, 1989.—Ed.

PAGES FROM HISTORY

AN UNUSUAL TIME...

Salomao MALINA

Chairman, Brazilian Communist Party

Communists from various countries took an active part in Allied military operations against fascism in Europe, but few remember that a Latin American country like Brazil also did its bit towards the victory. Salomao Malina was a member of the expeditionary corps sent by Brazil to the Italian front, and *WMR* asked him to share his reminiscences of that heroic period on the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

I grew up in a poor Jewish emigre family from Poland. We kept hearing about the vicious anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany. I had my first idea of what war was like from the horrifying accounts of those who had been there. There was a groundswell of indignation in Brazil, especially when the Germans began to sink Brazilian ships, a fact which did much to generate the massive campaign for the country's entry into the war on the side of the Allies. President Vargas had been openly speaking in favour of Germany, but now the government had to alter course. Besides, in spite of the censorship, news was filtering through about the heroic struggle of the Soviet people, which had stopped a seemingly invincible Nazi army on the fields of Russia.

We were naturally sympathetic towards the USSR, the first to stem the Nazi tidal wave. People stopped believing the lies being spread about the USSR. The papers were quoting experts who insisted that the USSR could hold out for no more than eight weeks but everyone knew that most, if not all, of these press reports were made up of fabrications and outright lies.

In this atmosphere I began to work with the Communists. I took part in street demonstrations to mark Allied victories and so on. Antifascist films were screened and I remember that Charlie Chaplin's *The Great Dictator*, which had earlier been banned by the regime, was very successful. Our party work often involved supporting such initiatives.

Popular pressure forced the Brazilian government to declare war on the Axis powers, and a movement naturally arose for the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Europe, a movement which was democratic from the start and had the support of the whole people. In this situation, the Communist Party had before it a wide field of activity and in effect it emerged from underground although many Communists were still in jail. The party used every available opportunity for active work which was in keeping with profound national aspirations.

In the early 1940s, along with many other young men, I was drafted into the army but in those conditions my party membership was not advertised for security reasons: I was not connected with any military organisation, I did not know any of the comrades working in it, and I generally behaved with great circumspection. I sensed that Communists were active within the army, I think I realised what was going on, but I observed the rules of the game until later I was contacted by some of the underground comrades.

In the army I was invited to take an accelerated officer training course, and after completing it I was asked whether I wanted to volunteer for service in Europe. Fired with patriotic enthusiasm I agreed, and so, even before receiving my commission I found myself a member of the expeditionary force.

At that time we were still trained mainly the traditional French way, with French weapons. Suddenly, we had to learn the American way of doing things. That was a real eye-opener. Brazil was a poor country then, and we were used to a life of material hardship. The abrupt revelation of the sheer wealth of the Americans made our heads spin. Little by little we came to realise just how poor we were. We were awakened to an awareness of our real problems and difficulties.

When the time came to sail for Europe, most of the volunteers were keen to see action, firstly because we were young, and secondly because it was 1944 and the hardest period of the war was already past. It was almost won, mainly thanks to the Soviet Union. There was a mood of elation, then, despite the dangers ahead. People were cheering and saluting the soldiers as they prepared to embark. We were moved by this show of affection, particularly from the young. A man in the uniform of the expeditionary corps was regarded as a cut above ordinary soldiers. Of course, this was very flattering and we felt like heroes. Naturally my parents, especially my mother, were not too happy, but I think my father understood why I was going.

I have to say that the preparations for our departure proceeded against a far from cloudless political backdrop. Despite the general sympathy for the Allies, there was continued pro-Nazi activity and Communists were not the only ones to sound the alarm. It was common knowledge that the Nazis had an extensive spy network in Brazil, tracking our ships, collecting and transmitting information, etc. This diabolical mechanism relied on strong German and Italian enclaves, mainly in the south of the country. Brazil also had its own fifth column. The government came down hard on fascist infiltration, and the people were no less resolute: anti-Nazi demonstrations erupted here and there, and excited crowds occasionally wrecked shops and offices for no other reason than that they displayed German or Italian signs. But those are the facts—at that time anti-German hysteria was as much a reality as Nazi espionage. There are documents, books, and eye-witness accounts which prove it. I heard, for instance, that during

the war a large group of men of German descent left Brazil—whether it was a regiment or a whole division, I don't know—to join the SS in Germany.

All I can say about our arrival in Italy is that at first I found it to be a strange and unfamiliar world. I think the Italians were also fearful of us, not knowing what to expect from these "visitors". For many people today Brazil is still an exotic and mysterious country, even more so then. But we got along with the Italians fairly well: we could more or less understand their language, and we didn't miss any opportunities to mix with local people. Besides, when our expeditionary corps landed in Italy, Rome was already deep in the rear, and the war was being fought in the north, where progressive and antifascist attitudes were especially pronounced. In the course of our military operations we often worked with local partisans, many of whom were Communists. Funnily enough, when we met them we had an inkling of who was who, and I, for my part, felt a certain affinity with them; they appeared to feel the same, but we never really got to know each other. I got a closer look at the work of the Italian Communist Party after the campaign ended, when our unit was stationed in the country for two months before being shipped home.

I shall never forget my first impressions of the Italian CP. When I first saw it in action I didn't understand what was going on: I found it strange that instead of revolutionary conspiracies, its work involved popular street protests, mass festivals and so on. When on leave, our men, even those who were not Communists, often spent hours at the local party committee because there was so much good will and hospitality; and the meetings and demonstrations organised by the ICP were supported by large numbers of people. Understandably, I could not take part in this kind of political action, but I was amazed at the scope. In Brazil, the Communists tended to stew in their own juice. Suddenly, we saw a strong mass party capable of leading millions of citizens out into the streets, an open and dynamic party firmly rooted in the real world. This had a tremendous impact, showing what we ourselves could do in the future.

But let us return to my reminiscences of the war. I was then a lieutenant in command of a platoon of sappers, a difficult and dangerous job. In the battle at Montese in northern Italy, where only Brazilian troops were deployed (this was their largest military operation of the war), we had to perform an extremely hazardous task in providing safe passage for the infantry through a minefield. We managed to do this together with a forward battalion, and I was awarded the Military Cross First Class, the highest military decoration in the Brazilian army.

I should like to say a few words about the conditions in which we had to fight. At first it was hard to adapt, we were unaccustomed to the arduous operations in the mountains and the widespread use of planes, tanks and other weapons, and we made tactical mistakes. But after a few months of fighting, the Brazilians, particularly the junior officers and men, got the hang of it and began to

fight no worse than the Americans. One should also bear in mind that it was winter, when it is very cold out there, and that our uniforms and equipment were not designed for that kind of climate.

I should not like to confine myself to the purely military side of my combat experience in Italy. The moral aspect at the time was perhaps as important, if not more so. We all had a tremendous sense of community in the struggle, and the joyous confidence that what we were doing served all the peoples of the world, above all the peoples of Europe, who greeted the liberators with such jubilation. This created the conditions for cooperation between very different political forces in the fight for a better and fairer world, one in which—as it then seemed to me—class and other antagonisms would lose their sharpness. That is how we, the common people, saw the immediate future. I even remember when in one of his speeches after the war, Joseph Stalin announced the beginning of an era of peaceful coexistence. The Brazilian Communist Party emerged from underground, aligning itself to the same perspective. We were caught quite unawares by Winston Churchill's Fulton speech, which marked the beginning of the Cold War.

When I returned from Europe, still a very young man, and apparently not a bad officer, I was not at all attracted by the trappings of a military career. After serving for some time I put in an application and was transferred to the reserve. I continued my studies while working at a US electrical company and actively joined in party work. In 1947, my comrades invited me to work as a staff journalist on the party paper. However, the reactionaries soon took the offensive, the activity of the Brazilian CP was banned, and the police tried to take over our editorial offices. We put up armed resistance, there was shooting all night, but we eventually had to surrender. I was put on trial and sentenced to six years in jail. I actually spent 18 months in prison. When I got out I became a professional revolutionary.

If you ask me about my attitude, as a Communist, to the historical fact of my participation in the defeat of Nazism, about my being a war veteran, and whether I am in touch with my frontline comrades, the answer is yes, I am proud to have been among those, few of whom are still alive, who were in the thick of those events and who did their bit. As for keeping in touch with other participants in the Italian campaign, I must admit that for at least 20 years I had to hide in the underground under an alias. Still, I am a member of the War Veterans' Association, and I am still regarded as one of its founders.

I am always welcome at the Association's branches in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, because just after the war I became a member of its National Council and a vice-chairman, and worked together with Castelo Branco, then a major or a lieutenant colonel; he later became a marshal and the President of Brazil from 1964 to 1967. All such contacts were naturally broken off after my arrest in 1948. When I was released I tried to re-establish these contacts,

but by then much had changed. Some had died, others had grown old and were living in different parts of the country. I meet them now and again, but some of them berate me for being a Communist.

The war years were an unusual time. Theoretical predictions are often turned on their head by reality, which showed in the struggle against fascism that countries with different ideologies and different political regimes could unite to defeat the common enemy. Mikhail Gorbachov now asks: Can we not unite, for instance, against such a common danger as war? I believe that we can and must.

I do, of course, understand that things are not all that simple, and that it's not just a question of kissing and making up. Nor is anything like that necessary. But one should always bear in mind that there was a time when the people themselves, broad public opinion, in a sense forced mankind to unite, and prevented the United States and its partners from evading the great alliance with the USSR and the forces supporting it. Nor should one forget that in many countries after the war patriotic popular governments were set up in which both Communists and bourgeois leaders were represented. All of that was ended by the Cold War.

The very idea of a cold war is now being rejected and the effects of it gradually being thrown off. This opens up

the prospect of a return to the old state of things, but on a new level. I feel sure that if a mighty world public movement takes shape, if the Communists are able to mobilise the masses, and if all the democratic forces continue to cooperate for peace, mankind will be able to find a common way to resist the dangers ahead.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I regard World War II as having been the last. Despite everything that has happened since—local wars, aggressive ideological propaganda—there is a growing awareness that another world conflagration cannot be allowed to erupt. That is why public opinion is now so powerful, so much more influential than ever before: it is served by powerful mass media, the rapid spread of information, the knowledge of the horrors of war, and, of course, the vigorous action of those who want to prevent war. Although this naturally clashes with the nature of imperialism, it cannot but accept the new realities. I believe that life will lead us to victory, and that unexplored ways to progress will open up before mankind, with each one of us being able to make a contribution to the common good. I think Communists have a duty to do their utmost to accelerate the ongoing process by which peace efforts are being pooled, to stick to this path and seek to create a more perfect model of civilisation.

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TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF COOPERATION

Dr V. D. CHOPRA

Vice-Chairman, International Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, New Delhi

Three years ago in Vladivostok Mikhail Gorbachov set forth the Soviet programme for attaining security in the Asia-Pacific region. His speech gave an impetus to the development of peace process in this part of the world. It was followed by the Delhi Declaration, several new Soviet proposals and initiatives advanced by India, Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia and other countries.

V. D. Chopra (b. 1918), an economist by training, was active in India's national liberation movement and was jailed by the British colonial authorities. He is Deputy Chairman of the editorial board of *Link* and *Patriot*, two major Indian newspapers, and author of several books on Asian problems. His work *India and the Socialist World* brought him the prestigious Nehru Award in 1984.

Below, a prominent Indian scholar and journalist discusses with a WMR staff member how the process of stabilisation is faring in Asia and what difficulties and contradictions are involved.

■ **What is your attitude to the issues of war and peace and to their place in the developing nations' scale of priorities and values?**

The developing countries are deeply interested in the struggle against the threat of war, nuclear war in particular, because it has a direct bearing on their efforts to eliminate the vestiges of the colonial period. Tensions and regional conflicts impose a very heavy burden on their backward economies as has become evident in the recent Iran-Iraq conflict and the tragic developments in Afghanistan.

As a matter of fact, the struggle for world peace is a component of the struggle for independence. The Indian national movement has always been taking a consistent stand on this vital issue. In the post-independence period, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the first leaders who raised his firm voice against the threat of war and took one step after another to identify the Indian people with the international movement for peace. His concept of Asian unity, which later developed into Afro-Asian unity, as well as India's role in giving a new thrust to the Non-Aligned Movement, are part of our country's contribution to the struggle for universal security.

The Delhi Declaration, which spelt out a concrete programme of action for building a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world and the disarmament action plan placed before the UN General Assembly on June 9, 1988 are concrete manifestations of this policy in the changing world situation.

It has to be admitted that despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the developing countries, including India, have been rather slow in coming to realise the grave danger of nuclear war. There are certain historical and objective reasons for this, the chief among them being that in most countries of the region the havoc caused by the Second World War was not experienced directly or with the same intensity as, for instance, in Europe. Nonetheless, it would be naive to believe that people in the developing countries are indifferent to the nuclear threat. The priority of the struggle for peace is obvious to them, although the masses are not yet completely clear on this matter.

■ **How do you assess the Soviet programme advanced in Vladivostok and developed in Mikhail Gorbachov's statements in Krasnoyarsk and at the UN? What aspects would you single out? How is it being implemented?**

Before I answer this question, I wish to state that the ideas and concepts which the Soviet leader has spelt out in the statements you mentioned *should be seen as an evolution of new thought structures concerning the problems of peace, security and development in the Asia-Pacific region*, which can aptly be described as a region of tomorrow. In India, the response to these ideas and concepts has been slowly but steadily developing in the positive direction. Initially, certain reservations arose, but as these ideas began to crystallise, the response became more and more positive.

A close scrutiny of the developments in the region reveals the emergence of two contradictory trends—the *arms race and confrontationist tendencies, on the one hand, and certain positive developments, on the other*. The latter are:

- the movement for ending the arms race and ensuring disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is gaining momentum;
- the demand for a negotiated settlement of regional conflicts is growing (after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, even in Pakistan sober elements have become more assertive);
- new bilateral relations among the countries of this region, irrespective of different social and political systems, are now crystallising;
- slowly but surely, attempts are under way to promote broad and multifarious cooperation in economic, scientific and technological spheres.

Against this background, it will be particularly relevant to mention that *people in our region are increasingly demanding that all the nuclear powers should pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons*. The Soviet Union

and China have already responded positively to this demand and joined the Treaty of Rarotonga.¹

Nevertheless, Gorbachov's speech in Krasnoyarsk has provoked controversy in India with regard to certain proposals. Strategic experts in India, for instance, have a reservation about the proposal that the main naval powers of the region should hold consultations on the non-increase of naval forces. There are valid reasons for this. The existing balance of naval forces in the region has posed a new threat to India's security, and that in a situation in which some of our neighbours are engaged in increasing their naval strength and further nuclearising it. Naturally, India cannot be indifferent to it. If you freeze the naval forces as they are today, you deprive India of strengthening its security.

Another aspect of this proposal which has become controversial in India relates to the idea that discussions should be started between the USSR, China and the United States as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Some non-official defence experts in India have been advocating that the Security Council should be expanded and India should be made a permanent member. They fail to see why the Soviet Union wants to confine these discussions to the "Big Triangle". The non-official circles in India have suggested that three other countries should be associated with these discussions—namely India, Vietnam and Indonesia.

■ **What do you see as the new approach to the policy of peaceful coexistence as reflected in the Delhi Declaration?**

The Delhi Declaration on a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World is a historic document indeed, in more than one sense. The fact that the first socialist country and the biggest non-aligned country spelt out a concrete line of action is in itself very significant, but there is something more to it. *The declaration bases the restructuring of international relations on the principle of peaceful coexistence and on the concept of non-violence*. In the nuclear age, when all of us are in the same boat—not a very large one at that—there is no other option for humanity but to accept the basic tenet that we have to peacefully coexist with each other and that each nation and state has to make its own choice about the social system it wants.

Philosophically speaking, this means that the use of force, including psychological pressures, should be banished from state-to-state relations. This, in a way, coincides with the concept that international relations should be delinked from ideology. Notwithstanding the fact that many have yet to grasp the significance of delinking international relations from class struggle, it is a fact that both India and the Soviet Union have placed before humanity an entirely new concept of building international relations on the basis of a balance of interests of states and not on a balance of military power. That is why in my opinion the Delhi Declaration has given a new content to the concept

of peaceful co-existence and made it more realistic and more practical.

■ ***How do you view the mechanics of today's struggle for universal security?***

The struggle for universal security should have many dimensions—state-to-state relations, diplomatic initiatives, concrete and practical confidence-building steps and above all mobilisation of the people in keeping with their consciousness and political views. What is refreshing in the new approach of the Soviet Union is that it has infused the movement for universal security with a new dynamism and realism. Perhaps for the first time after the Second World War, people have started to think and talk about this problem, transcending political, religious and national barriers.

The concept of an interdependent and interconnected world has begun to grip people's minds. In this sense the "iron curtain" has been broken. People are closely watching the internal and external developments in the Soviet Union. The old barriers are breaking down. However, it would be simplistic to come to hasty conclusions. The old ideas, the old thinking conditioned by the atmosphere in the past are still retarding this process. That is why in my opinion the intelligentsia in every country has an important role to play in creating an atmosphere for building universal security. The new ideas can become a material force only when they capture people's minds.

■ ***Why do you think the idea of an Asian collective security system has so far failed to find expression?***

I think that this question does not reflect the reality of the situation. The reaction of officials and the mass media in the countries of South and South-East Asia and Oceania has shown the great interest they have in the general Soviet concept of promoting cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, and their support for declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. There is also support for the Indonesian proposal on creating such a zone in South-East Asia, the idea of extending bilateral relations, and for the concept of economic alliances.

Cooperation between the USSR and the US in nuclear disarmament, particularly after the INF Treaty, shows that mankind can and must decide the most complicated questions, including the settlement of regional conflicts, not on the battlefield but by political means, at the negotiating table. This wind of change has begun to blow over our region too. It should neither be ignored nor exaggerated, although the trend towards collective political and economic cooperation, for bilateral and multilateral security is certainly in evidence.

■ ***Why then has the concept of nuclear-free zones failed to generate widespread support in Asia, especially in India?***

As I said, India has been in the forefront of the struggle for disarmament, nuclear disarmament in particular. India

does have certain reservations on the concept of nuclear-free zones. We hold that the idea of nuclear-free zones cannot be isolated from its global dimension. The nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean, the nuclear programme of China and, in recent years, the nuclear capability of Pakistan have impelled India to take this position. Therefore India's stand on the concept of nuclear-free zones and nuclear disarmament should be seen as two sides of the same coin. There is sufficient empirical evidence to prove that in strengthening the nuclear-bomb capability of Pakistan the Western world overtly and covertly played a very significant role.

■ ***Why is it that India, while opposing the arms race, does not support the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?***

This may appear contradictory at first sight, but the logic is as follows. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the NPT, there has been in recent years a relentless nuclear arms buildup by the nuclear-weapon states. In this sense, there has been a vertical proliferation, and this is contrary to the NPT regime. The main concern of the NPT has been not to allow the spread of nuclear weapons to more states, what may be called horizontal proliferation.

India does not deny that the Soviet Union, particularly in recent years, has taken one initiative after another to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally. This India has never denied. India's objection to the NPT is that it discriminates against non-nuclear powers (though certain major nuclear powers have themselves been prompting non-nuclear powers to become nuclear). Recent developments about the nuclear-bomb capability of Pakistan and of Israel illustrate this point graphically. That is the crux of the problem.

There is another aspect to it. The hawkish political circles in India claim that we should acquire a nuclear-bomb capability. However, the democratic forces in the country, including a large section of the intelligentsia, have been opposing it, and I believe that India should not go beyond the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that we should resist the pressures of the hawkish circles. This has to be seen in the context of the fact that certain conservative and reactionary elements are utilising the nuclearisation of this region as a political instrument to pressure the government and the democratic forces into abandoning the nationally accepted policy.

■ ***Given the complexities of ensuring security in Asia and the Pacific, what real opportunities do you see for the practical implementation of the political initiatives taken by the USSR, Afghanistan, Mongolia and other countries? What are the problems involved?***

After the tragic developments in Afghanistan, the militarisation of Pakistan entered a qualitatively new phase—a major obstacle to stabilisation in South Asia and in the region as a whole. It is precisely in this period that

the militarisation of Pakistan and its nuclear-bomb capability were promoted by certain countries, the United States in particular. Most of the military aid which has been given to Pakistan was not required for its defence against the so-called threat from Afghanistan. I need not go into detail, but if you make a comparative study of the military strength of Pakistan as it stands today with that of its position in 1971, you will come to a very disturbing conclusion: the Pakistani military buildup has been promoted beyond the requirement of its defence, and this has become a major cause of tension in the area. India has been demanding an end to outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. We demand that the Geneva Accords should be implemented in letter and spirit.

The settlement of regional conflicts and the INF Treaty were major events of this period, and they created a new atmosphere for stability. A restructuring of world affairs is inseparable from what is happening in our region. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea has generated new opportunities for normalising the situation in Asia. The stand of the ASEAN countries—Indonesia and Malaysia in particular, and partly Thailand—is more realistic, but this breeze has yet to blow in Islamabad, even though Pakistan has a democratic government now. If the Afghan and Kampuchean problems are peacefully resolved, there is no doubt that the concept of peace, security and development in the Asia-Pacific region will assume a new dimension and benefit the international situation as a whole.

■ **How feasible is the European path of cooperation in Asia? Would it be realistic to expect the convocation of an "Asian Helsinki conference"?**

The Helsinki process took quite a long time to develop, although the objective conditions were more favourable in Europe (a relatively similar level of economic, military and other potentials). As for the Asia-Pacific region, two elements need to be emphasised.

Firstly, the political systems there are multistructural and diverse. Besides, the states in this region vary from too small to big in terms of size, and so does their stake in this issue.

Secondly, unlike Europe, the balance of military strength is qualitatively different in Asia. That should be taken into account in considering a possible Helsinki model. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachov has himself admitted that the concept of Asia-Pacific security has to proceed from the existing structures and above all from the specific conditions of this region. Therefore, the thing to bear in mind is the Helsinki spirit and not the Helsinki model. Some motion in this direction has already begun in our region though it would be incorrect to believe that the task of promoting mutual relations among the Asian and Pacific countries will be smooth and easy. A great deal remains to be done—devising confidence-building measures, a negotiating mechanism, etc.

■ **Do you think genuine possibilities exist of finding a solution to Asia's economic problems?**

The Asia-Pacific region has immense economic potential and its impact on the world economy is clearly visible. The significance of this region has increased enormously after the Soviet Union adopted a new economic policy of developing its Asian part. Then there is the growing economic advancement of the "four tigers"—South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and partly Malaysia. The influence of China with its successful modernisation programme is growing too. India is also emerging as an important economic factor. It has been estimated that from 1970 to the year 2000 the Asian economy will continue to increase at a rate of 6.3% while that of the whole world will average only 4.8%. For the same period, Asia's share of the global GNP will grow from 16% to 23%. Western experts maintain that by the end of the century the Asia-Pacific region's economic growth will exceed the world's average level, and the focus of international trade will shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Notwithstanding the complexities of this region and the conflicting perceptions, the problems of economic cooperation among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have become issues of serious import. Some structures and forums are emerging to work for economic cooperation in this area, the experience of SAARC,² ASEAN and the Indonesian concept of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) giving graphic evidence of the urge to evolve some viable structures.

But there is another alarming aspect—the growing indebtedness of the countries of this area, including India. That is why India and other developing countries are demanding that a new international economic order should be established and the foreign debt question should be tackled. The Soviet Union too has begun to take a more practical stand on this problem.

India's bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union have now assumed a new socioeconomic content. They have a far-reaching significance, and this is bound to influence the course of events in this region. Patterns of economic relations between India and the Soviet Union, with direct economic ties between autonomous economic enterprises of the Soviet Union and the Indian private sector on the one hand and economic relations of state enterprises on the other, are emerging on the basis of equality and mutual benefit between countries with different social systems. Indo-Soviet relations represent a new model not only of political but also of economic cooperation.

¹ Drawn up and adopted by the South Pacific Forum nations in 1986.—Ed.

² The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985.—Ed.

RECLUSES? NO, PARTNERS

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE EPOCH

Khambo Lama KHARKHUUGIYN GAADAN
President of the Asian Buddhist Conference for
Peace (ABCP)

■ **What are, in your view, the principles and fundamental concepts in Buddhist philosophy which link it to the diverse trends and forces working to strengthen peace and harmonise human life?**

It is impossible to deal briefly with the basic concepts and importance of Buddhist philosophy, but I shall try to bring out the main points.

To emancipate living beings from suffering¹, our teacher, the great thinker, the Lord Buddha, preached His teachings and said, in particular, that "all formations are impermanent, the entire continuum exists in the relationship of suffering and happiness under the law of Dependent Origination, that all Dhar-mas (dharma: perfect truth as expounded in the teachings of Bud-dha.—Ed.) are without an individual Self; the origin of suffering is ignorance, and the way to bliss lies in the perception of an insight into the true nature of things and in the attainment of Nirvana, thus freeing oneself from delusion or ignorance". This is exactly what our Great Teacher Lord Buddha taught us. For centuries, this teaching has been expounded and developed by Buddha's disciples and thinkers. Nirvana, attained by virtue of knowledge and insight into the phenomenal world, means the possession of peace and tranquillity. It is an understanding wherein one is delivered from delusion and can

Buddhism is one of the three most widespread religions in the world and an influential factor in the social and cultural development of almost a score of countries in the East. In view of the disillusionment with the values of the bourgeois world, it has also attracted interest in the West. That is largely due to the elaborate Buddhist philosophy, which sets forth in intricate and symbolic forms profound dialectical ideas about the universal interconnection of phenomena, the inter-relation of the material and the spiritual, and the ways to human ethical culture.

Here are the reflections of two leaders of the major Buddhist organisation in Asia on the problems of peace-making in the doctrine and practice of modern Buddhism.

enjoy Nirvana, given the deep insight into the whole universe as an entity void of Self, belonging to Self, or empty and also not empty because of the ultimate unconditional nature of all things, thus denying the conventional expression of Ego-Entity.

The philosophic concept of Buddhism concerning peace for all, the extinction of suffering, relief from Ego-Entity and passion, the attainment of knowledge about the law governing the universe is of great significance today. These philosophic notions of peace and harmony have now become the theoretical bedrock for Buddhists in linking themselves to the forces working for peace. We, as peace-loving Buddhists in the ABCP, have as our objectives the promotion on this basis of the sacred cause of

peace through the strengthening of our solidarity with all the forces striving for peace, progress and human dignity.

■ **What are the principal moral values in Buddhism that could be of interest to the peace-loving and progressive forces fighting for emancipation and equality?**

The Buddhist concept of peace and tranquillity is based, above all, on Four Boundless States. These are: loving kindness, compassion, equanimity, and joy. The four principles embody the Buddhist notions of extinction of suffering, being equality and loving kindness or compassion for all living beings, regardless of their being high and low or distant, and joy in helping others. On account of these Sublime States, Buddhism venerates the purification of body, speech and mind from defilements as the principle of moral conduct and way of life in peace, harmony and justice.

Great is the importance of these principles today.

Touching upon the situation in which there still exist forces busy developing weapons of mass destruction and vigorously practising a warlike policy, I emphasise that Buddhism strongly rejects the self-centred view of achieving satisfaction at the cost of the suffering or tribulations of others.

¹The questions were submitted by the WMR Commission on Peace and Democratic Movements.—Ed.

Growth in worldly wealth without growth in the values of wisdom and without purifying the mind makes it impossible to put the material value to purposeful use, and it may give rise to destructive forces imperilling the whole of humanity. We can prevent the danger of war only on condition that our minds are spacious and wealthy. Then we would be able to carry on our practical activity more purposefully, and more meaningfully employ the mind and wisdom for banning these lethal weapons. We are in solidarity with all the forces working in this spirit. In particular, we support General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov's efforts to bring the principles of new thinking and morality into play in international relations. And this fully accords with the aspirations of all progressive mankind, including the Buddhists.

■ ***What is the inseparable relation between peace and harmony in the teaching of the Lord Buddha?***

According to the Buddhist philosophy and moral code, peace and harmony are viewed as an integral being. Therefore, where there is no harmony, there is no tranquillity. Worship of the motive power in harmony has long been well known in the history of Oriental nations. The symbol of harmony between the four animals (elephant, monkey, rabbit and grouse²) is revered in Buddhism. The moral of the four is that the powerful come to help the weak, and the latter, in virtue of harmony, can achieve what is believed to be awesome and onerous.

The principles of morality to which I referred earlier communicate the idea of harmonious integrity, because we do not preach any single moral principle in isolation from the others, or as the sole and most important one. Buddhism esteems the following five principles: saving others from being killed, the virtue of alms-giving, the wholesome deed, telling the true words, and turning foes into friends. These principles of loving kindness, compassion, purity of mind, perfect morality and harmony serve as a unique and valuable ethical code of conduct for Buddhists, and we believe them to be of paramount importance in relations between nations. The five principles, Panchashila, which were proclaimed in 1955, originated in Buddhist morality.

In the new conditions today, the ideas emanating from the principles of peace and harmony have been developing in depth in the relations of friendship and cooperation among states and various forces. I believe that the Delhi Declaration, signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov, is a case in point par excellence. The principles set forth in that document, concerning a world without nuclear weapons, a world without violence, could be fully applicable both to relations between countries and between all political forces, and even other world communities. To help translate these principles into reality is a sacred duty of Buddhists.

■ ***Unfortunately, many people in the West, especially the young, have a distorted view of Buddhism and***

its philanthropic principles. They see merely the outward attributes and the chance for egotistic self-improvement. What do you think of such views?

Let me say frankly that I am happy to see the spreading interest in Buddhism even in countries where classic Buddhism has never existed, but I am afraid that it is not always correctly understood.

The supreme goal of Buddhism is the deliverance of human beings from suffering and the bestowal of peace and tranquillity upon them. For that reason, Buddhist monks strive above all to help others to enjoy the fruits of peace, and strictly adhere to the austere precepts of altruism. It is true that the disciples of Buddha live at times in seclusion in order to devote themselves to prayer and meditation, but they do not withdraw from the course of life for the sake of their own selves. So it cannot be said that Buddhism keeps aloof from the principle of loving kindness and compassion or justice, or that it is a passive doctrine, for that is inconsistent with the very essence and true principles of Buddhism.

Buddhism has survived for 2,500 years, and it is the oldest of the religions existing in the world. In the course of this long historical period, Buddhism has played a very important role in human and social life. If it stood aloof from worldly life, and if Buddhists cared merely for their own being, the Buddhist religion could not have survived for so long and would have failed to become a world religion. Today, as Buddhists, we feel that we bear an enormous responsibility for the life of society, especially in promoting the cause of universal peace.

■ ***A dialogue has been developing between Christians and Marxists both in Europe and in Latin America.³ What is your view of the prospects for similar contacts between Buddhists and Marxists in Asia? In broader terms, how could the development of cooperation between the various forces on the continent be promoted?***

The dialogue between the representatives of various religions and Marxists is a welcome development. I take it as an important practical achievement conducive to promoting the common good. As Buddhists, we work for the development of mutual understanding and dialogue between representatives of the various religions and those who have a different world outlook.

It is highly important to be a human being in this world, in which all formations in the universe become an entity of oneness under the law of Dependent Origination. Therefore, the threat of a nuclear holocaust looming large over our common home is not to be viewed as something selective: it is a universal concern of humanity as a whole calling for redoubled and combined efforts by one and all to come to grips with the problem of human survival. Under these circumstances, human morality dictates that it is essential for all of us to work together for amicable

dialogue, mutual understanding and cooperation, regardless of differing political, ideological and religious outlooks or social systems. I believe there is good scope for developing both dialogue and cooperation between Buddhists and Marxists on such vital problems as the prevention of wars and the defence of peace.

We can have exchanges on a wider range of matters. Buddhism is a treasurehouse of masterpieces from the culture and thinking developed over the centuries in many countries of the East. There could be dialogue and cooperation on the Buddhist cultural heritage. I believe there are many concepts and ideas in Buddhist dialectical thought, logic and psychology that are identical or very similar to those of Marxism. There is an obvious need for constructive dialogue, for more objective approaches and mutual trust.

Buddhists regard mutual trust as a supreme force and hope for continued and greater progress in this direction. I am sure that ill intentions and mutual suspicions, low bickering and confrontation are the greatest initial impediment in world politics. Let us then develop that excellent start made by the two great powers when they began to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, thereby increasing the potential of mutual trust.

NOT BY PRAYER ALONE

Gelegjamts LUVSANTSEREN
Secretary-General, ABCP

In this period of ordeal for the peoples of Indochina, Buddhist leaders in a number of countries have decided to join together in resisting wars and aggression in a sincere effort to lighten the load for their fellow-Buddhists. Our continental organisation was set up at a meeting of Buddhists from Vietnam, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, the USSR and Sri Lanka in Ulan Bator in 1970.

Since then, the ABCP has won recognition in various parts of the world as a mass Buddhist movement for peace. Among its members are individual religious leaders and groups, temples, monasteries, and communities in 12 countries of Asia with national ABCP centres.

Among the most important tasks for Asian Buddhists following on the decisions of our 7th General Conference (Vientiane, 1986), which constituted our action programme, are:

- active participation in the peoples' struggle to prevent a nuclear war, to check the arms race, and to achieve general and complete disarmament;
- intensification of joint action in easing tensions in Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the creation and expansion of zones of peace in various parts of the

region, and the elimination of existing foreign military bases;

- the extension and deepening of ties and cooperation with peace organisations and movements throughout the world for the sake of the human right to live in tranquillity, and for the noble cause of peace.

In spreading the Buddhists' peace-making efforts, involving Buddhists in this process and helping to unite the antiwar forces, we have used many of the well-known forms of activity, such as marches, prayers for peace, seminars and symposiums, solidarity weeks, lectures with slides, and the publication of pamphlets; we circulate an ABCP quarterly and an ABCP bulletin in more than 90 countries.

Just before the Asian Buddhists held their conference for disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons two years ago, we staged our international march along a route running from Pyongyang, to Ulan Bator, to Ulan Ude, and on to Tokyo and Hiroshima. Following rallies and prayer meetings, we collected 16,000 signatures in support of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Appeal. We support the policy of national reconciliation, the establishment of accord and harmony of the whole nation (as in Kampuchea), and the peaceful re-unification of Korea. By holding the meeting of Buddhists from the Himalayan states (India, 1987), we sought not only to help spread the ideas of Panchashila, but also to strengthen the religious, ethnic and cultural unity of Buddhists for the good of the entire region and for the cause of peace. The seminar in Sri Lanka will make another modest contribution to the peace-making mission of calling an international conference on peace and security in the Indian Ocean area.

The ABCP has established itself as an international non-governmental organisation in contact with the United Nations and its specialised agencies, which actively supports UN efforts for disarmament and the solution of other urgent problems, and contributes what it can to the affairs of the world community.

¹ Suffering is a basic tenet of Buddhism that includes human behaviour and unwanted action beginning from self-contradiction, tribulation and death of living beings, to all kinds of hardships and pains, including wars.

² These four living beings, which differ in size, temperament and habits, are depicted as standing on top of each other in front of a high tree, picking the fruits from the top and handing them down along the line; the four are symbolic of the cooperation of differing species for the common good.—Ed.

³ See, for example, Stepan Mamontov, "Christ Was the Name of the Political Prisoner", *WMR*, No. 10, 1988; Kazimierz Morawski, "A Moral and Public Duty", *WMR*, No. 9, 1987; Nikolai Kovalski, "Communists and Christians in the Nuclear Age", *WMR*, No. 10, 1987.



THE IDEOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES OF RENEWAL

Fabio MUSSI

Leadership Member and Secretary, Italian Communist Party (PCI)

■ *As it declared at its 18th Congress, the Italian Communist Party has launched a renewal. The documents adopted at the congress indicate that it was dominated by a spirit of change, a critical reappraisal of the past, attention to global problems and a comparison of the PCI stand with that of other political forces. What are the main objectives and the essence of this renewal drive?*

Renewal is particularly obvious with regard to the people and the groups at the helm of the PCI. I would say that at certain times changes of leadership are essential to any party. Our 18th Congress in March 1989 was a turning point which coincided with a change of generations. But the processes behind it run deeper. They are connected with national, European and world realities. Their assessment and comparison have led to a *qualitative change* of our views and attitudes. The congress was a forum from which we declared clearly and for all to hear that we were departing from our previous policy course.

I am referring to the fact that further orientation on a "historic compromise" is no longer acceptable. The long period of debate within the party on the possibility of forming a government with the Christian Democrats is over. We tried to use this opportunity throughout the past decade, when the PCI had large electoral support. This made it possible to actually consider our participation in a coalition government. However, this opportunity was lost for a number of reasons—stiff resistance on the part of the more conservative forces, as well as the assassination of Aldo Moro, the DC leader, who believed in the usefulness of a dialogue between the nation's two biggest parties.

We thought this dialogue would mark, in Enrico Berlinguer's words, the "beginning of a new stage in the antifascist democratic revolution". We were seeking to put an end to discrimination against the PCI and to secure recognition of our right to participate in a government created on a new basis. Today the situation has changed, and the question is no longer relevant. The DC has shifted

further to the right. The Communists have begun to realise the need for and the feasibility of creating a coalition government comprising forces which can offer an alternative to the DC—the left secular democratic organisations and movements, Catholic groups not linked to the Christian Democrats, etc. Moreover, we have begun to realise the need for a radical reform of the political system because Italy's democratic institutions are serving the interests of the DC, and they have gradually become an obstacle to society's further democratisation. This is why we have advanced the concept of a "political alternative", an idea approved by the congress. It includes proposals on a new government, a new majority, a new alliance of forces and a restructuring of the political system. The essence of the project is that the future of democracy lies in alternatives: without them, democratic gains may be eroded.

Viewed from the angle of domestic policy, all this is a wholly new development, not just a modification of our previous stand, hence one of the signs of a renewal of PCI strategy. But there are others too—specifically, the development of our international ties. We are putting our relations with the progressive forces of the East, West, North and South onto a new basis, and this prompts us to profoundly reassess the entire history of the emancipation of working people—the history of the French and the Russian revolutions, the 19th-century bourgeois revolutions and the 20th-century anticolonial revolutions. We are also taking a fresh look at the ideals of freedom, equality, democracy, emancipation and socialism.

The renewal of our party is gaining depth and covering the history of ideas. This is necessary because we have reached a critical juncture and are experiencing great difficulties. The party has lost millions of voters and hundreds of thousands of members. Its social influence has declined.

If our development is viewed as a series of leaps, then it is extremely difficult to assess the steady progress and continuity of ideas. Some spread and become viable, while others "fade away" and have to be replaced by new ones. But new things do not always fit into the framework of previously established traditions. There is the sway of continuity, as well as the absence of new ideas in parties with which we used to fight side by side. But even practised continuity does not prevent our heritage from being ignored. Take the history of our party's theoretical thought. It is only now that greater emphasis has been placed on the works of Antonio Gramsci, rather than Palmiro Togliatti, although many of Togliatti's ideas can be linked with the present situation—those concerning progressive democracy, the party of the masses, and so on. This leads me to stress that without a profound *ideological renewal*,

a reappraisal of our intellectual legacy, or independent research, it is impossible to give an impetus to *political renewal* or to overcome the crisis affecting the party's relations with the masses.

■ **How do you see the theoretical novelty of the party platform adopted by the congress?**

I have already referred to the concept of our political alternative. Let me dwell on another aspect of our renewal—the abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism which has become a fiction with us, at least in our previous interpretation. Now that we have a growing diversity of views and our party Rules proclaim the right to uphold a dissenting opinion not only during discussion but also after a decision has been taken, up to and including statements in the press, there is no point in preserving this principle. After all, democratic centralism allows freedom of expression before the decision is made: after that, even the more outspoken of its opponents are supposed to follow the charted course consistently. We have dropped this definition as unrealistic. Naturally, in conducting our work within the party, one should share its prime objectives and its principles of mobilisation, follow its basic strategic guidelines and be principled in one's political behavior.

At the same time, the new Rules prohibit organised currents within the party, and I hope this prohibition will remain in force for a long time, although this principle is not forever either. There have been cases of such currents—say, in the history of the Bolshevik party, and some of them were even led by Lenin. Similar things have occurred in other communist parties as well. Still, we believe that in Italy, where lobbyism and the division of parties into groups and factions are typical of politics, the party which is not affected by this malady has more appeal to the public.

I would also single out five more aspects that highlight the novelty of the party's policy programme as far as theory is concerned.

First, we have arrived at an organic and comprehensive definition of democracy as a universal value. To us, democracy is not simply a way toward socialism or a transition to a regime which can "overcome" even democratic forms. It is the very process of building socialism. The struggle for society's full democratisation in Italy is getting ready to make a quantum leap. Democracy should cover all centres of power which regulate relations between people because these institutions tend to grow by virtue of the complexity inherent in the relations that exist in modern society. Full democracy is an objective which has historically matured in terms of the social and cultural evolution and level of civilization. The concept of complete democracy is profoundly socialist. We began to put forward these ideas at least a decade ago. At the congress, they took definitive shape.

Second, an important theoretical step has been made in raising the issue of expanding the scope of civil rights

and freedoms as progress toward complete democracy. The definitions were worked out with due regard for the accomplishments of liberal democratic thought. Incidentally, Marxist theory has repeatedly turned to the ideas of liberal democracy: suffice it to recall Marx's attitude to Alexis de Toqueville or Gramsci's to Pierro Gobetti, a prominent Italian liberal democrat of the 1920s. Continued pursuit of this trend makes it possible to gain a better insight into both old and new civil rights and social freedoms in the course of the struggle for a fully democratic state.

Note that we have again raised the question of how Marx, and Marxist thought after him, considered the development of human abilities. Specifically, in criticising contemporary society, Marx examined the ways of liberating man's capacity for labour, education, scientific knowledge and spiritual life. He wanted to find out how these abilities can be promoted. These ideas were enriched by his 20th-century followers. For example, Gramsci spoke about the individual's "comprehensive development"—the ability of the individual to assert his or her talents and thus expand his or her rights and freedoms irrespective of one's labour specialisation, class affiliation or social status. Such conclusions served as a basis for whole schools which were related (albeit remotely) to Marxism, and liberal democratic thought sought to reassess all these Marxist ideas and to place them in an entirely different theoretical context. Attention to this thought proved useful when the congress developed the concept of a political alternative, institutional reforms and full democracy.

I would like to stress that democracy is not a structure, let alone a mechanism, but a process. It cannot be established once and for all. It is a requirement of a diverse mass of citizens. The struggle for the juridical recognition of their new interests is what democracy as a process is all about.

Third, on some questions our vision is close to Mikhail Gorbachov's new political thinking. In addition, it is also close to the new thought patterns adopted by the international community of those scholars who study problems of global importance—the interconnection between modes of development and the military and political situation (blocs, states and regions), between the development of the rich countries and the opportunities for the advancement of the poor ones, between restructuring in Eastern Europe and the struggle for greater democracy in the West, etc.

Fourth, we have almost completely revised our view of economic growth in the environmental context. Achille Occhetto began his speech at the congress by noting the community of humanity's interests and the need to protect the planet's ecosystem and achieving a balance between nature and society. We sought to overcome the narrow class-based approach to the world's development and the conflicts inherent in it. Democracy, competence and control are essential to the organisation of a new type of development.

Fifth, another major step has been taken in the renewal of our theory. We are now tackling the issue of the social significance of the difference between the sexes. The traditional view was that first we should fight for the emancipation of women and then for their liberation. There is a difference between emancipation and liberation: the former is mostly connected with the equality of women as workers, while the latter relates to their legal status. In Italy, important gains have been won in this sphere—the right to employment, family law, etc. Some wholly new legislative instruments have been enacted.

Proceeding from the basis of women's guaranteed equality under the law, the PCI has begun to reappraise the concept of a society of men and women as equal partners and the differences that exist in this society. A new and very interesting vision of society is taking shape—of a community where there are no abstract, sexless citizens. What we see is not a "neuter" individual or citizen. We see individuals of different sexes, with their own distinctive history, culture and perception. We believe that this is a major advance in theory and practice which, in turn, calls for bold new insights.

■ ***How do you link environmental protection, new human rights, new relations between the state and its citizens and between parties and citizens, as well as an open attitude to youth and future generations with the "shadow cabinet" idea the Communist Party has advanced? Will such a government undermine the monopoly of the DC?***

Let me begin with youth issues, which are quite acute as far as we are concerned. During the latest elections, the curve of young voters' confidence in the PCI reached bottom. At the same time, several thousand new members joined the Italian Federation of Communist Youth (FGCI), and this after it had been in crisis for a number of years. The FGCI is growing again, and its numerical strength has reached the 50,000 mark. The party's youth cells (comprising students, intellectuals and industrial and office workers) display a high level of militancy, a new culture and mature political thinking. But this is so far a minority part of our youth. Most young people keep aloof from politics (casting blank ballots, taking no part in elections, etc.), or opt for new political movements such as the Greens, or join those who support the ruling majority parties.

It follows that we have yet to overcome these difficulties in our work among young people. I hope the PCI's new course will enable us to cooperate fruitfully with the younger generation. We hold that today it is impossible not to pursue a policy *oriented on the future*, on those young people who have not yet voted in elections, and on those who will be born during the 1990s and later. The objective has never been as relevant as it is now: we are dealing with issues of humanity's survival, threats to the environment, the need to save the Amazon and the like. The need to face the future is becoming universal. Ob-

viously, the interests of future generations are an important factor of present-day politics.

Unlike the conservative quarters, the Left—the Socialists and the Communists—have always been much more concerned about the future. The struggle against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe is being waged not only for the sake of the present. I should note, however, that the vitally important issue of future generations was first examined in theoretical terms by Gregory Bateson, one of the founders of environmentalist thought, an expert in thermodynamics and a philosopher, author of an impressive study on the ecology of intellectual work written 20 years ago. This book even became a kind of scientific manual for various currents among the Greens. In other words, this openness to the needs of future generations was theoretically substantiated outside the framework of Marxism. Marxist researchers can only make vague guesses in this field: thorough studies have yet to be completed. These questions are treated particularly fully in a number of works on ecology, but it is important to take the next step: the problem of future generations is a major hinge in the activities of the Left.

Finally, the "shadow cabinet" question. This idea has been "imported" from Britain where such cabinets exist when the governments of the two leading parties—the Conservatives and the Labour Party—succeed each other. Together with other political quarters, the PCI seeks to test this institution in Italy and to assert the latent creative potential of the Communists. We want to be able to demonstrate to the public the opposition's *ability to manage society* and tackle its problems *for the sake of the people*. These plans specify the PCI concept of a political alternative. We want to translate our ideas into reality and test them in practical work.

■ ***Italy's Communists are now increasingly emphasizing joint action with influential parties in the Socialist International. They have virtually abandoned the concept of Eurocommunism developed during the 1970s. There are even references to the possibility of the PCI joining the Socialist International. How do you explain these changes?***

I believe that, as an experimental idea, Eurocommunism did yield important results at a certain stage. Several large communist parties in the capitalist West, particularly the Italian, French and Spanish parties, established mutual ties. But this experience soon exhausted its potential. In the final analysis, the experiment failed: politically and theoretically, the parties that had been united by the idea of Eurocommunism parted ways. Today, we differ considerably from the French Communist Party in terms of both policy and theory. Our relations are cordial, but our positions do not coincide. We maintain friendly ties with the Portuguese Communists, but our political and theoretical views are quite dissimilar.

More importantly, we are aware that the entire world of communist parties has changed. Today, the PCI believes

that the international communist movement has long since ceased to exist.¹ We do not think that it is possible to have any single organisational structure or even any minimal common ground that could underlie a community of all those forces which are known as communist. The global galaxy of these forces cannot be reduced to any single pact and I don't think anyone believes that it can, with the exception of several small communist parties.

We therefore maintain that it is not West European or global communist unity we should pursue as our objective. Instead, the main issue (as Gorbachov and Ochetto said during their meeting in Moscow) is to find common ground between all of the world's progressive, democratic and left forces on the biggest problems of our age.

In Europe—I am referring to Western Europe and particularly to the Europe of the EEC—the single European market comes into effect in 1992. The creation of a European political community is also envisaged as a long-term prospect. The real problem during the next few years or maybe even decades will therefore be whether economic integration and political unification is guided by moderate and right-wing conservatives or by progressive, democratic and left forces. We are trying to wage a campaign for a Europe of nations, not a Europe of capital, for a Europe cooperating with, not exploiting, the Third World. Everything will depend on who directs these processes—the right-wingers or the Left.

The PCI is strong enough to contribute to a unity which will enable the Left to seize the initiative. With this end in view, we are seeking contacts with the biggest left parties in Western Europe. We are also interested in bilateral ties with smaller parties and we believe that each of them can contribute their fair share. But of decisive significance is the role of the main left forces: will they be able to find a *common perspective* and attain mutual understanding in order to claim the right of directing the supranational process of integration? We are looking for new ties so as to create this left, alternative and democratic bloc. The PCI is not raising the question of joining the Socialist International: the matter was not discussed at meetings either with the SPD leaders or with French Socialists. But Italy's Communists have a stake in a comprehensive improvement of relations with socialist, social democratic and labour parties. We admit, of course, that the PCI programme and cultural platform are quite close to the position of the West German Social Democrats. We make no secret of it, and we hold that this closeness is an asset—both ours and, to a certain extent, theirs.

■ ***Democratisation is also under way in several socialist countries. It is obviously a common trend which is in turn reflected in the PCI-supported drive to build a "common European home". Which aspects of Berlinguer's idea of a "world government" remain topical and which should be amended and developed?***

We are immensely gratified that democracy is making

progress in Eastern Europe. The PCI regards itself as part of the forces that grew aware of the urgent need for democracy under socialism somewhat earlier than 1956. But it was after the events in Hungary that we became particularly clear on this problem and expressed our conviction that far-reaching democratic reform was possible. In a way, the political and historical prospects of the PCI were also connected with the way this problem was being tackled. And now several countries where communist parties are in power have launched a radical social restructuring (a process we, too, sought to bring closer) which is unthinkable without a democratic renewal.

What is happening in the USSR, Poland and Hungary and what may happen in China and other countries of "existing socialism" shows that we were not mistaken. There were, of course, years when practically no hope was left for any change. It was the period Gorbachov described as the "great stagnation" and I, as "Brezhnev's neo-Stalinism". It was very difficult for us too: there seemed to be not a glimmer of hope because internal stagnation in the Soviet Union was matched by a great-power foreign policy pursued from positions of strength. Generally, it appeared that negative aspects had become dominant. But then a "reversal" set in and the orientations were changed radically. Prospects for democratisation have opened in these countries. Their economic, cultural, civil and historical resources will enable them to follow a democratic path of development. Such is my understanding of the essence of the present juncture, which is important to the future of democracy throughout the world.

To us, Gorbachov's efforts symbolise the new phenomena that have emerged over the past few years. We not only welcome his initiatives: we will do all we can to promote them. This is also important because we see the development of the New Left—that is, the forces that have succeeded in reappraising themselves and their own national and international circumstances—as the real *hope of humanity's future*. The PCI is in solidarity with them: we feel we are participants in the same process.

The idea of a "world government" is one of the more unconventional and intuitive political notions of the past decade. When Berlinguer spoke about such a government (I think it was at the 15th Congress of the PCI in 1978), the responses varied from the ironic, through the sceptical to the sarcastic. The idea of a "world government" was interpreted in the party, as in the Italian political community generally, as an extravagant invention. True, with the arms race accelerating, regional conflicts mounting and the East and West aiming new missiles at each other, our leader's proposal looked like a utopian improvisation. Still, I think it was a mental leap of the kind that visits greatness on leaders. Berlinguer made a lasting impact by his work, advancing several brilliant ideas which have since become central to the Italian Communist Party's new course.

Mikhail Gorbachov spoke in New York about the new role of the UN as a universal organisation capable of accumulating humanity's collective reason and will, and

George Bush has hinted at this in his speeches too. At any rate, the idea of a "world government" is present in statements by non-aligned and Third World countries and in UN documents on environmental and development issues. This idea has therefore emerged, if not as an immediate prospect, then as a distinct possibility the forces aware of their responsibility for the world's future are looking to. I think Berlinguer was the first—at least among political figures—to grasp the significance of this prospect.

■ **What demands do you think a left party undergoing a renewal should make on itself?**

To begin with, it must feel the *necessity* of renewal. Otherwise, a party will find itself in crisis. This awareness is not the product of disaster—sometimes it is a result of growth, and sometimes it emerges when growth stops. To a certain extent, such a situation in a party can be explained by the crisis of society and its political system. There are functional crises that affect a party's internal affairs, its democracy and its mechanisms. There are also crises of representation, when a party is no longer capable of representing a particular part of society or particular ideas or individuals. Awareness of this fact, an assessment of its causes and a desire to overcome the crisis are the first steps towards renewal.

The same desire can be discerned if you look at the situation from another angle—from the standpoint of non-Communists, of society. People want to be represented better in social institutions, and as broadly as possible. They want more choice, more alternatives. Parties are judged by their ability to say: "This should be done in this way"; or "This is what we suggest". Frequently, however, parties, including ours, give the impression that they are irresolute and cannot make clear, timely and effective decisions. It is therefore necessary to detect the needs of

society and its citizens and to meet new political requirements.

There was a time when parties were guided mostly by ideological considerations: one preached Christianity, another advocated communism, and a third was committed to liberalism. Political choice was largely determined by one's affiliation to a particular camp of major and compact ideologies. I am not sure that, as some theoreticians of modernism claim, all ideologies are dead. They live on, but I think they are now more fragmentary, more interconnected and less compact than they used to be; at the same time they are multitiered and pluralistic. The mentality of citizens, which often comprises elements of different ideologies and historical and cultural values variously regarded as their own by Communists, Catholics, democrats, liberals, etc., shapes the demand and the need for policy. Hence the necessity of renewing the party so that it should *represent more fully the interests of society*, which keeps raising new questions and wants them answered effectively.

If we want society to recognise us, to join our appeals, to vote for us and to fight together with us, we should respond to its demands promptly. There is a dialectical interconnection between the party and society. This interconnection is very intensive and much more complex than before. In other words, we cannot burden our predecessors with the responsibility for finding solutions to today's problems and requirements: this is wholly the province of a party that is renewing itself.

¹ For more background on this point see "Communists in Western Europe: Retreat or Buildup of Forces?" Two Views on the Problem. Grigoris Pharakos (Greece), "There Is Every Ground for Optimism"; Gianni Cervetti (Italy), "Perspectives in Renovation", *WMR*, No. 10, 1988; Rene Urbany (Luxemburg), "An Optimistic View of the Prospects", *WMR*, No. 7, 1988—Ed.

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OUR INTERVIEWS

INTIFADA CONTINUES

At *WMR's* request, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) answered a number of questions about the Communists' role in the popular uprising (*intifada*) in the Israeli-occupied territories.

■ **The Intifada has been going on for over 18 months now. Could this be said to have been organised by**

the Communists together with other forces, and if so, in what way?

There has been a lot of talk about the spontaneous character of the Palestinian uprising. Some leaders, including those in Israel proper, are still at it, trying by such statements to show that the Palestinians have no leadership and to present their revolt as a fortuitous event, an "incident".¹ At the same time the idea is to keep a lid on the resentment felt among Palestinians towards the occupation by claiming that the 20 years the Israeli aggressors have spent on our land have been years of "tranquillity and prosperity".

In actual fact, no one "timed" the popular uprising for December 9, 1987. It would be wrong, however, to separate it from events which preceded it: the popular masses had already risen against the occupiers more than

once, some of the actions lasting for several weeks. In 1987, too, there were a number of stormy protest demonstrations. The uprising can thus be seen as the logical culmination of earlier developments and as a qualitatively new phase in our people's struggle for national independence.

The PCP had been consistently working to mobilise the people and create various mass organisations. Many with a broad social base operate under the leadership of our party. We were criticised by those who had tried artificially to oppose different forms of struggle. In one of the publications that appeared right after the declaration of the intifada, for example, it was said: "The Communists want to provoke a mass uprising, but even if absolutely everyone were to take part, they would still not be able to shoot down a single Israeli plane."

The situation has changed radically, and the intifada now enjoys the widest possible support. It should be noted that our party was from the start politically, organisationally and morally prepared for the uprising. Without a moment's hesitation, it was thus able to take its place in the vanguard of the masses. Early in the uprising, the PCP proposed and led an initiative to set up people's committees, which have become the backbone of the intifada. It is obvious from the Israeli authorities' campaign against them and the arrest of thousands of their members that these committees have been playing a leading role in organising and guiding popular resistance to the occupiers.

■ ***What new features has the uprising introduced into inner-party life? How is party growth proceeding, educational work with the new membership being conducted and the activity of primary organisations being coordinated?***

The uprising has been a serious political and moral test for all participating forces. And I think I can say we've acquitted ourselves well. Its course and the behaviour of our comrades, their high morale, their ability to promptly respond to the requirements of the masses, their initiative, and their heroism show that the daily, painstaking ideological and political work and the numerous actions of the party in the interest of the popular masses have borne fruit.

Members of our party have seen in practice that everything they had been taught was true. The intifada has emphasised the soundness of its policy in resolving the national problem, the need for persistent work among the masses, the realism of its tactics and their correspondence to the specific conditions of our country.

However, this is only the beginning. We are seeking to raise the initiative of party members so that primary organisations acquire a real leading role among the masses. They have expanded their sphere of activity, launching their own publications, drawing up programmes of educational work based on concrete local requirements. The need for this is particularly acute now, thousands of young people having joined the PCP during the uprising.

The party has rapidly been increasing its membership.

Most of its new recruits are 18 to 22 year-olds participating in the uprising. Such a large influx in so short a time naturally makes it necessary to educate these comrades, helping them to master the PCP Programme and Rules and study the basics of Marxism-Leninism.

This was initially not easy because of a lack of skilled cadres. But the intifada has brought out genuine leaders at all levels from among the communist rank and file. It is now easier for us to fill the vacuum caused by the campaign of mass arrests. Possibilities have appeared for greater decentralisation in work. Grassroots party bodies have learned to conduct propaganda and agitation within particular situations.

Locally-published information materials are based on a common programme of party studies. Taking the new PCP members' inadequate training into account, the materials for them are prepared in a simple, concise form. We believe that such an approach guarantees an understanding of their content and ensures the active participation of all in their discussion. Moreover, the briefer the material, the safer things are for members, since meetings take less time.

All party organisations have their own work plans normally drawn up for each quarter, fulfilment of which is reviewed and assessed on a monthly basis. Worthwhile experience is then generalised and disseminated to other organisations. The centre, together with local committees, coordinates the work on plan fulfilment. During the revolt, district party committees' role and powers have increased significantly.

■ ***What new forms and areas have appeared in the PCP's political work with the masses? How does the party counter attempts to sow discord between the working class and the bourgeois strata, and between the Communists and religious organisations?***

On the basis of the above-mentioned people's committees, branch commissions responsible for various aspects of the citizens' daily life have emerged. They render assistance to the population under curfew, and help in introducing new methods of farming and in organising craft and home-based production, thus removing the necessity of having to buy certain Israeli goods. Numerous agricultural committees, commissions for the promotion of a craft industry and so on have sprung up in most villages and communities.

The Communists play a leading role in all this activity. As a result, the PCP's ties and influence, and the membership of mass organisations, are on the rise. The Palestinian Communists have acquitted themselves well. Of every three fighters who have died in Israeli prisons, two are Communists. Scores of party members and their friends have been tortured to death or killed, hundreds injured, and hundreds more arrested. Our comrades' self-sacrifice arouses the respect of the people, who acknowledge and appreciate their courage. This is reflected not only in swell-

ing party ranks, as I have already mentioned, but also in a significant expansion of the circle of PCP friends and sympathisers.

Occupation authorities have repeatedly tried to set the Communists and religious organisations against each other by issuing fake leaflets, circulating false rumours and gearing the whole of Israel's propaganda machine to this task. But so far not a single one of these attempts has succeeded.

The aggressors are seeking to drive a wedge between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. For example, they have artificially lowered the dinar's rate of exchange against the Israeli shekel, thus halving workers' real wages. Through such measures, the Israeli authorities would like to turn the fight against occupation into an economic struggle between workers and employers, thus weakening Palestinian national unity. From the beginning our party has opposed such a policy. Based on its influence in workers' trade unions, the PCP acts as an arbiter, helping to find mutually acceptable settlements in labour conflicts.

■ **What alterations has the Intifada brought about in Communist strategy and tactics, particularly with regard to a link between peaceful and armed forms of struggle?**

I repeat that even before the uprising the party was ready for it politically, morally and organisationally. As a result there has been no need to introduce any special correctives to its strategy or tactics. Admittedly, total civilian disobedience seemed at first to us perfectly realistic. As the uprising got under way, however, it became clear that there were insurmountable difficulties here, main-

ly connected with a poorly developed economic structure in the occupied territories and the impossibility of providing the population with even a modest supply of locally-produced basic goods. For example, to satisfy a considerable part of the people's requirements in bread and other products, supplies have to be brought in from Israel. The campaign of total civilian disobedience has therefore been replaced by a selective boycott of Israeli goods depending on the given situation.

■ **What new features are there in the activity of the party abroad, and also in the PCP's relations with the Communist Party of Israel?**

The intifada has undoubtedly invigorated the external activity of our party. Since joining the PLO in 1987 the Communists' responsibility for explaining to world opinion the just aims of the Palestinians' struggle and winning international support for the uprising has increased. We are now required to help in effecting political changes within the organisation and to work actively to strengthen the positions of the PLO and implement its programme.

Our relations with fraternal communist parties in the region, including the Communist Party of Israel, are characterised by a spirit of solidarity and cooperation. Israeli Communists fulfil their international duty by actively working in all manner of ways to support our struggle, and we are grateful to them for this.

¹ For details see Naim Ashhab, "Uprising in the Occupied Territories", *WMR*, No. 2, 1988.—Ed.

INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

MEETINGS OF SECRETARIES

The Central Committee secretaries for economic questions from the communist and workers' parties of the CMEA member countries have gathered in Berlin to consider the ways of enhancing their parties' influence on the introduction of the latest advances of science and technology into the economy and the social fabric. The participants stressed the importance of cooperation among the sister parties for improving socialist economic integration and creating a firm basis on which to develop the socialist countries' economic ties. The secretaries discussed the prospects for the establishment of a united market within the CMEA framework, reiterated their parties' firm resolve to upgrade economic relations with Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia, and advocated broader economic, scientific and technological cooperation with all countries

irrespective of their sociopolitical systems on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Central Committee secretaries for organisational party work from the communist and workers' parties of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, the DPRK, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Vietnam met in conference in Havana. They considered questions connected with the quantitative and qualitative growth of the fraternal parties and with efforts to improve the style and methods of their work in the distinctive conditions of their countries. The secretaries noted the inseparable link between the composition of the parties and their vanguard role. Prestige with the masses and the practice of Communists setting a personal example of competent work are essential, they said, to each party's dialogue with the people and to the performance of its functions with the help of political methods. The participants stressed the need for fur-

ther democratising party affairs, strengthening discipline, enhancing the parties' ties with the masses and upgrading the role of grassroots organizations.

THE RIGHT CHOICE

During his visit to the FRG, CC CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov met with Herbert Mies, Chairman of the German Communist Party (DKP), his deputy Ellen Weber and with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The CPSU and SPD leaders reiterated that their parties were making the right choice in advocating the development of their relations on the basis of constructive and creative cooperation to benefit both countries and promote social progress. The admiration and support the people of the Federal Republic expressed for Gorbachov and his policy, Herbert Mies said, are a manifestation of genuine people-to-people diplomacy. Our meeting, he stressed, is

another step forward in the development of our two parties' friendly ties.

FOR CLOSER COOPERATION

PCF General Secretary Georges Marchais and General Secretary Georgi Hawi of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party met in Paris to discuss various aspects of the tragic situation in Lebanon brought about by the extreme right forces. Georgi Hawi spoke in favour of resolute steps to implement the democratic nondenominational project for far-reaching constitutional reform as the only way towards a political settlement of the problems facing Lebanon. Georges Marchais expressed the French Communists' solidarity with the PCL and with the Lebanese people as they suffer under artillery bombardment. The leaders of the two sister parties pledged to strengthen their friendship and cooperation.

IN BRIEF

COMMUNISTS AND ELECTIONS

CHILE The Communist Party of Chile holds that the struggle for popular power is linked objectively with the general elections slated for December 1989. Although the elections will be undemocratic (conducted under the fascist institutional system), the PCCh has called on Communists to take an active part in the electoral process. Chile's Communists are convinced that mass action can transform the elections into a confrontation between the dictatorship and democracy, that it will help prevent rigging, and that in this way Pinochet and Pinochetism will be defeated and the way will be paved for democratic change.

DENMARK A plenary meeting of the CC of the Communist Party of Denmark has approved the results of the talks with the Left Socialists and the Socialist Workers' Party on establishing an alliance during the next elections to the Folketing (parliament). The Central Com-

mittee called on DKP members to help circulate a petition so as to register the coalition as a participant in the elections.

GREECE In recent parliamentary elections the New Democracy opposition party won 44.4% of the vote, securing 144 out of the 300 parliamentary seats. The ruling Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), with 39.1%, is left with 125 seats. The Left Coalition whose ticket was led by Harilaos Florakis, CC General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece, received 13% and 29 seats against the KKE's 9.9% and 12 seats in 1985.

LUXEMBOURG In the new 64-member parliament, the ruling coalition parties—the People's Christian Social Party and the Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party—retain a majority, having won 40 seats (and lost 6). The Communists, who have secured almost as many votes as in the previous election, nevertheless lost one of their two seats. Four seats

went to a group advocating old-age pensions at five-sixths of the highest wage ever received by the pensioner during his or her career.

POLAND In the new bicameral parliament of Poland, the coalition government—the PUWP, other allied parties and the secular Catholic organisations that support them—will have 299 seats out of 460 in the Sejm. The opposition (the Solidarity civic committee) has 161 seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 in the Senate.

WESTERN EUROPE In direct elections in the 12 EEC countries for 518 European seats, Socialists and Social Democrats secured 182 seats, an increase of 16 within five years. The communist faction now has 42 seats instead of 48. The Greens now control 38 seats (18 more than before). The Christian Democrats have 107 seats, the Liberals 45, the Conservatives 50, the far right 16 and other parties 38.





COMMUNISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: A TIME TO GATHER STONES TOGETHER

Three memorable dates in the history of the international working-class movement occur in 1989—the 125th anniversary of the First International, the centenary of the Second International and the 70th anniversary of the Third International. This history has been marked by ups and downs, by efforts to find common ground and by periods of acute confrontation, primarily in relations between Communists and Social Democrats as representatives of the two major currents of the working-class movement.

Today, mutual recriminations and biased assessments are yielding increasingly to a civilised dialogue in which views are openly expressed and each side listens to what the other has to say. This attitude is much more fruitful than the "argument between the deaf and the dumb" which lasted for so long. Within the mainstream of this trend, an international seminar on "The World of Labour and the Future of Humanity" was held in Moscow on May 23-25 to mark the centenary of the First International and of May Day. Sponsored by the Institute of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, it was attended by scholars and political activists representing communist, socialist and social democratic parties and trade unions from more than 20 countries.

At the request of WMR two participants in the seminar shared their views on the current state of cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats and prospects for it.

Jean ZIEGLER is a professor at Geneva University and the Sorbonne, the author of many political science books, an activist in the Swiss and international social democratic movement and a member of parliament.

Alexander WEBER, a Doctor of History, is a specialist in socioeconomic history and an official of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Alexander WEBER. I hope our conversation will be a modest contribution to the ongoing dialogue between Communists and Social Democrats—a dialogue which, as our workshop has shown, is quite active.

My one preliminary remark is that in expressing my views, I am, of course, guided by the position of my party. There is no "centre" in the communist movement, nor any desire to recreate one. All the parties are sovereign in the choice of policies and in their relations with other forces, including the Social Democrats. It is common knowledge that there are nuances and differences of opinion between communist parties on this subject. I believe the situation

is similar in the social democratic movement and in the Socialist International.

Jean ZIEGLER. I share your hope, but I would say that my approach to the dialogue is somewhat different. Although I serve on the governing bodies of the Swiss Social Democratic Party and of the Socialist International, and although my colleagues and I discussed the issue of contacts before I left for Moscow, in this case I am not expressing the official position of either organisation but speaking only as a dedicated Socialist.

On the other hand, let me stress that a mere two years

ago I would never have believed that I would sit at the perfectly round table at the Oktyabrskaya Hotel in Moscow and discuss today's major problems at such a broad, representative and competent forum. In our workshop, we addressed one another as "Comrades", and expressed our views in a straightforward but friendly way. One could feel a sincere desire to work for greater unity of the international working-class movement despite the differences that remained.

LESSONS OF HISTORY

J. Z. Established in 1889, the Second International remained the real centre of the world revolutionary working-class movement for a quarter of a century. That was when Socialists from different countries together struggled and discussed things in a creative spirit. Remember, for example, Lenin's vigorous involvement in work on issues such as the colonial question, the attitude to the bourgeois parliament and the like. Incidentally, until he left Switzerland he took part in the work of the Social Democratic Party in the canton of Zurich and enjoyed great prestige there.

Without going into historical detail, let me just say that if the different branches of the working-class movement were united now, as they were then, in a single organisation, and were to develop and pursue a common strategy on urgent global issues, the movement could really become a decisive factor of universal progress. Let us not rule out this possibility. Willy Brandt, whose 75th birthday we celebrated late last year, once said that before he died he would like to be able to see the rift which opened in 1919 healed, and to witness the reunification of Communists and Social Democrats in a single International.

You said, Comrade Weber, that there is no longer a single centre in the communist movement. I think the reason lies in the pernicious practice of the past. This has become a source of prejudice, and has led to an obsession with demonstrating to all and sundry that no one's independence is being curtailed. The Social Democrats have not had such a negative experience. After its 13th Congress in Geneva (1976), the Socialist International entered a stage of genuine renaissance. It affiliates scores of parties in countries on different continents, and many millions vote social democratic. SI congresses and Bureau meetings are convened on a regular basis, and there is an SI Secretariat. Common strategic positions are developed on issues such as disarmament, North-South relations, unemployment, etc. So we do have a centre, and it is operational.

A. W. I cannot accept the sweeping assessment of the policy pursued by the communist movement in the past as pernicious. The movement's weaknesses and mistakes are well-known. There is hardly any other political movement which has condemned its own blunders

as severely. Yet there are also many heroic pages in its dramatic history.

But, to return to our subject, let us begin by clearly outlining several positions of principle.

We are talking about two independent political currents in the international working-class movement. We have to proceed from the premise that we are different. We have ideological differences, and we hold dissimilar views on certain political issues. I don't think this, in itself, is a bad thing, as was once believed. To me, the diversity present in the international working-class movement as a whole, and in each of its currents makes mutual enrichment possible and essential. Just as in the years of the first two Internationals, and even earlier, each current reflects particular (and different) aspects of social reality and of people's interests and experience. The question is whether we have anything in common.

I think we do. We share a common heritage with regard to our teachers. We are both dedicated to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the solution of other global problems on which human survival depends. History has guided the two currents of the working-class movement along different paths. But times have changed. We have changed, you have changed, and so have the circumstances. In the words of Ecclesiastes, there is "a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together".

J. S. But how can we gather them if we regard the split in the working-class movement as something positive? I see it as a real tragedy. Look at the fratricidal war that accompanied the revolutionary events in Germany, when Social Democrats committed crimes against the Left and even had Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg assassinated. Instead of fighting the threat of fascism together, Communists and Social Democrats were at each others' throats all over Europe. Or take the infighting among the Left during the Civil War in Spain, when Soviet secret police agents, acting on Stalin's orders, eliminated the socialist leaders of the revolutionary movement. These are just a few manifestations of the tragedy.

But that's really enough of mutual recriminations. I recalled this tragedy merely to explain my rejection of the idea that pluralism in the working-class movement is positive. Nevertheless, you are right in saying that its two currents are now objectively united in a common struggle against the nuclear threat and environmental degradation, and in the fight for the interests of the working classes. Unfortunately, something else is also clear: fundamental differences remain, and they stand in the way of cooperation.

A. W. The split was indeed a tragedy. But it was brought about by the course of historical events, it was not an act of malice. And, incidentally, it materialised before 1919.

Recently, my party has been revising quite drastically many of its past assessments, including those relating to social democracy. The conflict in the working-class move-

ment, generated by the different attitudes to war and revolution, undoubtedly far transcended the framework of its causes. It turned into fierce confrontation almost utterly divorced from its historical sources. The efforts of Stalin and his clique to foment hostility towards social democracy played a fateful role. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is now trying to cleanse the past of these accretions. We have long denounced the essentially false definition of social democracy as "social fascism", its representatives as "agents of the bourgeoisie", and so on.

There's no point in arguing who was right and who was wrong. At the beginning, even in the middle of the century, the circumstances were different, and so were people. You seem to believe that first we have to sort out the past, arrive at common conclusions, and only then can normal cooperation be established. I don't agree. History is indeed an "endless debate". In some respects our assessment of the past is likely to remain different. The important thing is to get rid of all the sediment, everything artificial, to throw out everything that impedes cooperation.

I find it paradoxical that you deny the value of pluralism. But perhaps this is a misunderstanding, perhaps we are talking about different things. As far as I know, Social Democrats are essentially in favour of pluralism, not against it. I am talking about diversity and different views, not about taking potshots at each other. I do not think an emotionally charged assessment of historical facts is conducive to an objective scientific analysis or a productive dialogue.

J. Z. I am glad that the CPSU is revising its previous attitude to social democracy and giving up its old definitions. As a Social Democrat, I have to admit that we should apologise to the Communists for the language we used when referring to them prior to the 13th SI Congress. Our assessments were sometimes insulting and downright foolish.

At the same time, I would like the history of the working-class movement to be studied in greater depth, to be defused ideologically. I want the truth to be told about what used to overshadow our relations. For example, I am concerned that to this day no reappraisal has been made of the 1921 events in Georgia, when the Red Army crushed the only social democratic experiment to have been tried in the course of the Russian revolutionary process. I am also worried about the fact that when I ask a Soviet fellow professor what his students know about Karl Kautsky, I am still told only one thing—that he was a "renegade".

The impression is that the reappraisal of the past is under way in the top party echelon and within the academic elite, but that, generally, Soviet public opinion, particularly at local level, sticks to the old views. The same is unfortunately true of many communist parties in the West. The Swiss Party of Labour, which we share the election ticket with in Geneva, is an exception. But if you listen to what Communists in many other countries say about Social Democrats, you will understand that there is a host of problems to be solved.

A. W. The impression that only the top party leadership and the academic elite are reappraising the past is mistaken. Our attitude to the past has emerged as the subject of an emotionally charged public debate in the Soviet Union. I believe the West is aware of this too. We are in favour of studying the history of the working-class movement in greater depth and removing all that is alien to it. We want history as a science to tell the truth. Soviet historians are now working hard in this direction, turning to the archives for sources and preparing new studies which, I am sure, will shed more light on many past events.

Nor can I agree that Soviet public opinion knows little about the CPSU's new attitude to social democracy. People do know. The position in question is publicised through the system of political education, by social scientists and by the mass media. True, not everyone has adopted this new attitude. The inertia of old thinking still exists. It will certainly take time to overcome its influence on mass consciousness. But our new assessments and views are not based on short-term opportunist considerations and are certainly not for internal consumption only.

We are discussing these and other questions with our sister parties in the course of bilateral contacts. We know that, for various reasons, a prejudiced view of social democracy persists in some communist parties. But in every country, the situation in the working-class movement has its distinctive features, and quite peculiar combinations involving elements of rivalry and cooperation often arise. In any case, we cannot impose our views on anyone else, nor do we intend to.

THERE IS NO PROGRESS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY

J. Z. As to opportunities for cooperation, we must obviously get together, not only because of the nuclear or environmental threat, but also out of regard for the socioeconomic interests of the working people in both Western and socialist countries. As a Social Democrat, I cannot reconcile myself to the fact that, despite the rise in production and consumption, great masses of people in our society—in fact one-third of the able-bodied population—are unemployed and take no part in the "game".

I believe that socioeconomic distortions are typical of East and West. We have a flawed system for distributing national wealth. You are concerned with creating this wealth, that is, with production growth. The figures available for Soviet economic development rates in recent years put it on almost the same level as Third World countries. So I would say our ills are polar opposites.

A. W. Of course, the concrete social and other phenomena do look different, but I think we also have common problems, particularly with regard to the character and consequences of the revolution in science and

technology, the problems it creates and the search for solutions.

Stagnation in the USSR resulted from distortions in the development of socialism and its isolation from democracy. Under Stalin, a system of administration by fiat and an overbureaucratized and overcentralized system of management emerged. We all know the awful effects this produced. But a similar phenomenon arose in the West (although, of course, in different forms), in countries where Social Democrats had long been in power as well. There was a trend towards more government and more bureaucracy. This gave rise to anti-etatist sentiments which the neoconservatives exploited.

As far as I understand, this problem has prompted Socialists and Social Democrats to reassess the role and place of the state in economic processes and to devise ways of resisting overbureaucratization.

J. Z. I disagree completely. Sweden, the country where Social Democrats have been in power longest, is one of Europe's leaders in terms of economic growth. Thanks to a dynamic policy relying on the public sector, its economic performance has been quite impressive. You seem to be taking a Thatcherite view of things, essentially justifying neoconservative attacks on the public sector in Britain.

We believe that neoconservatism should be repulsed, that the social democratic model of development does not lead to bureaucratization or stagnation and that, according to this model, society functions freely and democratically thanks to political pluralism and a parliamentary system which ensures completely free elections. In the USSR, everything is different; hence stagnation. Spain, for example, is developing faster under a socialist government than ever before.

A. W. With a high unemployment rate.

J. Z. Precisely. That is what I am driving at. The Social Democrats' dynamic model of economic growth is accompanied by profound distortions in distribution. In your case, the reverse is true: the economy is in decline, the growth rate is infinitesimal, but there is virtually no unemployment in the USSR. I repeat that the problems and difficulties facing East and West are completely different.

A. W. Let me comment briefly on "Thatcherism". I have no intention of backing neoconservative arguments, which are based on "social Darwinism". Moreover, I myself have criticized neoconservatism, in a book I published in 1986 and in several articles. But as far as the economic role of the state is concerned, I hear that there are differences on this score among Socialists and Social Democrats too.

But I would prefer to forgo a detailed debate on this question because it would lead us away from the main subject of our discussion. True, the problems we in socialist and you in capitalist society encounter are, in

many aspects, different, but I still insist that there are some similarities, rooted in certain common factors and in the trends of a complex modern society developing against the background of a revolution in science and technology.

J. Z. Nevertheless, let me return to one aspect of our subject. I am almost dogmatically opposed to the one-party system. History tells us that wherever a single party holds sway—from Franco's Falange to the more respectable Marxist-Leninist regimes—creative effort is restricted, public control over production and distribution is limited, and there is stagnation in the economy and in other fields. Do you believe that genuine democracy and, consequently, economic progress are possible in the Soviet Union as long as it preserves its one-party regime? Would it not be better, in order to provide the conditions essential to social advancement, to switch to a multiparty system?

A. W. I suspect that you are not familiar enough with the processes that have been rapidly developing in the Soviet Union in recent years. You are repeating clichés which may have been valid three to four years ago but which no longer reflect reality. If you knew more about life in the Soviet Union today, and about the debate which is now on, I do not think you would talk about the party's "dictatorship" or the absence of democracy in the USSR. Our policy of comprehensive democratization is guided by the firm conviction that this is the only way of overcoming stagnation and imparting dynamism to economic and social development. I agree with you on this point, and on the idea that the issue of democracy is topical for all societies no matter what their system. But I cannot agree that the whole problem boils down to a question of one-party rule.

We are now asserting in practical terms what we call a socialist pluralism of interests and opinion, expressed in the diversity of views existing within our party. The CPSU, the initiator and motive force of perestroika, is itself changing, reassessing its place and role in society, transforming its internal organization, etc. We are reforming the nation's political system. Pluralism has already given rise to hundreds, maybe even thousands of various unofficial organizations and associations.

Besides, the USSR, like Switzerland, is a multinational state. It comprises more than 100 different nations and nationalities. What would the introduction of a multiparty system mean under these circumstances? How would this affect our society now, when the social problems which have been accumulating for decades have begun to surface, when interethnic relations have become aggravated, when we need to consolidate all progressive and intellectually active forces in order to advance perestroika and overcome resistance? Would a multiparty system help? Hardly. If we tried to add this problem to our already heavy load, we'd just fall right back.

Let me cite another argument. Did the multiparty system in the Weimar Republic guarantee democracy? Alas,

this system did not stop the growth of Nazism or the establishment of a dictatorship. The lessons of fascism were tragic for the entire working-class movement, for all forces of democracy—and so were the lessons of Stalinism.

Democratisation has undoubtedly made considerable headway in the Soviet Union. But we do not claim to have reached all our objectives. On the contrary, we have only just begun. Naturally, democratisation is not yet full democracy, but a process leading to it.

J. Z. I regret that your reply has failed to convince me. I am aware of the great difficulties involved in the transition to a multiparty system in the Soviet Union, a vast country with its own centre and its own periphery. In principle, however, the Socialist International regards the multiparty system as a basic criterion of a society's democratic nature. My conviction is that if there is to be genuine democracy, those currently in power must acknowledge the possibility of defeat, that is, of rotation on a peaceful and democratic basis. That alone implies the existence of several parties.

When you talk about the mushrooming of informal associations and movements, you fail to mention that they are wholly unable to compete with the ruling party and have no chance of coming to power. It is unthinkable for any of them to win a majority of seats in the top echelons of power, or to secure the election of a representative as head of state—in other words, to challenge the monopoly of the communist party.

Or take another question. Side by side with the state, a civil society must exist, and the two must be dialectically interconnected, not ruled by the same leaders. In my opinion, the party controls everything in the Soviet Union—the state, civil society, the means of production and the mass media. Equally, I doubt one can entertain any illusions about the state's possible autonomy with regard to the party: even if you switch to an operational parliamentary system, it will still be controlled by the Communists, by the apparatus of the single ruling party.

Perestroika in the USSR is a fascinating process, similar to a volcanic eruption on a motionless and silent glacier, a landscape that has not changed for decades. Bold initiatives, heated debate and the outburst of civil activity produce an inspiring effect. But the alarming thing is that the perestroika movement is directed by a small group of leaders playing some sort of messianic role. The movement may lose momentum if tangible social and economic results are not achieved soon. Yours is a country possessing great riches, and your people are educated and hardworking. And yet you still import grain, your currency is not convertible, and your economic growth rates are inexplicably low.

It takes an inner urge for the people to become really involved in perestroika. But so far, the suggested reforms have been handed down from on high. The same ruling group advances the initiatives and marches in the front rank. This is a historically unique situation! Meanwhile, in

its search for democracy, perestroika is encountering a number of serious obstacles which cannot be surmounted as long as one-party rule persists in the Soviet Union.

A. W. Any democracy develops under specific historical circumstances and is a product of specific social processes. You are criticising us from the standpoint of a Western view of democracy, using as a model the form that took shape over centuries of political development in Britain, Switzerland and other countries. But I do not think it would be productive to conduct our discussion purely from this angle. Judging by what you have said, you seem to think that the specific Western experience can be transplanted wholesale onto completely dissimilar terrain.

Russia developed in a different way. It got its first taste of parliamentary democracy only after the revolution of 1905. Then came the world war and the socialist revolution. It would be politically unrealistic and methodologically wrong to claim that certain forms of democracy can be mechanically transferred to fit differing conditions. I think this should be taken into account. We should not reduce democracy to any one form or deny the possibility that others may exist also—forms that may be no less (and perhaps more) democratic.

There is no longer any substance to the allegation that the CPSU has a "total monopoly", that it controls and determines everything. Anyone who takes the trouble to follow the Soviet press cannot possibly accuse the party of monopolising the mass media. There is now a wide range of extremely diverse views and opinions. Look at the spectrum of platforms presented by candidates in the elections of People's Deputies.

Creating an independent mechanism of democratic control is a major task in the perestroika-related reform of the political system. This includes glasnost, the openness of the mass media to a pluralism of views, the new election procedures based on competitiveness, the greater rights and responsibilities of civil organisations and so on. A state based on the rule of law, the primacy of law over government, is our objective.

The problems and difficulties of perestroika you are referring to are well-known. But so are the problems of those countries where social democratic parties operate. One could cite a long list of negative phenomena (albeit of a different character) chronically plaguing the West—unemployment, homelessness, etc.—despite years spent trying to deal with them. I will refrain from listing them here. It would be more useful to speak about the problems of socialism, even though we view it somewhat differently.

Historically, social democracy has indeed contributed greatly to the development of the democratic basis underlying Western society, to the struggle against fascism and to the defence of civil rights—but it has advanced little towards socialism. On the contrary, at some stage after 1917 it even became more removed from it. It's worth recalling at this point Olof Palme's famous phrase about social democracy living in symbiosis with capitalism.

In the case of the USSR, the reverse is true. After the revolution, we rushed full speed ahead towards socialism, but Stalinist distortions led us astray from socialist democracy, the foundations of which were laid in Lenin's time. Socialism ended up divorced from democracy. But Lenin said that socialism and democracy are essentially inseparable. Genuine socialism means democracy, and genuine democracy calls for advancement towards socialism.

It was as if two halves of one and the same phenomena emerged separately. You have democracy but not socialism. In our case, the shaping of socialist society was accompanied by bureaucratic distortions which grew into a system of administration by fiat. Perestroika is designed to destroy this system and restore to socialism its democratic, human face. We admit that mistakes are being committed in the course of perestroika, but we are still at the initial stage. The important thing is that we are moving ahead. A lot will probably have to be changed and revised. Nevertheless, we are firm in our conviction that we need more democracy to make socialism genuine and renew its image. You seem to need more socialism in order to make your democracy more profound. I think this is a question we could discuss.

BUILDING A NEW EUROPE TOGETHER

J. Z. Such a discussion would be interesting, but let us put it off until another occasion. Today, I suggest we exchange our views about those aspects of cooperation on which a measure of agreement has been already achieved. To begin with, no matter what the differences between us, all of us—strong social democratic and strong communist parties—belong mostly to the rich and developed part of the world, which dominates the rest, politically and economically. But next door to us there is a different, Third World where 43,000 people die of hunger every day.

All those who view history from a social angle and see themselves as heirs to the traditions of humanism must act jointly in order to help change the existing world order. To cut my explanations of the essence of the problem short, let me simply quote a few figures. In 1987, the industrially developed countries spent \$1 trillion on armaments, while the combined external debt of 122 African, Asian and Latin American countries amounted to \$1,100 billion. Disarmament is an absolute imperative. Among other things, it could release the funds necessary not only for tackling the economic problems of the advanced nations, but also for helping the developing countries overcome their backwardness.

For all the importance of the INF Treaty, it is not enough to achieve a real breakthrough in cutting down on military spending. This objective calls for serious negotiations on conventional armaments, which consume a large part of this expenditure. We must support the dialogue on the subject which began in Vienna in March. I think that, by

mobilising public opinion and putting pressure on parliaments and governments, Social Democrats and Communists should seek to prevent NATO's planned modernisation of battlefield nuclear weapons. The creation of nuclear-free zones and corridors could also help us advance.

We would, of course, like to beat all our swords into ploughshares, but let us be realists. Today, a universal transition to what Egon Bahr has described as "nonoffensive defence" would be a major victory for both currents of the working-class movement. This means a transition to structures which would rule out armed aggression by either side.

Next question. It will be impossible to tackle environmental problems in earnest without the Soviet Union. This was the conclusion reached by the Brundtland Commission (Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway.—*Ed.*). There are, however, certain difficulties involved here: while most of the Socialist International parties urge an end to nuclear power production, the French Socialists and the Soviet Union unfortunately hold a different view. But a productive dialogue is always possible on specific issues. The differences are surmountable.

Finally, my last point concerns the creation, by 1992, of a united Europe on the basis of the EEC. I have every reason to say that most of Europe's responsible social democratic leaders are profoundly aware of the need to arrive, by that time, at some system of cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Americans would dearly love the USSR to join the EEC, rightly believing that this would bring about a decline in socialism. Sober-minded politicians are unable to accept this approach. I personally think it would be expedient to use the existing mechanism of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Austria (nations unaffiliated to the EEC). EFTA and the EEC have concluded agreements on monetary and investment policies and on the certification of goods and articles. Why don't the Soviet Union and some East European countries join EFTA, thereby strengthening their relations with the European Economic Community?

A. W. I agree wholeheartedly with your most important point: it is our common duty to promote disarmament. The idea of making the armed forces "structurally incapable of launching an attack"—an idea social democracy helped develop—acted as a major stimulus, and was received with great interest in the USSR. For our part, we advanced the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency. Our military doctrine has been changed to make it strictly defensive. In contact with its allies, the Soviet Union is taking practical steps to reorganise the structure of the armed forces and impart a non-offensive character to them.

You are undoubtedly right that disarmament and the transfer of part of the funds thus released to the developing countries would be of great assistance to the Third World.

We share this view. It has been stated repeatedly, and we worked on it together with the Social Democratic Party of Germany. A joint working group tackled this question for several years, and proposals for a development fund financed from military budget cuts have been submitted to the UN.

Generally, we have a common position on environmental problems too. But there is indeed the issue of nuclear power plants. There is no complete unanimity on it because different countries depend on nuclear power to different degrees. Besides, a debate is under way about which energy sources pose a greater danger to the environment, and opinions are being exchanged about alternative energy sources. At this point let me note that, after Chernobyl, we drastically upgraded our nuclear power plant safety standards. The Armenian nuclear power station has been shut down and, under pressure from the public, the viability of the Crimean nuclear power station is being re-examined.

You touched upon the subject of a common European home, something Mikhail Gorbachov raised a few years ago. It is all the more topical because the creation of a single West European market in 1992 may weaken rather than strengthen economic cooperation in Europe, while many problems will have to be tackled on a continental scale. Naturally, we would welcome further discussion on interaction between the two integrative structures. As to the USSR joining the EEC or EFTA, this question is not (and cannot be) an item on our agenda today. But we are in favour of extensive economic cooperation with the EEC and with other West European countries.

In summing up this part of our discussion, there is a question I would like to raise. Can we conclude that the things that unite us are weightier and more important than those that divide us?

J. Z. We obviously need each other—to prevent local conflicts accidentally escalating into international ones, and to end the squandering of resources on the arms race. Besides, we have a common enemy—the transnational monopoly bourgeoisie. While we are trying, each side in its own way (you with the help of perestroika, and we through parliamentary struggle and the mobilisation of public opinion), to improve the position of the working classes, the bourgeoisie is building up its strength. It has already created the transnational corporation. In 1987, according to the World Bank, 20 of these controlled 18% of the capitalist world's goods and services.

How can we resist this power jointly? As far as Western Europe is concerned, there is a chance for the Social Democrats to enter into an alliance with the Communists and, by 1992, to gain ground from the right-wingers in the European Parliament, thereby securing some measure of financial, budgetary and political control over this latest superpower, one with a population of 320 million and the world's greatest industrial potential.

We must work towards active cooperation between the two parts of Europe, the one under the influence of the

Communists, and the other hopefully soon under the decisive influence of the Social Democrats. We have already covered the economic side to the question. But there is also our common European culture: Zola and Tolstoy, Fellini and Tarkovsky are names familiar to schoolchildren on both sides. We ought to establish a common cultural fund to be managed by the working people. This would help bring them closer together.

Finally, the issue of human rights. How much longer are we going to indulge in mutual recriminations, accusing one side of ignoring social rights and not caring about the homeless, and the other of violating political rights and personal freedoms? Let us acknowledge that all human rights are an integral part of the communist and social democratic moral heritage, and let us devise a common concept to oppose big capital.

I am positive that these prospects are not simply utopian. But it will not be easy to translate them into reality. To attain these objectives, the Social Democrats have to come to power, which is impossible if we receive no assistance from the Communists who, at least in four EEC countries—Italy, France, Portugal and Greece—are supported by a large part of the electorate. True, prejudice persists on both sides. But if we fail to act together in each particular country, we will hardly be able to oust the right-wingers. If this does not come to pass, a united Western Europe will turn into a simple appendage of transnational capital, with all the disastrous consequences this will entail for the working people, whatever their electoral likes and dislikes at home.

DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE

A. W. In principle then, we agree that there is a basis for rapprochement. I think your view that, in the final analysis, the left forces in Europe have both common problems and common objectives is very interesting and very important. There is a question of concern to us all: how can the new demands of economic and technological development be transformed into a democratic alternative so that the objectively necessary restructuring could benefit rather than harm the working people and the environment?

All this clearly calls for cooperation, joint action and a common search for a policy programme aimed at economic and social advancement not only in Europe but also globally. Can we talk about any new prospects for cooperation?

J. Z. This is what worries me. Although contacts between the CPSU and the Socialist International have become more frequent, they remain insufficiently regular and lack a solid organisational basis. As a Social Democrat, I would like to see the CPSU represented in Socialist International structures, and many of us share this view. But until that happens, we should create at least temporary structures of transition.

Why don't we agree, at the level of the CPSU and the Socialist International, on the principles and techniques of our dialogue and on the areas in which it should be continuous? Why don't you join the SI Advisory Council on Disarmament led by Kalevi Sorsa and then the environmental, monetary/economic and other commissions? An international commission could meet, say, twice a year, alternating between Paris and Moscow, to take stock and discuss new ideas and initiatives put forward both by the CPSU and by SI bodies.

I think we badly need an organisational basis for a permanent dialogue. The absence of well-developed contacts gives rise to unnecessary anxiety. Don't let's waste this opportunity. Let's raise our cooperation to a level that corresponds to the demands of our age.

A. W. The thrust of your remarks appeals to me. I would like to hope that an end to the rift in the socialist working-class movement is in sight. We are no longer drifting apart but, on the contrary, drawing closer together. But I don't think we should accord priority to the organisational factor. To be quite realistic, any attempt to restore earlier forms of unity would be unlikely to win broad support. At the seminar, neither Communists nor Social Democrats backed it.

I think it's more important to build on what we have already achieved in the field of cooperation. In fact, a mechanism for dialogue already exists. The CPSU and the SPD have set up joint working groups on reductions in military spending and on issues of European security. The

SED and the SPD are setting a good example in this respect. Multilateral meetings are also held—for example, the regular contacts between six parties, representing three Western and three East European countries. We are continuing our cooperation with the SI Advisory Council on Disarmament. Contacts between academic establishments are developing, too. At the same time, I share your view about the creation of new joint groups or commissions—say, on environmental or other issues.

The mechanics of cooperation are gradually improving. But there's no point in attaching any special significance to the formal aspect of our efforts because this may alienate some quarters and complicate rather than facilitate further progress in our dialogue. We shall move faster towards healing the rift by expanding our bilateral and multilateral contacts.

I hope we can achieve a degree of understanding that would outweigh the existing ideological and political differences and give a sufficiently strong impetus to joint action. Naturally, each party would retain its identity and its traditions. After all, each has its own distinctive experience and its own record of achievements and mistakes from which each draws its own conclusions. I don't think it would now be possible to accommodate them all in a single organisation. However, progress towards greater mutual understanding with regard to the major issues of modern social development is perfectly feasible. It does have a future, and perhaps it will lead us to something radically new.

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THE READER JOINS THE DISCUSSION

INTERNATIONALISM TODAY: THE DEBATE CONTINUES

The article *"The 'New Internationalism': A Drama with a Happy Ending"*, based on a dialogue between Antonio RUBBI, a member of the leadership of the Italian Communist Party, and Professor Grigory VODOLAZOV, published in the April 1989 issue of *WMR*, has elicited the following responses from two of our readers.

NOT ONLY THE PAST!

I very much welcome the discussion between Cdes Vodolazov and Rubbi in the April issue of *WMR*. I particularly appreciated Cde Vodolazov's introduction, brilliantly outlining both the need for the clash of ideas as well

as some guidelines for conducting such debates in depth. All the more, therefore, my disappointment in the outcome of this "drama with a happy ending". The ending would have been much happier, in my view, if the backcloth and full scenario had been presented to the audience—in this case the readers of *WMR*.

The discussion is presented as an argument between the advocates of "proletarian internationalism" and those of "new internationalism". But there were parties who did not see it in "either or" terms. A number of communist parties, including mine, stopped using the slogan "proletarian internationalism" before the 1976 Berlin Conference. They did so because its inherent concept of international working-class solidarity had, over time, been

drained of its original meaning and for some communist parties (perhaps not without the encouragement of the CPSU) became synonymous with, and a euphemism for, unconditional support for all domestic and foreign policy lines pursued by the USSR and the other socialist countries. Consequently, it became a restrictive, sectarian slogan and a hindrance to worldwide working-class solidarity.

The acceleration of the nuclear and environmental threats to survival, the deepening North-South divide, and the rapid growth of interdependence are all important factors demanding solidarity and support above and beyond that of the working class and its traditional allies. These problems, which know neither national nor class boundaries, cry out for a much broader response involving all strata and institutions of civil society.

The concept of "new internationalism", developed and articulated by our Italian comrades to help prevent nuclear or ecological disaster, was an important contribution to the development of Marxist theory. But the discussion failed to explain why "new internationalism" was presented as an *alternative* to and a *replacement* for working-class international solidarity.

Indeed, at the Sophia international seminar, convened jointly by the WMR and the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1980, this debate was very much in the forefront. In my contribution at that seminar I did not oppose the need for broad alliances on modern global issues, not as an alternative, but in addition to international working-class solidarity, which not only has not ceased to be necessary but is becoming more essential.

The nuclear arms race, the ecological threat, the North-South divide, and world indebtedness are all issues which affect not only the working class and its allied strata, and therefore require, as Cde Rubbi cogently argued, a broader or "new internationalism".

Unfortunately, the list of global changes missed the one that is having the greatest effect on the working class, namely the growing domination of the capitalist world economies by the transnational companies, with their ability to play off the workers of one country against another. And it is precisely here that the need for retaining and strengthening working-class international solidarity is so vital.

There are two reasons why I do not believe that the use of the slogan "proletarian internationalism" is helpful in our common cause. Firstly, it is associated with the abuse of that slogan as a code phrase for uncritical support of all things Soviet and, secondly, the changes in the forces of production—with many hornyhanded proletarians being replaced by working men and women with new, less manually intensive skills, and a growing proportion in services rather than production industries—mean that the word proletarian in its classical sense sounds and has become dated. But its essential concept—the need to develop international working-class solidarity against international capital—is more necessary than ever. Further-

more, such struggle and solidarity is not unimportant to the attainment of our ultimate objective—*socialism*.

That is why I am less than happy with the implication in Cde Rubbi's argument that the fight for socialism is now low down on the agenda of Communists and hence also that the unity of the working class and the closer cooperation of Communists are of secondary importance and less relevant. It is one thing to criticise the abuse, distortions and harm that such misuse of "proletarian internationalism" has done in freezing Marxist theoretical development in the field of international relations between Communists, as well as between Communists and Socialists. But to reject its essence—the importance of working-class unity and solidarity in meeting the daily struggle and contributing to the ultimate transformation of society—is to throw the baby out with the bath water.

All communist parties have gone through sectarian periods in their histories and created artificial barriers between themselves and other parties, movements and individuals, differing on how best to realise the common goal of socialism. Many communist parties have overcome or are in the course of overcoming their sectarianism. The sooner we all do so the better.

Over the years, many communist parties have attempted, some more successfully than others, to develop closer relations on issues of common concern with a variety of organisations and movements, as well as with social democratic parties. What I fail to grasp is why Cde Rubbi considers broader contacts as incompatible with close cooperation between Communists. Here too I do not see it in terms of "either or".

International working-class solidarity, then, is more vital than ever in this era of transnational companies. So, also, with regard to this and other issues, is the broader concept of "the new internationalism".

If we can accept that the dramatic changes which have taken place require both responses—in some areas an emphasis on one process, and in other spheres (where appropriate and possible) on both—then this drama will indeed have "a happy ending".

Bert RAMELSON
(Great Britain)

GIVE AN "OLD SOLDIER" THE RIGHT TO REST!

When I read the dialogue on the fate of the idea of the "new internationalism", my first reaction was to wonder whether the twelve-year wait for this publication was worth it. But an "inner voice" quieted me: only twelve years after all... In this case (even though in principle I am against happy endings) I am inclined to think that yes, it is a drama, with an unfinished, but nevertheless a happy ending.

Let me say at once that I do not share all of Rubbi's ideas. Like some critics of the "new internationalism", I cannot accept the connections between proletarian inter-

nationalism and socialism as an immediate task, or between the "new internationalism" and the struggle for social progress and survival. The idea that proletarian internationalism has become obsolete simply because there is not a single communist party in the developed capitalist states fighting unswervingly for socialism, or aiming to take power, seems to me wholly unconvincing.

I also find it hard to accept the attempt by supporters of the "new internationalism" to appropriate the concept of socialism as a process, and of the struggle for "universal values" as its motive force. It is well known that Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, in *The German Ideology*, stressed: "Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things."¹ (I was pleasantly surprised to see this half-forgotten thesis reproduced almost word-for-word in the Political Document of the 18th PCI Congress.) Nor is it quite modest—in terms of a petty controversy over "who first"—to build the other two artificial links: proletarian internationalism equals "generally common features"; "new internationalism" equals "universal values".

And yet, despite these remarks, I am for the "new internationalism". My arguments are as follows. The working class is gradually losing its "classical" features. New tendencies have been added to the sharp reduction in the agricultural proletariat and to the growth of employment in the sphere of trade and the services that have characterised the postwar period. I mean the decentralisation of production, the appearance of qualitatively new contingents of the working people, of new thinking—economic, social, political—and higher living standards for the majority of workers. This separates us still more from the perceptions of a class "which has nothing to lose but its chains". It is my belief that the idea of the "new internationalism" corresponds more accurately to the social shifts and changes and to the international working people's solidarity that is developing on their basis.

Whether we want it or not, one more factor has to be recognised: the second half of our century has turned into a "golden age" of parliamentary democracy. The overwhelming majority of the population in the West gives it preference. Take, for example, Portugal, Greece and Spain. In not a single one of these three countries has the replacement of dictatorships led to proletarian democracy or democracy of a socialist type. The reasons are complex, but mention should be made of the "legacy" of the 1950s and the 1960s, when both political systems—bourgeois and socialist democracy—suffered serious ordeals. The former reached the limit of its capacities in trying to solve the problems by peaceful means. The latter found it necessary to use force, justifying this with socialist internationalism—the "highest degree" or form of "realisation in the new conditions" of the principle of proletarian internationalism. This was bad publicity in the eyes of people in the nonsocialist world, the overwhelming majority of

whom favour the principles of noninterference, sovereignty, a rule-of-law state, etc. One cannot expect that this kind of "proletarian internationalism" will receive "free credits" in the "bank" of universal human values from the average citizen of the Western world.

Under proletarian internationalism, as is known, the class dominates over the universal, and the international over the national. This means, firstly, the subordination of the interests of proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle of the working class on a world scale; secondly, it presupposes the ability and readiness on the part of a nation that has overthrown the bourgeoisie to make the greatest sacrifices for the sake of victory over international capital. After World War II proletarian internationalism became the principle not only of one class, nor even of one state, but of a whole world system that possesses great military capabilities.

World realities have changed substantially, and a number of global problems have arisen that threaten the very existence of humankind. This, I think, requires the introduction of *certain correctives* to the previous theoretical assumptions. Outside of new political thinking there is no other way to save life on Earth. I am deeply convinced that the idea of the "new internationalism" is akin to it. Both concepts place the emphasis on *common human values as the highest expression of the class interest*. They both re-order the notions "class", "national", "international", and "common human" in the scale of universal values and make it contemporary. Moreover, the "new internationalism" is one of the elements of new political thinking or, to use Rubbi's phrase, fits into its concept.

I shall permit myself the following, partly emotional, argument. I am an adherent of the "new internationalism" also because I believe that this idea was yet another attempt to overcome sectarianism in the communist movement, something which Lenin heavily attacked in the early 1920s, but which even in the 1970s refused to leave its "little land".

I want to cite an almost anecdotal example of a remarkable combination of "new" thinking and old habits. In Sofia in 1977, as a budding researcher of PCI history, I met with one of the leaders of this party, a former active participant in the Resistance Movement. A communique on its leaders' talks with the leadership of the BCP had just been published. While I was considering my questions, he surprised me by asking that I "first translate from the communique on what basis relations are developing between the two parties." I translated: "...on the basis of international solidarity". "Are you sure there's no proletarian internationalism there?" And only after my reply in the affirmative did the conversation start... It is thus not only the "dogmatists" who show sectarianism.

I am far from assuming that "proletarian internationalism" inevitably leads to sectarianism. On the contrary, originally it was its opposite. What can be more selfless, and therefore beautiful, than the hands of proletarians extended across state and national bound-

daries? Has proletarian internationalism become obsolete in this sense? As a symbol—certainly not! Incidentally, 1989 is a year of symbols: the 125th anniversary of the First International, the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Second, the 100th anniversary of the decision to celebrate the First of May as an international working people's holiday, the 70th anniversary of the Comintern. To them all—with respect and with love—we have allotted a place in history, in the chronicle of the working-class and communist movement.

True, as a principle proletarian internationalism has become obsolete—after the glorious battles, after the remarkable feats, after an honest, meaningful and valiant life. As the twentieth century draws to a close it deserves, like an old soldier, the right to peaceful retirement. Why should we close our eyes to this obvious fact?

When the idea of proletarian internationalism seized the world, no-one, not even the wisest and most perspicacious, could have imagined what would happen in a hundred years. And hardly anyone among the doctrine's founders sought to prepare eternity for this idea. It is enough that they bequeathed to us the most important thing—their *method*. Its first precept is that the method itself and all that derives from it are not a dogma, but a guide to action.

Dragomir DRAGANOV
(Bulgaria)

¹ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 49.





FIGHTING BUREAUCRACY AND BELIEVING IN THE PEOPLE

Janet JAGAN

Executive Committee member and Central Committee Executive Secretary, People's Progressive Party of Guyana (PPP)

Under British colonial rule, the PPP won office on three occasions and was deposed two times. That meant that the PPP governed internally, as the British held the key posts of finance (in 1961, this portfolio was handed over to PPP Ministers), foreign policy, security and civil service. Under those difficulties, and in the face of strong hostility from the Mother Country and the colossus of the north (USA), it was not easy going. The PPP would be in office today if it were not for the rigged elections that have taken place since the CIA, MI5 (US and UK spy agencies) and other forces deposed the government in 1964.

We won remarkable achievements thanks to our adherence to democratic methods and the techniques we used to overcome a bureaucracy built in to prevent any substantial gains by the PPP. What we did has some significance today in view of the battles elsewhere to overcome the built-in problems arising out of stultifying bureaucratic growth and dominance. Of course, Guyana is a small country (population 900,000; area 215,000 square km), a microcosm of what exists elsewhere. Yet, sometimes, even microcosms have lessons to teach.

When we took office for the second time in 1957 (the first, in 1953, lasted only 133 days, and then the British moved in their marines and threw us out of office) we were several ministers in charge of agriculture, transport, education, health, housing, labour, trade and industry, community development and communications. As mentioned above, the key ministries were kept in the hands of the British colonialists. How were we to make a success of what was before us?

We chose the path of the people, closeness to the workers and peasants, keeping them informed of all we were doing, asking them to help with the problems and the finding of solutions. We did our best to win over the bureaucrats with whom we had to work on a day-to-day basis. For example, when we saw the need for more health services in the distant parts of the country, in the river and interior areas of Guyana, it was found that writing minutes

and asking for doctors or nurses to make regular visits to certain points got us nowhere. They remained on paper in files, tucked neatly away. Then we began involving civil servants, who had rarely left their desks, and knew very little of their own country. Trips were planned up rivers (Guyana is known as the land of many waters; it has numerous rivers with settlers along the banks) and key civil servants were asked to accompany the minister. We carried baskets of food, as there are no such things in the interior as restaurants or snack bars, and the trips became an adventure and something of a picnic, except that there was a lot of work to be done. The civil servants saw the needs and sufferings of the people and could not help but be sympathetic. Soon we had full cooperation in getting pre- and postnatal clinics working, in all the preparations for travel of nurses and doctors and provision of equipment, funding, etc.

Before it had seemed impossible to organise a wide network for interior health care. Soon it became a reality and the pleasure of achievement to those who had formerly sat glued to their desks every day.

Altogether, the health services grew as never before in other aspects, too. For example, government-paid rural doctors and city hospital specialists used to rip off the poor people in fees which they were not supposed to charge, but did. A relentless campaign began to give the poor people the free medical care they were supposed to get. After many efforts, it finally worked.

It must be remembered that the People's Progressive Party had no say in the hiring or firing of civil servants. That was kept strictly in the hands of the British Governor. Such was the framework within which we had to work and succeed.

We found that when the ministers spent time at the grassroots level meeting, organising and discussing with the people, there was more confidence in our government, the people understood our limitations and gave of their fullest.

They helped identify lands that could be cultivated, and we unwound all the administrative knots which had kept the lands from the people. Guyana has always been fortunate in that a great portion of its lands has always belonged to the state. Ownership of private lands is relatively small in comparison to the amount of state lands, and state lands can be leased to farmers. But before our government came into office, this was difficult to achieve because the bureaucracy created many obstacles. The plantocracy, in its quest for a cheap and abundant labour force in and around the sugar plantations, had "bottled up" the land. We began opening up the land and settling farmers on a cooperative basis. We gave bonuses to farmers to plant the crops we needed, like coconut, so we could stop im-

porting edible oil and produce our own copra to manufacture into coconut oil. It worked.

We began, too, to overhaul our educational system and to orient it to local history, culture and life in Guyana, instead of its British orientation. Children were still reading about apples; but apples do not grow in Guyana. We built new schools in the countryside and encouraged families to start sending their girls to school instead of keeping them at home to do domestic work. That worked too.

And we began the process of ending the system of "dual control" of schools: government paying for the upkeep of the schools and teachers' salaries, while the Christian churches appointed and promoted the teachers and administered the schools—a system which was unsound educationally and discriminatory to non-Christians. Our initiative was welcomed by the people, but brought out the wrath particularly of the Catholic Church, which charged that we wanted to "communist education".

We urged the development of cooperatives to purchase farm machinery and gave them all help and encouragement—not just on paper, but in reality. Our ministers went out and talked to farmers, guided them, encouraged them and celebrated with them when they acquired machinery. We were making the people conscious of their own identity and their ability to rise up to solve their problems.

As a result, in our second term of office from 1957 to 1961, rice production went up 15%; copra 32%; ground provisions 118%; livestock 39%; milk 25%; poultry 26% and fisheries 77%. The people felt close to their government and were happy in its successes.

We were careful to avoid corruption. We had a bad shakeup in the early period: one of our five ministers sold confidential information to enhance himself and make a lot of money. As soon as it was discovered, he was immediately dismissed. We made it clear from the very start that we would stand no nonsense, no corruption, no personal material gains. Ministers were not allowed to accept gifts of any kind, in any form or from anyone. We nipped in the bud one of the worst evils a government can face.

When our first public low-income housing scheme was finished, we faced the problem of how to allocate these much needed dwellings without patronage or favouritism. The minister along with the civil servants in the ministry, who by that time were working well and not like bureaucrats, worked out a fair and equitable system based on the needs of families. A points system was worked out and adhered to, and it worked well. Those living under the worst conditions, the greatest overcrowding and who had the most children to house were given top priority. There were no charges of bribery or playing favourites or giving party members first preference.

When land (17.5 acres) was being distributed in a Land Settlement Scheme, a big hue and cry went up that the wrong people had been given the first 1,200 plots. The process was halted and a fair system of allocation was worked out based on need. Then it was found that some people were providing false information. Therefore all ap-

plication forms had to be properly verified. And the procedure was adopted to read out the forms in public to ascertain the veracity of the claims made on the application forms.

Because of our many restraints, many of them financial, we had to try to do things in a realistic way without overspending or aiming beyond what was possible. We dearly wanted a university for Guyana. Without spending much, we began our university as a night school in the main high school of Georgetown. How our enemies laughed at us! They called it "Jagan's night school"¹. But we made a start and began in a small way the University of Guyana which has grown into a full-fledged university, offering higher education to those who never before had a chance. What should have taken three years to establish according to UNESCO advisers—the need for buildings and professors—we achieved in one year with late afternoon and evening instruction through the utilisation of this secondary school building and teachers and professors who had been witch-hunted in the McCarthyite era in the United States.

We had to expand our transport services. We had a super British-built river boat capable of ferrying large numbers of vehicles and passengers across our wide rivers. Then, we had two more constructed in the same manner locally. The three river boats, crossing Guyana's three main rivers daily, were a solution to a problem that had nagged the nation for years.

We needed to expand electricity, for at that time only the city of Georgetown was served. We nationalised the Canadian-owned electricity plant, modernised it and extended electricity to the rural areas, lighting them up for the first time ever. We made the electricity company profitable without increasing fees to the consumers. How? By good management, democratically run.

Because of our simple achievements and our closeness with the working people, we were voted back into office in 1961, even though the British tried to prevent this by manipulating the boundaries of the constituencies.

We stood for democratisation of all government institutions. We insisted and won the democratisation of the Rice Marketing Board, the selling agent of the farmers' rice, by putting farmers in a commanding position. Prior to 1957, the Guyana Rice Marketing Board had 16 members, with the statutory farmers' Rice Producers Association (RPA) having only 8. Whenever there was a clash, the chairman, drawn from one of the colonial government's 8 nominees, used his casting vote against the interest of the rice farmers. The PPP government amended the law and gave the RPA 11 out of the 16 seats. And because the farmers had a dominant voice in their own industry, it flourished, production increased at a phenomenal rate, and the farmers prospered.

The board that governed the electricity company was also made up largely of workers. We found that democratisation worked, and we sincerely believed and applied this concept in all things we did.

All this was later undone when we were kicked out of office in 1964. Now, without democratisation, without even the right to free and fair elections, the country is bankrupt, production has plummeted, so much so that this sugar-, bauxite- and rice-producing country cannot satisfy foreign markets, or provide enough rice and sugar for local consumption. Now the government will be importing sugar for local consumption.

Working people work hard for their country when they know that they really have a say in what goes on. Remove this, and everything fails, including production, cooperation and good will.

¹ Cheddi Jagan, leader of the People's Progressive Party, who was then Prime Minister.

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THE WORLD OF LABOUR IN THE COMPUTER AGE

CORNUCOPIA OR PANDORA'S BOX?

Round Table in Prague

In the 1980s, the Institute for Marxist Studies noted in its report: a new phase of the scientific and technological revolution has begun which involves the mass introduction of microelectronics. It has given a new dimension to economic restructuring in the leading capitalist countries. The shift to advanced technologies based on automated production and R&D, the installation of flexible production systems and the computerisation of management have markedly increased labour productivity.

The unprecedented growth of the flows of information and its arrival as a major productive force have led to the development of data processing and storage infrastructures consisting of databanks, telecommunications and computer centres. Capitalist reproduction has come to depend hugely on information technology. "It is a special feature of the ongoing technological revolution that many human intellectual and mental functions are being taken over by technology," Leisewitz said.

Other avenues of scientific and technological progress,

such as biotechnologies, alternative energy sources, resource-saving technologies and new materials also offer broad prospects for the development of the productive forces.

The WMR Commission on the Industrialised Capitalist Countries held a round table meeting in Prague to consider the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on labour. Dr André LEISEWITZ, deputy director of the Institute for Marxist Studies (FRG), read a paper on "Today's Working Class and the Scientific and Technological Revolution", and a discussion was conducted by Haralam ANGURAKIS of the research section of the CC of the Communist Party of Greece; Stephen GOURLAY (Communist Party of Great Britain), a researcher with the South Bank Polytechnic College; Viktor KUVALDIN, a senior researcher of the Moscow-based Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; Adolfo MANSILLA (Communist Party of Spain) of the University of Madrid; Gerry van HOUTEN, representative of the Communist Party of Canada on WMR; and Herman SCHMID (Left Party—Communists of Sweden), headmaster of the Motala Higher People's School.

The Commission has prepared a brief account of the discussion.

What then does the scientific and technological revolution augur for wage labour in today's industrialised capitalist society? Is it a force for good or evil? Will it bring about prosperity and well-being or create unheard-of dangers? What is happening to the worker? Does he feel himself to be a fully-fledged maker of material and intellectual values, or a tiny component lost in the electronic maze? Is he being relieved of the burden of arduous work, or denied the very right and possibility to work?

Dealing with these questions, the speakers concentrated on new problems encountered by the working-class movement, the trade unions

and the political organisations of the working people.

They were unanimous that there were alternative solutions to such problems, and that the achievements of science and technology could be used in any way. Whether

they become a cornucopia or Pandora's box depends on how the ways of scientific and technological advance and social progress are aligned.

THE NEW WORKER

Scientific and technological progress and the ensuing fundamental economic shifts, speakers noted, are drastically changing living and working conditions and the makeup and mentality of large social groups and strata. They give a new edge to the problem of the working class and its place and role in production and society as a whole. "The concept of the 'working class' is the key concept of Marxism," Kuvaldin observed. "Mountains of books and countless articles have been written on the subject. Every new spiral of social development forces us to return to this concept and re-examine it in the light of new experience. But only the present phase of the scientific and technological revolution has called into question the very existence of the working class as shaped by the industrial revolution."

The title of a well-known book by the French sociologist André Gorz, *Adieu au prolétariat: au-delà du socialisme*, suggests the complete disappearance of the working class as a social entity. But do the current changes provide any grounds for this conclusion? How far-ranging are they, and what are their implications for social classes?

Speakers noted that the very concept of the working class needs to be revised substantially. The worker image that over the decades has been a reflection of the traditional features of the proletariat no longer corresponds to reality. Today the working class incorporates not only those who sell their muscle power to the capitalist in the form of manual work; contemporary production requires increasingly larger inputs of intellectual and nervous energy, and lays emphasis on knowledge rather than skills. That is why the number of engineers, technicians and other specialists is growing rapidly and that of "classical" workers decreasing in the industrialised countries.

Leisewitz cited the following example: between 1962 and 1986, the proportion of shopfloor workers employed by the Siemens corporation in West Germany decreased from 67% to 47%, with that of low-and medium-skilled ones dropping especially markedly. The share of technicians grew, meanwhile, as did that of college-trained specialists, whose number now equals that of skilled workers. The more general statistics prove this trend: the share of "blue-collar" workers in the US workforce dropped from 40% to 32% in the 30 years between 1950 and 1980, a process which has gained momentum in the 1980s.

The state of the working class has been influenced not just by changes on the shopfloor, which altered the character of production: the "sphere of production" as such is a different concept today because it immediately involves R&D, planning, design and preparatory technological operations. Supply, marketing, finances, transport and communications are also becoming more crucial links in a single chain. What was once considered the "servicing" of

production is now a key production element, and the share of the workforce employed in these sectors is growing rapidly.

The reproduction of labour is undergoing immense changes. The role of education, occupational training and health care is growing immeasurably as these means are used to maintain the quality of the workforce and enable it to operate high technology. That is why the service industries are expanding rapidly.

More and more Marxist sociologists tend to view the working class today as including the huge army of wage labour, i.e., those who derive their livelihood from selling their labour power, are involved in the various phases of every kind of production, and contribute to the creation of surplus value; only the salaried managerial elite closely linked to the capitalist proprietors are excepted from that number. The British Communists, according to Gourlay, profess a broad concept of the working class that incorporates industrial and "white-collar" workers and most of the employees in the service industries; the important thing is to identify the common interests of these different groups and points of contact between them.

As before, the working class today is socially homogeneous and united from the point of view of its relation to ownership of the means of production. Yet it is more differentiated than ever in terms of skills, occupations, jobs, wages, lifestyles and therefore mentality. The picture changes kaleidoscopically with every twist and turn in production, scientific and technological progress and economic structures, with opposite tendencies often arising.

On the one hand, the living and working conditions of skilled workers and office employees are becoming more and more alike. On the other, the gap is widening between skilled and unskilled workers, between workers secure in their jobs and the unemployed, between inhabitants of sunrise industrial centres and people stuck in old, declining industrial agglomerations. In terms of education, job training and working conditions, the programmer has nothing in common with the production line worker, van Houten stressed. "The traditional militant core of the industrial working class has been eroded while simultaneously a new section of the working class has been created which is highly skilled and educated, relatively well-paid and, most importantly for the corporations, inexperienced in trade union and class struggle."

"BUTTON-PUSHING" OR "BRAIN-WORK"

An extremely controversial influence of new technology on worker skills was remarked upon in the discussion.

Clearly, high technology demands greater competence in a large part of the workforce. Workers must be better educated to be able to operate costly high-capacity machinery. Breakdowns, failures and malfunctions are fraught with huge losses and may cost dearly both individual producers and society as a whole, as is illustrated

by the tragic aftermath of disasters at large chemical plants and atomic power stations. The growing role of man in production is characteristic of the current phase of the scientific and technological revolution.

But the immediate association of the introduction of new technology with an overall improvement in occupational skills would be too simplistic, speakers observed. Often, the impact of technological progress is quite the reverse: high skills and expertise, no longer required on the job, are lost. While machines do ever more complex tasks, human functions are reduced to primitive manipulations which do not require any specialist knowledge. Even a low-skilled worker with little training can push buttons, monitor production processes and control them according to prefixed indicators. But the "traditional" worker involved with old technology is not yet on the way out. As *Leisewitz* noted, the West German car industry has 100,000 such "conventional" workers per 1,000 operators of high-tech production systems. According to some forecasts, by 2000 only one occupation in ten in industrialised countries will require specialist knowledge, and only one job in twenty will involve operating high technology.

The influence of technological innovations on working conditions, including the intensity of labour and the workload, is two-fold: new technology eliminates arduous, harmful and dangerous operations, eases the work of millions of people, and broadens the field of intellectual work; at the same time, however, the nervous and psychological strain on some working people increases, and the pace and tempo of work grows more demanding.

The share of women in the workforce has grown considerably under the new production conditions. The increased employment of women is due to the decreasing need for muscle power and the rapid expansion of the service industries, i.e., the "tertiary" and "quaternary" economic sectors. All this has put a strain on family relations and demographic processes, and narrowed employment opportunities.

The growth in small and medium-size companies and businesses, quite unforeseen by scientists, has also had a dramatic impact on the structure and composition of the working class. New technology has enabled small economic units to be even more flexible than large ones, and to respond better to market and consumer demand. The concentration of capital and the rise of the large monopolies that are so characteristic of capitalism proceed in more circuitous ways, and do not necessarily involve the enlargement of enterprises. *Van Houten* drew attention to the rapid growth of small-scale production and the petty bourgeoisie. According to him, by the early 1970s Canada had around 130,000 companies each with capital of less than 120 million Canadian dollars, while in the early 1980s the figure was nearly 400,000, the ground for such growth having been prepared by new technology.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises employ a large segment of wage labour. The situation, working and living conditions, organisation, mentality and attitudes of such

workers are shaped accordingly, which adds to the disunity of the working class.

Due to growing differentiation, *Gourlay* observed, individual groups among the working people now have different or even conflicting aspirations, with the common class interests taking a back seat to narrow corporate demands. For example, highly-paid specialists secure in their jobs take a view of production problems, such as the introduction of new technology, that is different from that of low-skilled workers or the unemployed. In pressing their demands, individual groups come into conflict with other sections of the working class. These diverse interests, a reflection of the diverse circumstances of the various social and occupational groups, are one of the reasons behind the decline of the working-class movement and the retreat of the trade unions in some countries.

At the same time many new needs, e.g., those involving worker participation in decision-making, better working conditions, shorter hours, job training, etc., bridge the differences between some categories of wage labour by emphasising their common social status.

"UNMANNED" FACTORIES AND IRREPLACEABLE CLEANERS

Central to the discussion was the *problem of employment*, an especially acute and important consequence of the scientific and technological revolution for most categories of wage labour.

In the industrialised capitalist countries participating in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), unemployment stands at more than 30 million, which is over 8% of the economically active population. (The situation differs from country to country, however: in Spain 20% of the employable population, and more than one-third of young people between 16 and 24, are unemployed, while the figure for Sweden is less than 2%.)

What kind of future then does the "technotronic age" hold out?

This question is a focus of attention for the general public, trade unions, politicians, public figures, economists and sociologists in industrialised capitalist countries: it involves the future of labour and the fate of large social groups and strata. Will new automated technology make human labour surplus to requirements? Will computers replace human abilities and skills? Will machines reduce millions of workers to idle lumpens subsisting on sops from society, or will they relieve the worker of arduous operations and help augment social wealth, increase free time and promote the comprehensive development of the individual?

Sociologists and representatives of the working-class movement have differing views of the scope and character of these processes and their short- and long-term implications. Some predict that more and more workers will soon be replaced in many industries by cheaper and increasingly sophisticated machines. Others argue forcefully that this is

unlikely in the foreseeable future. For example, the World Future Society said in a bulletin published in Washington in late 1988 that in spite of the rapid increase in factory robots, by 1997 the USA will have more than 400 factory and office workers per robot. Clearly, with such a ratio it is somewhat premature to talk of machines replacing people.

At the same time the use of robots is growing rapidly in certain areas of production, primarily in engineering. Although "unmanned" industries are not yet round the corner, the number of robots, flexible production systems and modules is constantly growing. (By the end of 1987, the US had 30,000 programme-controlled robots, and their number had been increasing particularly rapidly in the few years previously.)

Data cited at the symposium confirmed the trend towards the elimination of jobs, resulting from the employers' efforts to save on live labour and reduce production costs by introducing electronics and automated technology. In this situation the expansion of production and economic recovery do not boost employment. "Under the present technological development trends, 2.2 million jobs are going to be eliminated in the FRG between 1980 and 2000 even though the growth rate of material production is relatively high (2.5% a year)," *Leisewitz* said. "Mass lingering unemployment at the current average level should be expected in the next 15 years. By 2000, the economically active population will exceed the number of jobs by 3.5 million."

Discussing the causes of unemployment, several speakers warned against the summarily negative view of the impact of scientific and technological progress on employment in industrialised capitalist countries. "Neither the present state of affairs nor serious forecasts for the foreseeable future confirm the widespread opinion, encountered even in Marxist papers, that the scientific and technological revolution is almost catastrophic for employment," *Kuvaldin* observed. According to him, increasing unemployment in the early 1980s was caused by various processes, including cyclic crises, the internationalisation of production and economic restructuring, rather than simply by the replacement of live labour with machines.

The application of new technology not only saves on live labour in production and trims the workforce, but can also help create jobs in the booming industries involved in the introduction of new achievements, such as electronics, electrical engineering, biochemistry and others. Apart from that, structural economic changes increase the demand for labour on the part of the service industries, also known as the "tertiary" sector.

Paradoxically, these developments may increase both unemployment and employment. For example, between 1970 and 1986 unemployment in the US doubled from 4 to more than 8 million, while employment grew from 80 to 111 million. In the past few years, unemployment has decreased there both relatively and absolutely, and according to expert estimates in the 1990s there will be a shortage

rather than a surplus of labour in the US due to a sharp drop in the influx of youth to the labour market.

There is virtually no problem of new jobs in some of the more developed capitalist countries today. "There is no unemployment in Sweden," *Schmid* said. "Moreover, we are short of workers, and the questions discussed widely today are: Should we import labour? Or should we re-employ pensioners and postpone retirement from 65 to 70 years? Or should some other way out be found?" The demand for labour is felt especially in the services, including health care and education, which are mostly state-run.

The changes wrought in employment by the scientific and technological revolution produce a complex picture. As new jobs appear, the status of workers is not reproduced, and the "quality" of employment changes dramatically. On the one hand some of the newly-created jobs involve higher skilled and better paid work, such as the operation, adjustment and repair of sophisticated equipment, programming and other specialist engineering and technical functions. On the other, large groups of low-skilled workers lose in wages even in sunrise industries, the more so in the service sector, into which the bulk of labour is now flowing. Low-paid jobs prevail in the latter.

Altogether 13 million new jobs have been created in the US in the past decade and most of them are low-paid. For example, there are 800,000 auxiliary workers, garbage collectors and municipal workers per 53,000 programmers. US sociologists noted in a monograph published in 1986, *The Future of Work and Health*, that most of the jobs created in the US between 1982 and 1995 would be those of cleaners, cashiers, secretaries and shop assistants.

Participants in the round table pointed out that most of the newly-created jobs in industry and the services were insecure as they offered only temporary or partial employment. Growing flexibility in the organisation of production involves increasingly "flexible" labour relations.

This problem figured prominently in the discussion as a new economic factor increasingly influencing the situation of the working people.

"Flexibility" is a multivalent concept, speakers said. To begin with, production should be able promptly to respond to market demands and consumer needs. Possibilities for this are offered by new technology, such as electronic control devices. "The idea that flexible specialisation will be the characteristic form of industrial organisation in the future is paralleled by the argument that managers are dividing their workforces into two main categories—core and periphery," *Gourlay* observed. "'Core' workers are those essential to any particular firm's operations, while 'peripheral' workers are less essential. 'Core' workers provide employers with functional flexibility in that they will be highly skilled and possess skills to do more than one type of production job. They will thus be able to move between different types of production work as required. Workers in the 'periphery', on the other hand, will generally be less skilled, and will provide employers with numerical

flexibility—they will be hired and fired at will, depending on the precise labour requirements of the firm."

Production flexibility is not opposed by some workers, who are happy to have free time to look after children, to pursue part-time studies, etc. Certain workers and their organisations view flexibility as a way of preserving jobs rather than as a threat to them. Moreover, flexibility means the end of the production line system and various other rigorous, Fordist methods of organising production, promoting instead a degree of autonomy on the shopfloor.

At the same time flexible labour relations and the resultant temporary and partial employment enable capitalists to disregard the social guarantees won by the working people and to undermine the social security system. In many cases the terms of employment worsen and job insecurity increases. André Gorz, quoted above, wrote in his article "He Who Doesn't Work Will Eat All The Same", published by the *Futuribles* magazine, that by the end of the century the mass of insecure or marginal workers may well amount to three-quarters of the labour market.

WHERE IS THE ANSWER?

How is the working-class movement responding to all these new realities in production and in social life generally? Both the paper from the Institute for Marxist Studies and speakers at the round table outlined approaches to some of the bigger and more urgent problems confronting the working people.

In the past few decades the new productive forces and far more sophisticated technology have placed new demands on the worker, who has at the same time developed new needs. These have been shaping in contradictory ways, however, as differentiation grows between various groups and categories of wage labour with their diverse interests: the first priority for some is employment, for others higher wages, and for still others promotion prospects and a greater say in the introduction of new technology and other managerial decisions.

Speakers noted that many trade unions and political organisations of workers in capitalist countries had failed to respond promptly enough to changes in the composition and makeup of the working class, and continued to target their activities on the industrial proletariat in the conventional economic sectors. In 1987, the US service industry employed 72% of the country's workforce, but only 7% of them were union members. Such a high-tech industry as electronics has a mere 2% of its workforce unionised! This does not mean that new groups of workers are less active socially: outside the trade unions, they engage in other democratic movements and civil initiatives, such as antiwar, ecological and anti-racist movements.

Unions which stick to traditional slogans risk missing the challenge of the times, but the participants in the round table said they believed many of them had risen to it and were revising their programmes to take better account of the new demands of the working people.

The communist parties in industrialised capitalist countries have an important role to play in identifying the common interests of wage workers at a time when their working and living conditions are growing more and more diverse. This task is increasingly salient in social affairs and politics, where the threat of nuclear war and ecological catastrophe brought about by the scientific and technological revolution has shifted priority to the common human interest in survival.

"In considering the prevention of nuclear war and the preservation of the environment for succeeding generations to be paramount, Communists are keeping abreast of the times," Angurakis said. The programme of the German Communist Party, "BRD—2000", for example, centres on solutions to global problems and control over the modern productive forces, including the introduction and use of new technology.

According to participants, the involvement of the technical and scientific intelligentsia, i.e., the propelling force behind progress in production, in a joint search for ways to the future is a major goal for the working-class movement. Unless they are won over to the workers' side, it will be almost impossible to work out and introduce alternative programmes for the application of new technology and the organisation of production. New tendencies in the evolution of wage labour under conditions of the scientific and technological revolution make themselves felt especially strongly in the life of that group. For example, as workers' educational and cultural standards grow, so their broader interests in professional, social and cultural advancement, in more meaningful and challenging work and in diverse leisure pursuits increase alongside their material interests. Their desire to participate in running production acquires a new dimension, and they tend to demand comprehensive shopfloor democracy.

Faced with economic restructuring, the trade unions and working-class parties are pressing for alternative policies for the development of the productive forces. In the wake of the crisis in the Ruhr steel and metalworking industries, the unions demanded that the regional economy be reshaped in order to develop promising types of production. The unions' action programmes and the working-class parties' documents suggest options for economic progress that will not only guarantee employment, but also protect the environment, bring about a real improvement in the quality of life, and cut working hours. Demands for a 35-hour work-week without any cut in pay are increasingly resonant in Western Europe, with West Germany, Denmark and Sweden already moving towards that goal.

Whether science and technology serve the interests of employers or workers, speakers noted, hinges on the issue of shorter working hours. If this goal is achieved, unemployment will be reduced as additional personnel are employed. More leisure time will make for better recreation and offer broader opportunities for further education and advanced training.

"One of the central issues of the class struggle today is preparation for full-scale participation in production," Kuvaldin said. He quoted US sociologists as saying that the generation now starting out in life will probably have to change jobs six or seven times. The trade unions are thus justified in demanding that the right to occupational training and retraining be guaranteed and funded by the state and employers. One's ability to adapt quickly to changing conditions and absorb new knowledge depends to a large extent on general educational background. This may seem surplus to requirements, but in reality it prepares the ground for occupational and professional training, advanced training and retraining. The Communist Party of Greece has the reputation of being a "friend of education", Angurakis said, and its demands for improving and democratising the education system and making it accessible to all help it win young people over to its side.

The participants in the round table also noted that actions for a better quality of life constituted a new aspect of the work of trade unions and working-class parties in developed capitalist countries. The quality of life is a broad concept including better working conditions, social and economic security, and the organisation of recreation and leisure for various social groups. The programmes of many working-class organisations feature appropriate material prerequisites, such as housing construction, the expansion

of the health care and recreational infrastructure, and the opening of new youth and sports centres. The working-class movement is especially keen on making education, culture, jobs and meaningful leisure accessible to young people, Mansilla said, because this will help achieve the main goal of realising the rights of young people, and also reduce juvenile crime, drug abuse and alcoholism, etc.

The quality of life is inextricably linked to improvements in the ecological situation, and the demands of the trade unions and working-class parties here range from alternative kinds of development of the productive forces (e.g., power, better production safety and environmental protection) to the production of biologically clean food under public control.

In conclusion, the participants in the round table stated that the communist and working-class parties in industrialised capitalist countries are confronted by fundamental changes in the world of labour under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution. The resultant tasks call for a comprehensive analysis of the new demands of the working class, which are a result of changing working and living conditions. Only if they respect today's realities and tomorrow's trends can the political organisations of the working people and the trade unions hope for success, for a role as the motive force of social progress.

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THE GLOBAL CHARACTER OF THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS

Dr Kadhim HABIB

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In recent years attempts have been made to work out a programme for resolving Third World economic

problems, and a search has been conducted for ways to overcome the growing difficulties. For example, within Group 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement there have been debates on the question of the astronomical foreign debt of newly independent states. Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have also repeatedly dealt with this theme. Unfortunately, no genuinely effective concrete proposals to end backwardness have resulted.¹

In this context, governments and peoples are coming increasingly to believe in the *global character of Third World problems and in their organic link with the processes of achieving universal peace and international security*. In particular, the concept put forward by Fidel Castro has found a widespread response²: it is precisely in a *major overhaul of the economic and social structures* of this group of countries that he sees the route for eliminating the current state of affairs.

"Along with the problem of peace, the problem of development looms larger in Asia and Africa than anywhere else in the world. There are vast zones of hunger, poverty, illiteracy and disease on those continents. As everyone knows, the tragic plight of hundreds of millions is caused by colonialism and neocolonialism, and by the wide gap between the developed and develop-

We continue our discussion on how to overcome underdevelopment in the modern world. See Amath Dansokho, "The Destiny of Capitalism and the Prospect Before the Developing World", *WMR*, No. 1, 1987; Vital Balla, "Life Versus Dogma"; Benecio Costa, "How We View Liberalisation of the Economy", *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1987; Georgi Kim, "The Socialist Orientation: Theory and Practice", *Ibid.*, No. 11, 1987; "Lessons of Socialist Orientation", *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1988; Samir Amin, "Socialism and the Demands of Development", *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1989; and Christian Mahrdeh, "Reform and Revolution in the Third World", *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1989.—Ed.

ing countries today. In spite of all the efforts so far made, the gap keeps widening, largely due to the immense debt, a noose tightening around the neck of the debtor countries,"³ Mikhail Gorbachov said during his visit to China.

The countries involved form a majority in the UN. The population of the non-aligned states is 2.8 billion,⁴ i.e., over half the world's total.

The main economic trends in these regions are characterised by the following common factors, which engender sharp negative consequences.

Enormous uncontrolled population growth. Its yearly indicator ranges from 2% to 3.5%. Between 1950 and 1980 figures for population growth were: in Africa 213.6%, in Latin America 222%, in East Asia 174.6%, and South Asia 196.1%. Between 1981 and 2000 an increase is expected in these regions of 181.5%, 155.5%, 125.5% and 147.8% respectively.⁵ At the present low level of economic potential, such a jump in population numbers means a further worsening of the problems of unemployment, hunger, and shortages of food, consumer goods and services essential to the satisfaction of people's material and spiritual requirements. The more so since GNP growth remains slow; in most cases it is considerably behind the rate of population growth.

Moreover, a new tendency is increasingly making itself felt. If the developing world was chiefly a producer and supplier of farm products to the international market 2 or 3 decades ago, then today these same young states are themselves in need of such goods, having become importers. In other words, the very *security of their food supply is now under threat*.

These countries' share of total capitalist world output is also growing at a slow rate. Thus, their finished product exports for 1985 amounted to only US \$150 billion. Their share of all world exports in the manufacturing field is a mere 10.9%, which is a reflection of the uneven level of development. South and Southeast Asia accounts for 8.2%, Latin America 1.5%, West Asia 0.9%, and Africa 0.3%.⁶ The share of these regions in international trade is also decreasing, falling from 30.6% to 23.2% between 1980 and 1986.⁷

On the one hand the Third World suffers from a continuous upward rigging of prices for industrial products, modern technology, knowledge and expertise (knowhow), and sustains losses because of a steady decline in primary prices (from 1980 to 1986 the price of oil fell by 45%, and of other raw materials, by 37%).⁸ On the other, its population's need for the basic necessities is steadily growing. The problem of providing local industry and agriculture with equipment, machinery, etc. is extremely acute. Therefore, governments are forced to increase the volume of cheap exports and to seek new loans.

In order to cover (investment and usual) budget deficits, the young countries have borrowed large sums from international banks and from private and state financial agencies. But as the credits grew, so did the debt bondage.

In ten years (1977-1987), the developing countries' debt increased by 347.1%. In 1977, some 15% of their export earnings went towards its reimbursement; the figure for 1986 was 26%, and it looks to be heading for 50%. In 1977, the Third World paid its creditors \$15 billion in interest alone; by 1986 it was \$70 billion.⁹

As a result of the influence of subjective and objective factors (economic and political), the gap between the underdeveloped countries and leading capitalist states has continued to widen. In the developing world today about 700 million people are starving, another 1.5 billion go without medical care, and 1 billion live in abject poverty.¹⁰

A mechanism of trust in relations between governments still has not been shaped. There has been no end to the provocative activity of imperialist countries against national liberation movements and states with patriotic regimes; in Africa, Asia and Latin America arms purchases are increasing, more modern types of conventional weapons are being produced, and armies are growing. Some countries are contemplating the production of medium- and long-range missiles, and even nuclear weapons. This is being greatly encouraged by military-industrial complexes in the imperialist countries. The money spent on arms purchases by developing countries in the early 1970s was 7.5% of the world's total—by the mid-1980s it had reached 16%. Military expenditure rose by 7% annually in the 1960s; by 15% a year in the 1980s. The developing countries' armies today number over 15 million men, i.e., more than half of all servicemen in the world. Twenty years ago few of these states manufactured arms; now many produce them, including Brazil, India, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Argentina, Iraq and others. Most of these countries are large debtors, military loans making up about 15% of their foreign indebtedness.¹¹

Transnational corporations derive fabulous profits from the arms business, amounting to \$200 billion a year in the 1970s and \$400 billion a year by the 1980s.¹²

Imperialist states claim to be lending a great deal of aid to the Third World. Indeed, in 1986, for example, the real amount was about \$36 billion. Even then, developing countries annually pay out about \$50 billion to these states for the purchase of new technology alone.¹³ A significant proportion of newly-created wealth is thus taken away as the most important (foreign-exchange) part of the national income—a potential source of capital accumulation for economic growth—is reduced.

This practice forces the governments of newly-free states to resort to new credits. A further complication arises from the fact that governing circles, which control a large part of the national income, often use it for personal enrichment, transferring the money to their accounts in Europe and the US. By doing so they make the already difficult position even worse and increase budget deficits.

There is another side to this tragic reality. After the disintegration of the colonial system and the rise of neocolonialism there arose new forms of economic, financial, trade and other relations between the imperialist camp

and Third World. The process of streamlining these forms along neocolonialist lines continues. Imperialism has started on another phase of development within one and the same temporal stage, characterised by the increased role of transnational corporations and international monopolistic institutions both in the world capitalist economy as a whole and in all spheres of Third World life.

The capitalist world has made the newly-free states' economies dependent. Some scholars call this phenomenon "interdependence". *Dependence and inequitable ties have sharply increased the negative impact of the crises in the capitalist system (following one another and partly overlapping) on the newly-independent states' economies and their position in the international market, which further aggravates the contradictions.*

The influence of the factor of "interdependence" on the world economy covers the spheres of production and distribution, further complicating the structure of material production in the young states. Industrial countries, multinational corporations and international institutions are tending to coordinate their activities through integration, to compromise more often, to *step up the practice of collective colonialism* (by sharing out regions of influence) and to toughen their control over markets. They are also *evolving a common tactic of struggle against national movements, democratic regimes and the countries of the socialist community.*

In the course of this process, world capitalism is making effective use of advances in science and technology in order to cushion the destructive effects of its general crisis and at the same time trying to exert a purposeful influence on the action of the law of uneven capitalist development with the aim of widening the gulf between its centres and the "periphery". As a result, the various forms of economic dependence are being consolidated, and peoples' exploitation is being increased. Difficult new international problems are arising which have a tendency to undermine universal security and stability.

It follows that the *internationalisation of the socioeconomic problems of the Third World states demands efforts on the part of the entire world community in seeking solutions.*

Whilst living standards under reactionary and dictatorial Third World regimes have fallen, for obvious reasons, similar occurrences in countries with patriotic governments require special analysis. Along with familiar instances of eclecticism and the lack of a scientific approach to socioeconomic programmes, the root cause of the problem lies in the fact that they are pursuing a line which neglects the role of the masses in economic, political and social life. Consequently, the contradiction between the ruling circles (including the bureaucracy) and the working masses keeps growing. This has been one of the main factors behind the disavowal of proclaimed slogans and the fall of a number of national progressive regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America since the early 1960s.

Today, significantly, the idea that the imperialist powers

bear not only a material, but also a *moral* responsibility for the current state of affairs is gaining ground. After all, in the colonial era they were the ones who unscrupulously exploited these people and seriously retarded their independent social, economic and political development for decades. They are the ones who continue to exploit the national wealth and human resources in these countries. They are the ones who have built up powerful economies at the expense of the developing countries (and by exploiting their own working classes).

Actions by the international community should, I think, be concentrated in key areas. This would involve placing barriers to the policy of plundering the young states' national wealth; organising through international institutions the broad and comprehensive participation of industrial countries in financing Third World national programmes; giving effect to the principles of new international economic relations, i.e., granting peoples the opportunity to participate more actively in the economic, trade and other spheres of life of the world community; and, of course, ensuring the participation of all states in carrying out specific pledges to accelerate development. The UN could take on the task of organising and directing this process.

Two basic propositions would therefore have to be implemented. Firstly, governments of developing countries would have to maintain strict compliance with UN-coordinated programmes for their socioeconomic advance, and not use the allocated money for other purposes (I have in mind enlisting greater material and technical aid for the Third World from industrial states). Secondly, appropriate legal principles for the regulation of necessary funding would have to be worked out (the UN could form a committee to draw up a long-term programme—30 years for example—for top-priority areas of development in these regions).

Such a course means that plans for industrial growth and the modernisation of agriculture, organically linked to social aims and tasks, would naturally take account of qualitatively new structures in economic relations, scientific and technological achievements, and the questions of ecology, the international division of labour and integration.

I believe that in order to carry out long-term development programmes in the Third World, the following steps are necessary:

- to defer loan repayments for the young states up to the end of this century;
- to write off the larger part of the debts since most, if not all of the original debt has already been covered by the interest payments¹⁴;
- to treat the remaining sums as long-term loans without interest, granted for 50 or more years;
- to start elaborating new principles for state and private crediting of this group of regions so as to guarantee the use of funds in key areas and ensure the social and economic role of financing;
- to deduct 10% to 15% of today's spending on nuclear weapons for the UN development fund.

The question of arms-purchase loans should be examined separately. It is known that most developing countries are armed in excess of their defence needs. States expecting UN aid should first cease buying and producing arms.

This would also require working out principles for international trade, lifting the customs tariffs on Third World exports to the US and Western Europe, and safeguarding a balanced growth of prices for exported raw materials and imported finished goods.

Naturally, this is far from a complete list of measures for overcoming "underdevelopment". The *international community has a duty towards developing nations* to analyse the experience amassed, collect and study new proposals, and adopt the best solutions.

¹ See *AIB Dritte Welt Zeitschrift*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 5-15.

² See Fidel Castro, *The World Economic and Social Crisis. Report to*

the Seventh Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Havana, 1983.

³ *Pravda*, May 18, 1989.

⁴ *Studien- und Seminarhinweise, Leninsche Theorie über den Imperialismus*, Berlin, 1988, p. 129.

⁵ *Handbuch Entwicklungsländer*, Berlin, 1987, pp. 72, 74.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 127-129.

⁷ *Studien- und Seminarhinweise*, p. 127.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Klaus Schröder, "Der Weg in die Verschuldungskrise. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", *Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, Vol. 33-34/88, Bonn, August 12, 1988, pp. 1-6.

¹⁰ See Wladimir Gurewitsch, *Abrüstung und Entwicklung*, Moscow, 1987, pp. 17-21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹² *Studien- und Seminarhinweise...*, p. 124.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁴ Ramzi Zaki, *A Critical View of the History of Backwardness*, Kuwait, 1987, pp. 302-303 (in Arabic).

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CULTURE MUST BE PROTECTED

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In the 1960s, not an easy time for the Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary movement, the slogan of the Cuban revolution, "Cuba—Yes, Yankees—No!", rang like a tocsin around the world. And it was then that John Kennedy, the US President, proclaimed his so-called Alliance for Progress.¹ But the Western Hemisphere's first victorious socialist revolution provoked strong opposition to Alliance policies, including its cultural line. Then as now, our northern neighbour tried persistently to suppress the revolutionary consciousness of the Latin American intelligentsia, to tame its innovative spirit, and to neutralise and, wherever possible, draw its leading lights over to the counterrevolutionary camp. In other words, to accustom us to the "American way of life", to destroy our identity.

The single aim was, after the example of Puerto Rico, to turn the enormous spiritual world of the region's peoples into a kind of conglomerate under the aegis of the US Information Agency (USIA) and big cultural octopuses like the Ford, Rockefeller and Guggenheim foundations; and to force our journalists, long committed to national and anti-imperialist traditions, into partnership with the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), the Inter-American As-

sociation of Broadcasters (IAAB) and the three major US radio and television networks—ABC, CBS and NBC. In short, to convert Latin American culture into a sort of North American dependency.

Cultural policy is inseparable from a state's general line or economic processes. In fact, it is not simply associated with, but firmly tied to them. When a US cultural foundation grants a scholarship to a Latin American painter, this is done not only out of the recognition of his or her artistic merits, but also as a political investment. Such is the situation in all fields of culture. At each stage of the expansion of imperialism it is only the tactics which change.

For a long time the North American empire ignored our culture. This aspect of the mestizo peoples held no interest for a strong young nation. By the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal this trend had begun to change, although the Cold War soon put a stop to it. This paralysis lasted until the 1960s, when the Cuban revolution revealed Latin American literature to the world, as it were, causing a surge of interest. The successes of this revolution explain both the emergence of the Alliance for Progress and the United States' sudden attention to a culture which up to then it had regarded simply as a variety of folklore.

PARTY PRESS IN THE FOREFRONT

How did Communists react to imperialist cultural expansion? What was their response to the attempts to reform Latin America's national consciousness and gain control over the mass media in an era of scientific and technological advance?

Firstly, I should stress that the Latin American Com-

munists have always drawn inspiration from the *example of the great fighters and thinkers* of the 19th century: the ideas and achievements of Simon Bolivar, which were then taken up by Jose Marti; the feats of Jose de San Martin, Bernardo O'Higgins, Antonio Maceo, Francisco Morazan, Francisco Santander and other independence leaders; the profoundly national and patriotic works of the Latin American authors of the 19th and mid-20th centuries (the Argentinians Jose Ingenieros, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, and Juan Bautista Alberdi; the Colombian Baldomero Sanin Cano; and the unforgettable Costa Rican Joaquin Garcia Monge; the Venezuelan anti-imperialist Catholic Mario Briceño Iragorry; and the outstanding works of the Mexican humanist writer Alfonso Reyes...). Within our own generation, this has inspired such hardened revolutionaries as the "general of the free people", Augusto Cesar Sandino of Nicaragua; the "knight of the revolution", Gustavo Machado of Venezuela; and the brilliant Marxist thinker, Jose Carlos Mariategui. These make up a wellspring of thought and action for all Latin American patriots.

In order to reply as to how the Communists have fought against US cultural expansion, I must first mention the *militant party press and other progressive periodicals*. They have played a significant role in restoring the indigenous cultural identity of the continent's peoples and in upholding their past. The example set by this left-wing journalism is of great importance to current and future generations. Such an assessment has no hint of partiality because it is based on Marxist-Leninist principles and the supreme national and Latin American interest.

It is pertinent here to recall the publications of Joaquin Garcia Monge in the Costa Rican magazine *Repertorio Americano* (1919-1958). Besides further study, these also deserve new facsimile editions since they are an authentic chronicle of the struggle of the region's peoples over decades. The newspaper *Libertad*, founded in Mexico by Venezuelan exiles Gustavo Machado and Salvador de la Plaza, played an important part in the fight against the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez. The experience gained from the workers' newspapers that sprang up in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay after the Great October Socialist Revolution was later borrowed and developed in other countries of the continent.

As revolutionary thought matured here, official communist-party publications began to emerge despite persecutions, repression and restrictions, which still persist even under democratic regimes. Some of the most prominent of these are the Colombian newspaper *Voz*, formerly *Voz Proletaria*, Chile's *El Siglo*, Venezuela's *Tribuna Popular*, and the Brazilian and Uruguayan weeklies *Voz da Unidadi* and *El Popular*.

Politics is not the only subject dealt with by the communist press. It plays a special role in defending the culture, the national riches built up by the continent's indigenous population—theatre, folk dances, music in all its expressions, sculpture and literature.

Admittedly, the progressive bourgeois-liberal press is

also important in this sense. Hundreds of honest journalists, from Argentina to Mexico, are working to end their peoples' cultural alienation by exposing social inequality and upholding democratic freedoms and all human rights, including social.

AGGRESSION ON THE AIR

The Cuban and then the Sandinist revolutions led to basic shifts in the consciousness of progressive intellectuals. They are chiefly divided now on their attitude to the new Nicaragua, the leadership of which contains several prominent intellectuals. Insidious attacks against it come only from the hack journalists who belong to that dishonest and well-paid press elite which serves imperialism (and quite often also the CIA). Dismayed by Cuba's advances in science, education, health care and production, they have turned their attentions to an embattled and boycotted Nicaragua forced to defend itself in a dirty war openly unleashed by imperialist mercenaries. Reports for Latin American television, predominantly controlled by Washington, are a major factor in the propaganda war on the airwaves. Some of these have even gone so far as to blame the popular regime in Nicaragua for the genocide carried out by Somoza. In Venezuela such programmes appear on the 4th channel, which is closely tied to US transnationals and acts as a mouthpiece for their selfish interests. Another example of "cultural aggression" is the functioning of Radio Marti and subversive TV broadcasts to Cuba.

Television in Latin America is fairly *dependent*. It ought not to be forgotten that our continent, in terms of the organisation of broadcasting, is a special case. Only in North America is it, for the most part, privately-owned. As soon as a Latin American government tries to introduce some ethics into television or lower the dose of sex, violence and drugs in programmes bearing the trademark "Made in USA", objections immediately flood in from private business and accusations are made about infringements of the freedom of speech. The same arguments are used against attempts to protect our children from a spate of dubious and morally harmful publications, because for businessmen freedom of the press becomes free enterprise. This is the doctrine of a "free flow of information" imposed by the US after World War II. It's not hard to see that the bulk of this flow is directed towards the Third World, i.e., where it profits the imperialists most.

Fighting on the cultural front is not easy. Studies carried out by the Central University of Venezuela reveal that daily TV programmes feature dozens of US cities for each Latin American city shown; for each European programme of real cultural value our viewers are regularly poisoned by dozens of invidious North American clips. For the representatives of democratic and progressive thought, not to mention the Communists, access to major TV and radio stations is arbitrarily limited. The UNESCO declaration on the accessibility of the media to popular masses still

remains a utopian ideal. That is why a purposeful fight for a real democratisation of the mass media is particularly important in Latin America.

GLOBAL MIND-FISHING

Imperialism is not a "paper tiger" when it comes to culture, like the mass media and other spheres of public activity. Recently, the USIA launched an international programme to encourage ties with journalists, writers, scientists and university circles in many countries. Judging by its name, the *World Net*, the programme sounds fairly broad-based and democratic. Alas, its ideological content is dubious.

These days it no longer seems extraordinary when left-wing journalists in Latin American capitals put questions directly to White House spokesmen through a communications satellite, or when their press services in turn arrange Fidel Castro's interviews. Nowadays more and more Latin American artists are holding exhibitions in the USA, while increasing numbers of students, musicians, writers, even cultural figures from revolutionary Cuba—the eminent writer Miguel Barnet, for example—are visiting the country. Recent experience shows that a fishing for minds, attempts to neutralise independent thought, has become daily practice for imperialism.

Our awareness of this does not mean we should limit ourselves simply to exposing or criticising it, because the world is now unprecedentedly interdependent in economic, political, cultural, social and human terms. *But interdependence is one thing and dependence quite another matter.* Yet in the field of culture the imperialists offer us a very peculiar variety of interdependence, with a clear bias towards our spiritual enslavement.

This aim is served by the "friendly" exchanges between US and Latin American journalists that began with Venezuela in 1960; by direct cultural penetration via records, cassettes, disco music, hard rock and punk; by the Pavlovian craving of our young people for the so-called "American way of life", be it dance, clothes, sex or drugs.

Foreign infiltration into such a fundamental sphere of culture as the national language particularly worries us. Puerto Rico, for example, in the nine decades of US imperial rule, has been fighting stubbornly to preserve the purity of Spanish speech, which is suffering an increasing influx of anglicisms. The word "parking" now exists in almost all Latin American countries, and even the verb "parquear" (to park) has been invented. Most lexical hybrids are coined by the people themselves. For instance, the Chileans use "la tinca" for presentiment, from the English word "to think"; Venezuelans, Colombians and the inhabitants of Central America have refashioned the English "watchman" into "guachimán", a word often to be heard in the oil fields and banana plantations. It was after World War II that a "culture industry", encompassing all spheres of intellectual activity, grew up alongside the military-industrial complex. North American comics flooded the

planet, first via the press and then also through films, TV and video. Mickey Mouse and Popeye became known all over the world. Countless films brought Tarzan back to Africa from Hollywood. Along with political propaganda, neocolonialist ideas of the white man's superiority implied that the mestizo peoples were inherently unable to overcome backwardness, ignorance or epidemics on their own.

THE "CULTURE INDUSTRY"— A SERIOUS BUSINESS

The experience of the past few decades has shown that the US military-industrial complex cannot be viewed in isolation from cultural policy. It would perhaps be more correct to speak of a *military-industrial-cultural complex*, because the views imperialism is imposing through Latin America's mass media aim to lull and deceive public consciousness. At the same time continued attempts are being made to justify aggressive actions against Cuba, the intervention in Nicaragua, the occupation of tiny Grenada (which is supposed to have "threatened" the security of the United States), actions against Panama, customs protectionism, and the malicious anticommunist campaign being conducted in all possible forms and through all channels. Here a potent weapon like television is used, along with regular reports from experts on international affairs (Sovietologists, Cubanologists, Sinologists) who are slowly but surely getting their hands on the "big press", radio and cinema in Latin America.

Underlying this many-sided activity is the skillful use of the *theory and sociology of communications, social psychology, statistics and the technique of public opinion polls*, the foundation for which was laid back in the 1930s by Louis de Harris and George Gallup. In this sense so-called Latin American political science is only a rehash (of course, with certain exceptions) of the theory of propaganda being evolved by research institutes and universities in the USA. I cannot but note here that the socialist countries and most communist parties have noticeably fallen behind in the study and management of public opinion. By and large, our propaganda is too haphazard. The United States still plays the dominant role here.

The "culture industry", whilst not being purely material production, nor at the same time belonging either to the service sector or to the third (middleman) level of the economy, instead forms a *separate*, so-called fourth sector, embracing the whole of informatics and employing a greater workforce than the three traditional forms of economic activity combined. Suffice it to say that annual capital investments in the US mass media exceed \$100 billion. A similar picture, with some national variations, is observable in most Latin American countries. The Venezuelan media, for example, annually earn about 20 billion bolívars, which their proprietors can convert into dollars at the official exchange rate as a special privilege.²

In practically the whole of Latin America, elections within these "representative democracies" have also become part

of the *advertising industry*. In our country, both major participants in the 30-year-old two-party system, Accion Democratica's Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats from COPEI, import publicity advisers and public opinion experts from the USA and the FRG. Each of these parties spends over one billion bolivars on prolonged election campaigns, and their candidates and leaders are given whole pages in the press and prime time on the radio and television free of charge. These privileges, with a total lack of such facilities for other political organisations, make a mockery of the constitutional equality of all before the law. Politics, in the words of the French poet Paul Valery, acts as the highest form of spiritual expression. If this is really so, then obviously this way of organising elections is a plain attack on culture.

OUR SUCCESSES AND WEAKNESSES

Latin America's peoples owe much of their cultural development to communist and workers' parties and national liberation movements. The Communists have invariably launched the campaigns to end illiteracy, improve vocational training, democratise the school system, and set up new higher education and research centres. And to varying degrees they have helped as much in parliamentary struggles as in practical activity on the cultural front, promoting laws that favour the spiritual advancement of the people and their artistic creativity.

In the field of science and technology, Communists have been advocating higher budgetary allocations and broader ties with all states irrespective of their socioeconomic systems. Many Latin American republics have already signed bilateral agreements with scientific and research institutions in the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and even Cuba, despite the pressure and resistance from Washington.

Recently, in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, a new aspect of cultural activity has arisen, one connected with protecting nature, with defending and improving the environment, and with an ecological drive of such proportions that the Greens now form powerful mass movements everywhere. These interlock with the working people's actions for their rights and enjoy great authority. Gone are the times when a Brazilian general could cynically declare that he preferred death from environmental pollution to death from hunger in order to justify the construction of ecologically hazardous industrial plants by transnational corporations, and the destruction of Brazilian rain forests, the source of oxygen for the entire planet. The Greens' struggle is a just and progressive cause and is being waged for popular benefit. We as Communists cannot stand aside. It

is now our duty to unite efforts with all conservationist forces.

Although this is for each party itself to decide, central committees of Latin American communist parties could form special departments on culture. Today man himself should be the focus of our attention. And in this sense the struggle for an advanced humanistic culture, like the campaign for peace, for the prevention of a nuclear or ecological catastrophe, means the fight for human survival.

Communist cultural activity in many Latin American countries is systematic and dynamic. There have been moments, it must be admitted, when we also fell prey to dogmatism and sectarianism (above all when Andrei Zhdanov was responsible for ideology in the CPSU). But this is now history. The new stage, proceeding under the banner of perestroika, opens up new avenues for the communist movement and progressive intellectuals.

Many Communists are active on the cultural front. However, they still have to develop a *collective awareness of the humanitarian and immense political value of this endeavour*. How, other than by a lack of broad knowledge, to explain the fact that some among us still consider anti-Marxist the position of those who simultaneously share the views of Bolivar and Marti? There are also those who do not yet understand that Christian communities and liberation theology act as a principal ally in the struggle for national freedom, and that this implies no concessions from either religion or historical materialism. In the same spirit of self-criticism we ought to admit that opponents of the intelligentsia are still to be found within communist ranks, people who have forgotten that Marx, Engels and Lenin were from this milieu. No real Marxist-Leninist can afford to be contemptuous of intellectuals because that would mean a negation of Marxism itself.

We must try and overcome those dogmatic and sectarian errors, our primary task being to uproot the reasons behind them. Only then will Latin American Communists be wholly able to lead the struggle for the defence and advancement of culture.

¹ The Alliance for Progress—a programme of social, economic and political development for Latin America, advanced by John Kennedy in 1961 with the aim of impeding revolutionary changes on the continent and maintaining its political and economic dependence on the USA. - Ed.

² Certain entrepreneurs gained from being able to use the dollar's official (state) exchange rate of 14.50 bolivars. For the rest of the population the rate was 30 bolivars to the dollar. The single floating rate of 35 to 38 bolivars to the dollar was introduced in 1989.

THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY

TIPPING THE BALANCE: THE ARMED FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA

Juan TUTUY

representative of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) on WMR

The series of mutinies in Argentina; the "dirty war" in Central America, Colombia and Peru; the recent plebiscite in Uruguay on a law of amnesty for those guilty of human rights violations during the years of the dictatorship (1973-1983); the defence of sovereignty over the Panama Canal, the coup in Paraguay and the fall of Stroessner's dictatorship... What binds all these events together? The military stand at their centre everywhere. This is why I consider it timely to discuss the role of the armed forces in the countries of the Latin American continent.¹

THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE

In 1968-1975, our people were the protagonists in anti-oligarchic, anti-imperialist and genuinely patriotic transformations directed by the armed forces. This rendered the so-called Peruvian process unique. Its central importance lay in the fact that the long-standing alliance between the oligarchy and the armed forces, between the right wing and the army fell apart. During the last 60 years Peru has only twice had constitutional transfers of power, in 1945 and 1985, whereas coups have always served to consolidate the domination of oligarchy and imperialism.

But what happened in 1968 was different: after assuming power, the military made profound structural changes to the country: they carried out an agrarian reform; introduced worker participation in the management of capitalist enterprises; and nationalised the foreign-owned petroleum and steel industries, and the railways. They also established control over banks and mass communications, formerly the property of the oligarchy, and then handed them over to representative public bodies. They recognised more labour unions than any preceding government, respected folk customs, particularly among the Indians, and gave the Quechua language an official status. In this way they smashed the old oligarchic structures, limited capitalist exploitation and opened the way for new social processes.

On the international scene, the military regime pursued a policy of non-alignment, and developed relations with the socialist countries, including Cuba. It also initiated the first multilateral talks this century in Latin America aimed at limiting conventional arms. The idea found reflection in the

Declaration of Ayacucho²: along with noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states, it emphasised the need for real armaments cuts, for an end to purchases of offensive arms and for the reinvestment of these funds in development.

The dominant classes in Peru, their parties and economic groups (and also certain "left" circles), along with North American imperialism, systematically boycotted the military regime, eventually bringing down its leader, General Juan Velasco, in August 1975. Ideological confusion, distrust of the masses, and differences within the government itself, all played into its opponents' hands. The process of social transformations was paralysed, and a regressive trend began.

Nevertheless, the period left a deep mark. Peru has changed irreversibly in many ways. Today it presents a very distinctive picture: a politically active population inclined toward the Left; a single trade union centre, the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP), 90% of whose leaders are Communists; a vast and dynamic mass movement, including peasants, young people and women; and a United Left which can realistically aspire to state power.

North American political scientist Cynthia McClintock, who has long been studying Peru, notes that the present unusual political situation is in part a legacy of the particular experience of the period 1968-1975. In her view, that regime started a process of mobilisation and political reform which went much farther than the officers themselves had expected.³

PENTAGON INTERVENTION

In 1975 Pentagon placemen took command of the armed forces. Since then the Peruvian army has again come under the control of reactionaries, now more aware of the fundamental strategic role of the army in maintaining the system. To avert a repetition of the "bad example" of General Velasco, they have redoubled their efforts to inculcate a spirit of anti-communism into the army. By playing on the prejudices of the military, the reactionaries are fostering a sort of caste-like cohesion—in fact they are being isolated in a "barracks ghetto". Meanwhile civil society sits and twiddles its thumbs.

As a result the officer corps is drawing closer to the Pentagon and its ideology and politics than to the institutions and aims of their own country. This paradox is explained by the fact that the US has been more assiduously working with the Latin American militaries, even behind the backs of their governments, in accordance with the principle of "ignoring the authorities and establishing army-to-army relations".

It should be noted that Washington's familiar pragmatism does not mean a disregard for ideology. The Documents Santa Fe I and Santa Fe II are testimony to this in that they theoretically underpin and determine the aims of US policy in Latin America. Santa Fe II clearly distinguishes

between government and power; it defines permanent government as comprising those institutional structures "which do not change with elections: the military, the judiciary..."⁴ Based on this postulate, the chapter "Strategy of Work With the Permanent Institutions" concludes that the United States ought to "extend its aid programmes to the Latin American military".⁵ The report's authors even speak of a rapprochement with the Cuban armed forces!

Washington's particular attention to Latin America's armies is not a recent thing. There is good reason to remind ourselves of the Chilean patriot, General Carlos Prats' warning: "I believe that neither President Allende nor the Popular Unity parties know just how profound is North American influence in our armed forces."⁶ However, it would be wrong to think that the region's armies are totally subject to North American diktat. It would be an oversimplification to regard their positions and actions purely as being determined by imperialist designs. Refusing to make an objective analysis and repeating timeworn formulas is no way to understand the complex social processes.

The doctrine of national security remains in force, not merely insisting on "ideological frontiers" and "East-West conflict", but seeking in the main to destroy the communist movement—and not just politically. There are plans to physically exterminate its leaders. The 17th conference of the American armies, held in November 1987 at Mar del Plata, Argentina, enunciated a common imperialist strategy for the region: to crush left-wing forces and mass organisations, including progressive currents in the Catholic Church, in the course of a "low-intensity conflict".⁷ This attitude has been confirmed by the Ikle Commission report *Discriminate Deterrence*, which recommends enhanced military and technical training, logistical support and intelligence as a means of preparing for low-intensity wars in Latin America; and broader links with the new generation of officers.⁸ This involves a strategy of confrontation and war in the vein of the old Reagan concept of "peace through strength", a modern version of the imperial sentiment in ancient Rome: *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (If you wish for peace, prepare for war). On the Pentagon's directions, brutal counterinsurgency is now being conducted in Central America, Peru and Colombia. Much of the responsibility for the crimes being perpetrated in these countries also rests with extreme anti-communist civilian circles.

GET THE ARMY OUT OF ITS "GHETTO"

If imperialism's strategy gives the Latin American armies, in Colonel Horacio Ballester's words, the role of "executors of other people's orders",⁹ what can the democratic forces there do to oppose it? In the search for an answer to this question we should avoid one-sidedness and oversimplification.

In particular, viewing the complex situation in Peru, I must admit that the army is a political reality which cannot be ignored. The Left tended always to use two modes of

conduct with respect to it: the reformist, which boiled down to blandishments and self-deception; and the other, "left radical", a vulgar anti-militarism which hindered the development of progressive and patriotic elements in the armed forces. This latter mode played into the hands of the reactionaries in the army, who insisted that an organised people is the foe of the military, proving advantageous to the Pentagon in its strategy of work with the permanent institutions. Both these stands have been shown to be wholly inconsistent. History has revealed more than once that not all men in uniform are "gorillas".

We should abandon the traditional approaches and advance, if not a platform, at least a set of realistic proposals which would confront imperialism's general line on the armed forces in the continent. In denouncing the ominous national security doctrine and working out a new one tied to growth, disarmament and the New International Economic Order, the democratic forces already have certain precedents they can turn to. Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, the former minister of foreign affairs in Velasco's government, has raised the need to devise a "Peruvian doctrine of national security" which must include the betterment of the nation's conditions of life and the reduction of social imbalances and inequalities.

The Argentine Congress has already passed a new defence law which prohibits the army and intelligence services from meddling in internal conflicts and from collecting and processing political information unrelated to the danger of an external conflict. A group of Venezuelan officers has put forward the so-called Kayros project, which outlines a democratisation of the army. In Brazil, a similar proposal is also being studied. In both cases the talk is not of incorporating the national security doctrine¹⁰ into national legislation—something desired by army circles linked to the Pentagon—but rather of working out *alternative plans*. This is extremely relevant, since the defensive or offensive, progressive or retrograde character of a given military doctrine is bound to influence the mentality of the officer cadres.

I believe it fundamentally important to restructure training programmes in military and police schools, to remove their anti-communist bias and to impart to them a scientific and patriotic character.

As a safeguard against attempts to turn the army into a fascist force, the proposal on *democratising it* by giving the military political rights and allowing a free exchange of ideas within the armed forces merits serious attention. It is essential that servicemen should be able to refuse to carry out patently illegal orders related to torture, summary executions or genocide. This will help put an end to the army's isolation from civil society and enable it to get out of its "ghetto".

The Communists believe that this new military doctrine must be based on a *policy of disarmament* that is valid not only for the great powers but also for the Third World countries. It is necessary to breathe new life into the historic initiatives of the states in our region: the call contained in

the Declaration of Punta del Este (1967) for a reduction in military expenditures and the use of those funds for development; the Treaty of Tlatelolco, aimed at prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America; and the Declaration of Ayacucho, which I have mentioned above.

Obviously, such a course would be best served, in the words of the Programme of the United Left, by a "left, national and popular government" able to uphold genuine popular power. But there is no point in simply waiting for this to happen. We must act now.

¹ See *WMR*, No. 12, 1988; Nos. 3 and 4, 1989.

² Signed in December 1974 by Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.

³ *Democracia y violencia en el Peru*, Lima, 1988, p. 37.

⁴ "Una estrategia para America Latina en los 90", *Envio*, Managua, No. 90, 1988, p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶ Carlos Prats, *Una vida por la legalidad*, Mexico, 1975, p. 87.

⁷ See Jaime Barrios, "Low-Intensity Warfare: Reasons and Rationale", *WMR*, No. 7, 1989.

⁸ *Discriminate Deterrence*, Washington, 1988.

⁹ See Ernesto Lopez Meyer, Horacio Ballester, "Not to Be Pawns in an Alien Game," *WMR*, No. 4, 1989.

¹⁰ This doctrine has so discredited itself that even the Defence Minister of Guatemala, the "land of perennial dictatorships", General Hector Gramajo has been compelled to admit: "The religious worship of the national security doctrine is harmful to the cause of freedom and progress" (*Uno*, Madrid, No. 5, 1989, p. 20).

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DEMOLISHING STEREOTYPES

Leena PAUKKU

Secretary, International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ)

Humankind is today living through a qualitatively new stage which promises an end to alienation and to the negative stereotypes in nations' perceptions of each other. Those stereotypes have long prevailed in the world. Unfortunately, we journalists have done much to make them an integral part of readers' consciousness.

The problem of distorting "the image of others" is as old as the hills, but has become particularly pointed since the Cold War, when all world affairs were seen through the prism of East-West rivalry. As a result, the dividing line now runs across many fields of sociopolitical life.

This is clearly reflected in parallel international organisations, not least those involving journalists. The antipode to our International Organisation of Journalists is the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). Looking back on that period, one is tempted to ask: Once such a differentiation has occurred, does it have any positive aspects? Certainly. I would mention the fact that by uniting in its ranks progressive representatives of the press, the IOJ played an important role in furthering democratic journalism and in training journalists for the developing countries.

The growing warmth in international relations recently has changed the world perceptibly, especially Europe. Prompted by the imperatives of new thinking, European journalists have begun to look afresh at the autarchy inherent in our organisation and come to realise that confront-

tation and ideological rivalry merely reproduce the nutrient medium for propaganda stereotypes.

Is there any sense in this today when the swift information revolution, riding the crest of ever more powerful computer equipment, is sweeping away old barriers, and drawing people closer together on a new, universal basis? Our era demands a *free exchange of information* from the "world data bank". It is hard to imagine now that a country could exist outside this exchange system. The information revolution itself raises the question of the integration of efforts by representatives of the mass media.

The impact of the Helsinki process on media people in Europe was such that both in the Western and Eastern parts the international bodies of journalists revealed a *tendency towards accommodation*. The first meeting of their representatives took place in Helsinki in 1985; the second was organised two years later in Vienna. The November 1988 Moscow meeting on the subject of "Journalists in Europe: How We See Our Common Home and Each Other" marked a new stage in such contacts within the European process. Different questions were discussed during these forums, above all the central theme of the journalists' role in the prevention of a nuclear threat to the very existence of humankind. Not only governments and parliaments, but also the public at large now bear responsibility for the preservation of peace and for general security. Journalists, of course, cannot remain aloof.

The objectivity, truthfulness, and fullness of information are the "three pillars" on which democratic journalism committed to peace rests. However, as Josef Cassar (Malta), editor of *Independence Print*, told the Moscow forum, man is conformist by nature and journalists are no exception. Hence the temptation to follow propaganda stereotypes which can be not only a reflection of their own views, but also the result of the influence of publishers and mighty political forces. Western journalists, for example, tend to

reproach their counterparts in the socialist states for being constrained by party directives. But the restructuring process in the USSR and a number of other socialist countries shows that the press there is now distinguished by openness, pluralism and that it widely reflects public opinion. On the other hand, can one deny the impact on Western journalism of such factors as the omnipotence of the mass media monopolies or the advertisers' interests? Can one imagine here an independent journalist writing an article advising the public not to buy IBM computers because of the company's links with the armaments industry?

It is perfectly clear that improving East-West relations are forcing anti-Sovietism, anti-communism and anti-Americanism, the source for propaganda stereotypes, ofstage. If journalists do away with the "enemy image", then the cause for the cruel dilemma, "Whoever is not with us is against us", as well as for the misinterpretation of facts, events and tendencies in the modern world and national characteristics will disappear. The call to "know each other better" is at present not just a wish, but a *vital necessity*.

For journalists this is particularly important. The overwhelming majority of the world's population is not in direct contact on the international communications level. So they continue to form their ideas of other countries and peoples mainly from indirect sources, chiefly the mass media, whose work in helping people form an objective opinion about the life of other nations therefore acquires exceptional importance.

Here, the IOJ's aims largely coincide with those of the International Federation of Journalists. Both organisations are worried that the journalist, as an active moulder of public opinion, is becoming an object of extremely diverse pressures, bans and even persecution. According to data from the International Committee of the Red Cross, during the last ten years at least 500 journalists have been killed in the course of their professional duty, most of them in Latin America.

We are strongly in favour of an *international convention* which would bind participating states to provide conditions for the fruitful and safe work of mass media representatives. The IFJ is also doing much in this direction. As contacts between the two major international associations of journalists in Europe deepen in professional, social and humanitarian matters, it is becoming ever more obvious that they have far more common than opposed interests and that the difficulties on the road to cooperation are surmountable.

Their conviction in this has enabled several of my colleagues in the IFJ to suggest that the *rapprochement between the IOJ and the IFJ in Europe may result eventually in the creation of a single international organisation of journalists*. I would welcome such a solution of the problem. In reality, however, the idea of an international union of all journalistic forces is a little premature. We have to recognise that the existing situation is largely a result of our own tendency to supply readers with stereotypes. Only by demolishing our own stereotypes can we feel ourselves to be a single community of journalists committed to humanistic principles and the dissemination of truthful information in the name of peace and progress. It is this kind of mass media organisation that our common European home will need. By defending the right of journalists to objective analysis it will contribute decisively to its own construction on foundations of trust, universal security and cooperation.

Certain steps made towards a strengthening of mutual understanding between journalists in Europe show that a trend towards cooperation and the elimination of the IFJ-IOJ split does exist and can be a healthy start for the future reunification of the international journalist movement. The next meeting of representatives from the two large organisations of journalists will be held in Poland in September. I hope it will mark a new milestone on this road.

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"I BELIEVE IN THE TRIUMPH OF GOOD"

Interview with Nobel Prize Winner Egyptian Writer Naguib MAHFOUZ

Naguib Mahfouz, 77, is the founder of the modern Arabic novel, and the first writer in Arabic to win the Nobel Prize for Literature (1988). He is the author of 30 major novels, as well as numerous collections of stories, film scripts and plays. He is

a profoundly national writer deeply committed to his people.

When I was arranging the interview for *WMR*, I told him that it would be published in a communist journal and asked whether this might not cause problems since there is a campaign against him by extremists calling themselves Islamic fundamentalists. "I do not accept the communist philosophy," he replied, "but I am always prepared to enter into a dialogue with the Communists. I welcome the settlement of political and ideological differences by means of common sense and logic rather than violence. Everybody desires international agreement and cooperation, the lifting of the

threat of nuclear war and local conflicts. That is why I am prepared to give this interview."

This was a sort of prelude to our interview.

Ibrahim FATHI
Egyptian Marxist journalist

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

- *In your Nobel prize acceptance speech, you said that you regard your work as the offspring of a marriage between Ancient Egyptian and Islamic civilisations influenced by Western culture.*

By "civilisation" or "culture" I mean general human spiritual values and ideas rather than national concepts. As an optimist I believe that the good on which these values are based will triumph. Above all, I believe in truth as the sole reflection of justice. The ideals of this perception of life have existed since the time of the ancient civilisations. Later, they passed into Islamic culture, which has absorbed the values of many peoples. I believe that the exchange of values between civilisations in the course of human history, and their interaction, still represent a shining example for us.

- *In that same speech you mentioned the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, although he was very pessimistic about the triumph of good over evil.*

I have some fundamental criticisms to make of Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Treatise on Lasting Peace) from the point of view of rationalism, experience and reason. At the same time I very much admire his philosophy. Of course, you don't have to agree with his ideas. I think that discussions on philosophy, on the relation between human consciousness and the external world, are important. I am against those who deny the role of reason and regard it as no more than the passive contemplation of reality through the emotions and sense perceptions. In art, this amounts to a superficial and photographic representation of existing reality. On the other hand I do not agree with those who set reason over and above everything else, and who regard the real world as nothing. This way leads to abstractions, to a flight from reality, and to indifference. In other words, to the attitude of a detached observer. Both reason and the surrounding reality have an active role to play, and the possibilities for intercourse between them are endless.

I also respect Kant's moral approach to history. Man is a biological creature, but he possesses consciousness, the supreme form in which the real world is reflected. Conscience and ethics are independent of the individual's sensual, egoistic perception, but they must accord with each other. Briefly, I do not follow the famous philosopher literally, but try in my thinking and writing to conjoin science and religion, to combine people's wishes and basic needs in

such a way as to link them to freedom, the need to resist aggression and the desire for peace.

- *Could one say that your philosophy of art is based on a comprehensive view of life, unwavering optimism, progress and faith in science?*

Of course, I have my own philosophy, rooted in personal experience, meditations on reality, reading, and on the totality of my views. But this does not mean that everyone has their own specific philosophy. The world is not a box full of questions which science can answer one by one until there are no more. Quite the opposite, it is a boundless expanse constantly extended by each new scientific discovery. Even the best social system is incapable of sharing out happiness equally among people. Economic, social and political problems, for all their paramount importance, are not the only things that can shake the universe: there is more to the diversity of life, to personal relations, intuition and the subconscious than these problems. This is why scientific inquiry in nature and society must involve artistic imagination and creativity as well as a healthy and inquisitive scepticism.

THE AESTHETIC WORLD

- *Is there any correspondence between this philosophy and the content of your literary works?*

I should very much like to think so. That is how it ought to be. But a lot of what the artist creates is unconscious. I don't think there is any automatic correspondence between a writer's philosophy and the objective logic of his literary world.

- *In the West you have been compared to Honoré de Balzac. His works impressed me deeply, as did the works of Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Charles Dickens and other great writers. One cannot help comparing your Cairo to Balzac's Paris, and to Dickens's London. Your descriptions of the real world are said to have much in common with those of Émile Zola.*

I am pleased to have learned from them.

- *But are there distinctions as well?*

Like the literary pioneers of the 19th century, I reject any counterpoising of life to art, or the claim that art, as some ideal, is higher than life. The living connection between art and human experience means that they go hand in hand.

Concerning the comparison with Zola, I differ from him in that I do not depict the seamy side of life in the minutest detail. I try to reveal what lies over and above everyday existence—the internal contradictions and storms of life raging over the world—by means of actual events and psychology.

In contrast to Balzac's novels, mine do not contain any detailed descriptions. I do not believe that I am capable of

expressing the world view of all the classes, and I do not assume that my novels are a reflection of the fullness of life. I merely try to show that ours is a changing world, that relations which existed in the past cannot be regarded as model ones, and that new values are always being born.

I think many people understand that I have not taken as my main task any superficial portrayal of social reality, something which is obvious to the naked eye. I strive to grasp the logic of continuity and change, the deep-seated structures of life; not just a particular underlying social reality, but its various types in all their diversity, movement and development. I try not to separate the individual personality, with his or her inner world, from the real world. At least, I have always sought to do this.

■ ***Some advocates of modernism maintain that the real world is, in fact, not all that real.***

Nowadays we all see the world very differently, and the area where most people's perceptions converge is not large. That is why existence and the world are not one and the same thing for everyone. It is true that in our world, where millions are dying from hunger, disease and war, we all live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. This is the most acute and most fundamental problem.

Incidentally, most people's ideas of the real world are influenced by the mass media, and are not based on personal impressions and experience. However, historical experience enables people to distinguish between truth and lies. We in the Third World cannot survive on empty slogans instead of bread, we cannot live in palaces like film stars, or dress like TV adverts. Our life is an incessant struggle to eke out a living. But there is an insignificant minority who have at their disposal all the brilliant trappings of the so-called consumer society. It is this minority which has a stake in spreading false notions of the real world.

FREEDOM, JUSTICE, SOCIALISM

■ ***We have come to the important problem of the Third World. You are one of those who believe that progress in art is not directly connected with economic progress.***

This is obvious. The relatively backward Russia of the late 19th and early 20th centuries reached the topmost heights in literature, art and scientific thinking. Earlier, Germany, fragmented into many weak states and principalities, produced its own giants in literature, philosophy and music. This does not mean, however, that progress in art is determined by economic backwardness. It does to some extent stimulate thought and will to overcome difficulties, and a life of ease and luxury does often lead a nation to

decadence. But the important thing is that there are types of contradictions which, accumulating at every level of social life, become the motive force and impetus for development. It is not each individual contradiction, but their whole interconnected totality that serves as a force acting to overcome backwardness. The struggle of opposites helps to attain the objectives of progress.

■ ***Here, perhaps, you are already approaching the problems of social struggle.***

I am not a Marxist. It seems to me that Marxism in Egypt, despite its popularity and intellectual appeal, tried to reduce all the difficulties in society to the problems of property, the nationalisation of foreign companies and the need for a scientific comprehension of the national problem and its perspectives. I think that the influence of Marxism on the various political forces in the country was greater than its immediate effect on the masses.

I myself believe in social justice and the people's right to freedom. I feel indignant when someone tries to reduce the concept of freedom to liberalism. To me, freedom is the removal of all obstacles to a nation's development—this is the kind of socialism I believe in. It stems from the urge for a democratic revolution, for the improvement, enlargement and deepening of rights and freedoms. The capitalists have stolen the liberty which the French Revolution, for instance, called for. The people carried out the revolution, and destroyed the Bastille, but power was usurped by the bourgeoisie, which made liberty a privilege for itself, a liberty which it betrayed under the banner of liberalism.

■ ***Each country has its own living historical legacy and its own present. Is not the main discovery you have made in literature the fact that history is, in effect, the present?***

I agree. History is not a nightmare from which I am trying to awake, as one of the characters in my novel *Joice* says. The hard logic of change and progress prevails over stagnation, inertness and regression.

Throughout its history the Egyptian people's creative talent has made a considerable contribution to general human culture. In my literary work I lay emphasis on the present in all its unpredictability. For my own part, I do not regard history as consisting merely of relics and vestiges of the past; it is also the present—it is not miracles or surprises which cannot be foreseen. I am striving to depict society in the intellectual and moral development of the people in our country. Humanity, I think, is defined by the actions of individuals in the course of history. All these actions serve to perfect our civilisation and enrich humanism.





HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

MARIA KOSZUTSKA: "SPINELESS PEOPLE ARE DANGEROUS"

The Polish Question at the 5th Congress of the Communist International

The 5th Congress of the Communist International, the first since Lenin's death, was held in Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924. The united front tactics of the working class switched to joint action "at the grassroots level"; the leaders of social democratic parties were exposed and denounced for "defecting to the left wing of the bourgeois camp". This turn strongly affected the long-smouldering differences within the leadership of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (KPRP).

An ultra-leftist group accused most Central Committee members, primarily its leaders, the so-called three Ws—Warski, Walecki and Wera (Maria Koszutska's party nom de guerre), of a conciliatory and opportunist attitude to the agrarian question and of a wrong approach to social democracy and to the parliamentary system. The Comintern Executive Council set up a Polish Commission in December 1922, which firmly rejected these charges and fully upheld the party's policy as adopted at the 2nd Congress of the KPRP in 1923. But the "Polish question" was revived at the 5th Congress of the Comintern.

A new Polish Commission was established under Joseph Stalin, who had become General Secretary of his party at its 9th Congress in 1922. The commission was in session on July 2 and 3, 1924. Representatives of different political currents spoke several times. The commission decided to dismiss the "three Ws" from the KPRP Central Committee.

Maria Koszutska¹ addressed the commission twice. We present her second statement, made on July 3, 1924, because this was the earliest indication of the dramatic fate that would befall Polish Communists during the 1930s. I am referring to the 1938 decision of the Comintern Executive Council on the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland. In February 1956 this verdict was condemned as groundless in a declaration from the PZPR and the communist parties whose representatives had backed the decision on the dissolution of the KPP (Bulgaria, Italy, Finland and the USSR). Another reason for the publication of this document is that it also offers much food for thought today.

FROM THE COMMISSION'S VERBATIM RECORD

Koszutska: Five minutes is not enough. I request a bigger slot. (Voice from the floor: "Take ten minutes.")

Comrade Stalin has tried to sort our affairs out and to grasp what ails us. We must thank him for it, but I can't agree with him on everything.

A great deal has been said here about the need to admit our mistakes. Maybe so. But, comrades, no one can deny that it is

much easier to confess than to disagree with those you would like to see eye to eye with. The latter is much harder.

And now about the charges levelled at our group.

I admit that in terms of practical leadership we had many shortcomings, largely because we had to stay abroad. But it is completely groundless of Stalin to charge that we supported opportunistic trends in the Russian and German parties.

First, about Russian affairs.

I must begin by rejecting once and for all everything that has been said about our alleged diplomacy. When Comrade Zinoviev made bold to accuse us of this from the congress rostrum, he simply proved that he did not know or understand us well enough—although as Chairman of the Comintern, he should have better knowledge and better judgment of the people who have led the party for many years. I will therefore refrain from arguing about the change in our orientation for the motives ascribed to us because I believe that statements of this kind in reference to us are wholly inadmissible. We have always expressed our profound convictions without any diplomacy.

Once more about the differences of opinion between us.

Comrade Stalin spoke about us as sentimental people who are afraid of any struggle at all and seek some kind of idyll. Those who, like myself, have survived three splits, know full well what party struggle is. We have fought tooth and nail many times against comrades who later became our ex-comrades.² We then fought bitterly within the Communist Party too. And suddenly we hear Szumski³ say here that the absence of a bitter struggle is our party's biggest fault. This comrade appears to be in the habit of speaking about things that are completely unfamiliar to him.

We have had our share of sharp clashes. We have fought bitterly over the agrarian question. For a long time, we heard words like "renegades"—just as we heard it here. Even that is not news to us. When at the 3rd Conference of our party I suggested, for the first time as an agenda item, a revision of our attitude to the agrarian question, some overzealous comrades—perhaps those who are doing it now—shouted "Treachery!" We fought resolutely against the views of Comrade Slusarski, who in fact sided with the KAPD.⁴ We have never feared bitter clashes.

It is not that we raised the question of the "methods of struggle" in connection with Russian affairs for fear that some comrade would tell another unpleasant thing best left unsaid, or out of compassion for those humiliated or injured. It is not an emotional matter. It is cold calculation. Ideological struggle and manoeuvring within the party in relation to the threat of any opposition are two different things, particularly in Russia. We all

know that it is one thing to fight against those who we believe will never join us and quite another to deal with a current which does not differ from us on major issues. My next point is that in Russia the question concerns not only efforts to uphold the purity of the party line but also the manoeuvring of the ruling party. If, objectively, the development of the Russian revolution threatens to rally around Trotsky petty bourgeois elements or those younger party members who want to escape the leadership of the main Bolshevik centre, this problem cannot be solved once and for all by some single, reliable, correct and non-opportunistic method.

I think that the attitude of continuous struggle, tension and persecution which is being promoted within the party in this connection aggravates the threat greatly and encourages all sorts of centrifugal trends. I believe that the use of Trotsky's vast store of popularity for the benefit, not to the detriment, of the party is a matter of enormous importance for Russia. Anyway, even if it is more difficult for Trotsky as a strong personality to embrace Bolshevism fully, the effort should be aimed at forging a firmer bond, not at alienating him.

Comrades, you are free to claim that your methods of dealing with dangerous phenomena are the most productive and expedient. Experience may lead you to different conclusions. You can manoeuvre in various ways. But you cannot speak here about any single and absolutely reliable method as a principle which it is opportunistic to violate.

Molotov: Do you still doubt that?

Koszutska: It's not that I doubt it: I am convinced that this is not so.

Now to other matters, this time German ones. In the circumstances under which the October events developed in Germany⁵, victory was impossible because there were no mass workers' organisations to support a revolutionary government: the spontaneous movement failed to create them. There were no councils of workers' deputies, no armed detachments and no serious movement of factory committees. With all this in mind, the defeat should not be explained to the German working class as something stemming from the mistakes made by a few people who provided poor leadership. On the contrary, the German working class should know and understand that its own passivity was its biggest problem. It should know that its own movement, the movement of the revolutionary masses, was not strong enough to make victory possible. It should know that during the previous period, the then leadership and the entire Executive Committee of the Comintern made the mistake of not preparing properly for the coming decisive battles and then overestimated the mood of the masses. What is being said about the allegedly exclusive fault of Brandler⁶ and Radek⁷ prevents the German working class from learning the bitter lesson of these mistakes.

Let me now pass on to the question of the leaders: do we give them a vote of no confidence and replace them, or do we keep them?

We have never maintained that leaders are, in general, unique, everlasting or that they should not be replaced, but that is not the point. The point is that we should not forget the distinctive quality of the present period. It is a time of social revolutions. Our defeats, inevitable setbacks, mistakes and retreats will be many, and we are likely to stray frequently from the right path. Let us think about the consequences of using a method whereby, after each unsuccessful attempt and each defeat, our inevitable bitter response would be to promote a revolution within the party, replace all leaders and discredit them by exaggerating the

mistakes they really made. If this system is to be applied and if all potential leaders (and, in Lenin's words, they are not born by the dozen) are discredited in this way one after another, at a decisive juncture the working class may end up lacking experienced leaders who enjoy the confidence of the masses. Revolutionary leadership may end up in the hands of "leaders for a season", careerists and gamblers.

Such are the considerations we proceeded from in our letter and in our declaration.⁸ We had no intention of supporting opportunistic deviations from the united front policy. On the contrary, we were aware of these deviations several months prior to the October events, and this gradually led us to adopt a critical attitude vis-a-vis certain Comintern decisions. We have documentary evidence to prove it. The tactical turn the Comintern has now taken coincides with the course we mapped out at our latest plenary meeting.⁹ And if Comrade Molotov thinks we are not happy with the adjustment of the united front tactics at the 5th Congress and with the tactical turn made, he is very much mistaken. The difference of opinion above all concerns organisational methods and the assessment of current developments. This difference is acceptable within the framework of the Comintern's tactical policy. But we hold that the organisational methods are at odds with the tactical guidelines.

Referring to our statement and our critical response to some of the Executive Committee decisions, Comrade Zinoviev told us recently: If you try and move against us, we'll break your bones. Yes, comrades, you can do this easily. You know full well that a struggle against you is now impossible. If you staked everything on these disputes and told the workers in Poland that they should choose between us and you, what do you think we would do? We would simply have to tell them to accept your leadership.

To a much greater degree in Poland than in any other party or country, any sharp difference or any conflict with the Russian party or the Russian Central Committee poses a grave ideological danger to our party and is sure to encounter strong resistance because we are working against the background of hatred of Soviet Russia—hatred the bourgeoisie and those in league with it have fomented enormously. Precisely because of the difference in the situation it is much easier, say, for the German party to approach extremely difficult and disputed questions critically within the Comintern. So if you decide to make war on us over the issues on which differences have now surfaced, there will be no question of any struggle, defeat or victory. Such is your special privilege and the special responsibility that devolves on you in this connection.

Comrades, broken bones knit in our Communist International. I fear something else altogether. Precisely because of your special privilege, it is not those people whose bones you may for whatever reason want to break who are a danger, but spineless people. We have seen the German left comrades since the moment leadership was handed over to them. We have seen them change their minds on many issues and give up their previous views. But, while watching these changes, I have always said that this shows they have valuable political qualities. They are young leaders. They are inexperienced comrades, and they are acquiring experience together with the masses they lead and agonising together with these masses over things they did not understand previously. We have advocated criticism of their actions not to alienate them but to make them correct their mistakes more quickly.

Still, when the older comrades from our delegation—com-

rades who could and should have thought through the long-standing disputes, who fought for many years against the policy of our party and against the course of the Comintern—want this time to use our disagreement with the Comintern in order to further their interests; when they come and say that they now accept everything (the position on the agrarian question, the national question, the united front and revolutionary manoeuvring); when we witness such an about-face, we must note that this is a dangerous thing which we cannot trust.

Stalin: Do you regard this as unnatural?

Koszutska: Yes, unnatural to say the least.

Let me return once again to the developments in Germany. In January we may have exaggerated the danger of the KAPDist deviation, a product of the despair and disillusionment caused by the defeat. We were all the more apprehensive of power /within the party.—Ed./ passing into the hands of the leftists.

KAPDist distortions did make themselves felt, although not as strongly as we had thought. The working class has overcome the feelings of dejection, and this is borne out by the favourable election results in Germany. One can expect the leftward turn in Germany to signify (as it did in Poland) that the masses are striving for more independent action. Only then will this turn cease to be an empty phrase and become a real step forward in the development of our movement.

Finally, a few words about the results of the discussion here and about the conclusions the party should draw from it.

The enormous prestige of the Russian comrades is a factor of great benefit to all of us. But it would become dangerous if it were misinterpreted, if it stifled all independent thought. We can see signs of this danger in the behavior of many comrades in our delegation. For example, someone said here that the congress elected us to the Central Committee on the strength of Comrade Radek's recommendation. That, of course, is nonsense. But the mood of those comrades who think that this could have happened quite naturally is harmful and dangerous—simply because on the recommendation even of a Comintern Executive

Committee member, a party cannot and must not elect those in whom it has no confidence.

Let me mention another, related development. When Comrade Zinoviev came to our delegation and spoke against us, some comrades immediately forgot not only about the long years of our joint work but also about everything we decided to do, and were doing only yesterday. Central Committee members should be more independent both in assessing political questions and in judging their comrades. But the most pernicious effect was from the fact that outside pressure created such a panic in our delegation, and the comrades lost their sense of balance to such an extent, that all their party patriotism and dignity evaporated, although without them a party member is worth nothing.

You comrades who spoke here before me on behalf of the majority of the Polish delegation and addressed the entire Comintern did not even try to defend their party against unjust accusations. My charge against you is not that you failed to defend us but that you failed to defend yourselves, your work and your achievements. This I will never forgive you. Because of you, the entire Comintern has a false impression of our work. It is your elementary duty before the party to present its image as it really is. You failed to do that. There was no cause for you to repent here. It was you who bore the brunt of the work there, within the country—work in which any party could, and you should, take pride. It is thanks to you that our party exerts a considerable influence on the masses despite the terrible reprisals it has suffered. Contrary to all the attacks launched against our party by representatives of other sister sections /the reference is to parties as sections of the Comintern.—Ed./ largely because they are unfamiliar with our realities, I assert that our Polish party is one of the more, if not the most revolutionary in the Comintern. In spite of its clandestine status and the vicious persecution unleashed against it, it has succeeded in maintaining its ties with the masses and inspiring them with its militant spirit. The latest elections in the Dabrowski Basin¹⁰ and the May Day demonstration in Warsaw confirm this. The party should take

Editorial Council Members Reply to Our Readers

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE SUDAN

I am a regular reader of your journal. My special interest lies in the state of affairs in countries in Asia and Africa. Could you describe the latest events in the Sudan where I hear a complex situation has developed.

D. Dashzhamts
research worker, Ulan Bator

The uprising of the Sudanese people in March-April 1985, which brought an end to the 16-year-long military dictatorship, promised democratic reforms, social and economic changes in the interests of all people, an end to the civil war and the establishment of relations with other

countries on the basis of a consideration of mutual interests. We had high hopes of radical change. But the opposite occurred. Things are getting worse in every sphere of life as the country faces a crisis unprecedented in its recent history.

The responsibility for this rests mainly

with the Transitional Military Council, which came to power as a result of the uprising, and several coalition governments—more correctly, their right wing—which were formed after the 1986 parliamentary elections. The situation deteriorated further when, together with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Al-Umma Party, representatives of the National Islamic Front (NIF) joined the cabinet.

At the emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Sudan held in May 1988, it was stressed that the entry into the government of NIF representatives meant participation in the cabinet of a party hostile to democracy, with profascist leanings and concerned only with ensuring the interests of those Islamic financial institutions which had provided it with vast sums of money for political and

credit for these valuable achievements. Let me repeat that because of the factionalist and unpartisan statements of many comrades, all the parties on the Polish Commission and the Comintern as a whole have formed a completely false impression of our party. That is your great fault, comrades from the majority of the Polish delegation. The party can and must condemn you severely for it.

About the future.

If the Russian comrades were to help us turn the discussion in our party in the right direction, that would be the most important and the most sought-after kind of assistance they could extend to our party.

The right direction will be identified when there is clarity above all on issues of topical importance to us in Poland. If the discussion is mostly reduced to personal attacks and factionalist recriminations—the way it happened here—it will not help the party recover but, on the contrary, make it dangerously ill.

The presiding officers keep reminding me that my time is up. I am forced to conclude my statement. There is only one thing I can say about my record, a much-debated subject here: of course there are many mistakes in it, but it represents the past of a leading group which won a whole party over to the communist cause.

I will not respond to personal charges because they are not worth it. Let me just mention that they are based on things bearing no relation to the truth.

¹ Maria Koszutska, also known as Wera and Kostrzewa, was born into a landowner's family in Kalisz in February 1876. A teacher by training, she joined the socialist movement in 1902 and the Communist Workers' Party of Poland in 1918. Imprisoned in 1920. Emigrated in 1921. At the 2nd Congress of the KPRP she was elected to serve on the party's leadership. After the 5th Congress of the Comintern she was dismissed from the KPRP Central Committee and worked for the Peasant International in Moscow. In 1925 she was again co-opted to the Central Committee. Arrested on framed-up charges during the 1930s, she apparently perished in 1939.

² An activist of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) since 1902 and of the PPS-Lewica since 1906, Maria Koszutska was sharply critical of the nationalistic views of some PPS activists who fell under the sway of Józef Piłsudski, the party's leader.

³ Aleksander Szumski, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks), member of the Polish Commission at the 5th Congress of the Comintern.

⁴ The KAPD (Communist Workers' Party of Germany) was established following a rift in the Communist Party of Germany in April 1920 in protest against its presence in the parliament and participation in the social democratic labour movement. Ślusarski (Władysław Kowalski) was an ultra-leftist KPRP activist.

⁵ Revolutionary developments in Hamburg and other German cities in October 1923.

⁶ Heinrich Brandler, a KPD leader accused of opportunism for joining the Social Democrats in Saxony's regional government.

⁷ Karl Radek, a prominent activist of the S DKPiL (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), member of the Bolshevik party and of the Comintern Executive Committee, an organiser of and participant in the revolutionary events of 1923 in Germany. He was expelled from the CPSU(B) at its 15th Congress in 1927 and deported in January 1928. In 1929 he announced his break with Trotsky and was reinstated in the party, but he no longer took part in the work of the Comintern. In 1936 he was again expelled from the party and arrested, and in January 1937 sentenced to 10 years in prison. He died in internal exile.

⁸ Documents the KPRP Central Committee sent to the Comintern Executive Committee and to the Political Bureau of the CPSU(B) Central Committee in December 1923, criticising the methods of struggle used against Brandler's group in the KPD and Trotsky's group in the CPSU(B).

⁹ At the March 1924 plenary meeting in Gdansk, the KPRP Central Committee adjusted its united front tactics and approved a letter to the CPSU(B) Central Committee supporting the CPSU(B) Political Bureau's position on issues of internal party struggle.

¹⁰ In the 1924 elections to Kasa Chorych (a health insurance scheme) in the Dąbrowski Basin area the Communists won 26,000 votes against 12,000 cast for all other parties together.

economic activity. This created a new situation in the country involving an abrupt swing to the right and an abandonment by influential leading groups in the two parties of their earlier stated adherence to the Charter and slogans of the uprising.

The CC CPS also noted that the programme of the right-wing government, which had accepted NIF guidelines, included the adoption of Islamic Sharia law as a first step towards abolishing democracy, depriving the Communist Party of the right to legal activity, persecuting trade union leaders who refused to support government policy, rehabilitating the overthrown dictatorship, escalating the civil war, and agreeing to concessions for the US and its allies.

The government made desperate attempts to push the Sharia law through the Constituent Assembly (Parliament). The

situation deteriorated in the south. The authorities refused to approve the peace agreement signed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the DUP in Addis Ababa (November 1988) which became known as the "Sudanese peace initiative". This prompted the DUP to withdraw from the ruling coalition and side with the opposition.

With the help of presses belonging to the Islamic Front, the government has been spreading disinformation and accusing all those who want dialogue with the SPLM and an end to the war of corruption and betrayal.

The political crisis is compounded by the economic situation, which has been steadily worsening since the decision taken in December 1988 to raise the prices of essential goods (sugar is six times as expensive, for instance) and to increase

taxes. This caused the resentment among the people and a wave of protests swept the country. As a result, the government was forced to make concessions and refrain from carrying out the planned measures.

The ruling circles have been sacking or "pensioning off" government agency employees who do not support their policy, replacing them with members of the ruling parties who are related to the leaders.

The Communist Party of the Sudan believes that the right-wing policy of the government can only be countered by unifying all the forces who took part in the uprising, by continuing actions to uphold democratic freedoms and by expanding international solidarity with our people.

The country's trade union movement has been increasingly active since the second half of last year and this has led to

significant shifts in political life and the frustration of the criminal plans of the government. In the end the ruling clique suffered a defeat, having failed to force through the Sharia law. The Constituent Assembly decided to postpone discussion of this law until the convocation of a national constitutional conference.

There is a stiff popular opposition to the policy of privatising public sector plants adopted in line with recommendations from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The trade unions have launched a determined struggle in defence of the working people's rights and for improvements in social and economic conditions. Various methods are being used: negotiations, strikes, mass resignations. The trade unions are challenging illegal dismissals, upholding the right to work and insisting on the observance of civil laws. The most important task now is to support the peace initiative aimed at ending the war and preserving the country's unity.

The policy of the right-wing government, which runs counter to the interests and expectations of the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese people, has led to mounting dissatisfaction and the emergence of an open opposition in the armed forces. In February 1989, the Sudanese army command presented a 21-point ultimatum to Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Supreme Council highlighting such problems as a declining economy and worsening living conditions, the blatant disregard for public safety, the disunity of internal forces, the Sudan's isolation on the international scene, and the huge losses being suffered in the war with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).¹ The message contained a demand for the creation of a broad-based coalition government. Most importantly, the document stressed the army's adherence to democracy.

Under Article 15 of the transitional constitution, the armed forces are a part of the people. They must defend the country's territorial integrity and security, and uphold the aims and gains of the *rajab* revolution (the popular uprising in April 1985).

The message from the high command was preceded by the resignation of the Defence Minister, General Abdel Majid Khalil, a top leader of the Al-Umma Party. He said that he could not work with the government while under constant attack from the Islamic Front, which called him a pacifist and claimed he supported

an end to the war in the south. He also pointed to the lack of funding for strengthening the army as a reason behind his departure.

The ultimatum had a tremendous impact, causing a change in the alignment of political forces. It was supported by all the political parties, except the Islamic Front, and received the trade unions' approval. Basically, a consensus was achieved on forming a coalition government open to all parties, the trade unions and other public organisations.

A programme was drawn up for the new cabinet. On March 4, 1989 it was signed by the opposition parties, with and without representatives in the Constituent Assembly, and then by the Al-Umma Party, the trade unions and others. The NIF refused to join in. The programme states that its implementation will be the task of a government made up of representatives from these parties and organisations.

The programme outlines the following major tasks:

- The observance of constitutional legality; the preservation of the democratic system; the maintenance of the external and internal security of the country; an end to the civil war; the implementation of a policy which would serve to strengthen the fighting efficiency of the armed forces; and the official recognition of a peace initiative on the war in the south.
- A solution to the crisis in the national economy and the raising of the standard of living for the people.
- The conduct of a balanced foreign policy and non-participation in blocs.
- Preparations for a general election on the basis of electoral laws guaranteeing representation for the new political forces.

After 40 parties and trade unions had signed this document, consultations began with a view to forming a new cabinet, the creation of which was announced on March 25, 1989. Alongside representatives from Al-Umma, DUP and other parties, the new administration also includes a representative from the Communist Party of the Sudan (as minister of public service and administrative reform), and two representatives from the trade unions as the ministers of health and labour.

As has been noted, the Islamic Front refused to sign the government

programme and thus did not join the new cabinet, referring to the fact that the programme has no clause on adherence to the Islamic Sharia law and that the NIF objects to the participation of the CPS and trade unions in government. Furthermore, it did not accept the peace initiative on the civil war in the south. The Front's General Secretary Hassan at-Turabi described the new government as illegal and called for its overthrow. Certain Al-Umma leaders, and Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi himself, share certain NIF's standpoints.

Unlike the Islamic Front, which opposes communist participation in the government, we are not demanding that the NIF be excluded from the new cabinet. The position of the CPS is distinguished by a high sense of responsibility to the country and does not pursue any narrow party interests, a point made by Ibrahim Nugud, General Secretary of the CPS Central Committee, in an interview with the newspaper *Al-Maydan*. He went on to reaffirm the Communists' willingness to participate in the government so long as it strives to implement the agreed programme. On the party's behalf he said that it abhors the idea of isolating any political force.

For the forces which overthrew the military dictatorship the formation of the new government is the first victory over the right-wingers and renegades. Hostile political circles, especially the NIF, will undoubtedly seek to hinder the activity of the government and to block the democratic process, using their information networks, economic resources and international connections to this end. But experience has shown that the plans of the Islamic Front can be defeated by combined efforts.

The fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement in signing the peace initiative to end the war in the South, and its serious and sincere participation in the new political alliance for the sake of a just peace will be a decisive factor in future developments. Enormous historical responsibility rests with the SPLM.

All Ahmed EL TAYEB
representative of the Communist
Party of the Sudan on WMR

Author's Note: This article was prepared for publication before the military coup in Sudan on June 30, 1989. I do not believe that the overthrow of the

civilian government and the military takeover change the current objective reality in the country. Nor do I think this will help towards a solution of the com-

plex problems there, the most pressing of which is the civil war. Such a solution requires the preservation of the democratic system and the participation

of all political and social forces, including the military.

¹ The military wing of the SPLM.—Ed.

FROM OUR MAILBAG * * * * *

RESPONSES, PROPOSALS, CRITICISM

SHARED VIEW

WMR No. 3, 1989 carried a letter from Manuel Pac Vivas of Spain in which he wrote about the need for changes in the consciousness and political activity of Communists.

I feel that many people, especially veteran Communists, a group to which the author of the letter belongs, will find this very difficult. The dilemma lies in having to choose between remaining tied to dogma, thus disregarding the changes going on around, or listening to those persistent voices in their parties calling for a response to the difficult and pressing problems of the day and a reappraisal of the past.

Vivas favours an unbiased, genuinely Marxist analysis of all stages of communist struggle, and the overcoming of those ideological and political consequences of Stalin's concepts which have had such a negative effect on the work of many parties. Of course, this is easier for those of us who were not alive then than for veteran Communists. "I know the road ahead is thorny and contradictory," the author says, "but we must follow it."

I fully share this veteran Communist's view.

A. MISHCHENKO
Moscow, USSR

THE BANKS AND THE DEBT

I must disagree with Fidel Castro's proposal that the governments of the industrialized capitalist nations pay back, via cuts in their military budgets, the losses their own banks would suffer if the Third World's debt were cancelled (as reported by Francisco Maura in his review of Juan Vega Vega's *La Deuda Externa*, WMR, No. 2, 1989).

While I certainly sympathize with cutting the military budget, I know that here in the United States there are lots of uses for that money. I would argue strongly against recompensing our bankers for their "losses". The truth is, as Castro himself has pointed out, that the banks have made back their investments many times over. Maura demonstrates that the primary reason the debt remains is not lack of payment by the Third World countries but the usurious interest rates charged.

The solution of the CPUSA is to nationalize the financial system of our country and cancel the debt outright. Thus when we cut the U.S. military budget the money can be invested to meet people's needs, both here at home and in the Third World.

Laurent ROSS
Washington, D.C., USA

SOME SUGGESTIONS

I decided to write after reading the January 1989 issue of *WMR*, which included a piece entitled "Readers as Coauthors" by Jorge Bergstein. It contained some bold and innovative ideas. The suggestions on the need "to look for new methods and forms in the exchange of experience between fraternal parties", on a "discussion forum", and on the desire to create a publication which with the active participation of the reader could become "not only a source of information but also a means of communication", all point to recent significant changes in the concept of the journal.

An increasing number of interesting letters on this subject have been appearing in *WMR*. Through your articles, readers are being given a great deal of food for thought and this in turn is leading to a qualitatively new level of correspondence.

I would like to make several suggestions:

1. The journal ought to devote special attention to exposing bureaucracy. After all, Lenin did call it the worst enemy of socialism. This is even more pertinent given the appearance of such terms as "the bureaucratic bourgeoisie" and "state bureaucratic capitalism". This question has not yet been studied in sufficient depth.

2. *WMR* articles acquaint us mainly with the experience of two socialist country parties—the CPSU and the HSWP—in the restructuring of social and

political life and in the complete exposure of and practical response to the Stalinist legacy. It would be interesting to find out in more detail what experience other parties in the socialist world have to impart.

3. There are a number of parties in power which have declared their adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but surprisingly they are often ignored by *WMR*. I have in mind Madagascar, Benin, People's Congo, Angola, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and so on. Are these socialist or so-called socialism-oriented countries? Are their ruling parties communist or revolutionary democratic? What are the differences between the two types of party? Why does the journal only rarely offer the reader information on the experience, achievements and difficulties of these countries as they seek to build a new life for themselves?

4. I think it would be a good idea to give the full names and addresses of readers who send in letters (except those who wish to remain anonymous). In this way, the journal could act as an intermediary for contacts between readers. First-hand knowledge and direct contact would help us come to know each other better. If, for reasons of space, the journal were unable to publish in full all the responses to a particular subject raised in a letter from a reader, then those who wanted to could write directly to him or her.

Razzaq ABBOUD
Svishtov, Bulgaria

WMR TIES * * * * *


* Freda Brown, President of the Women's International Democratic Federation, and Natalya Berezhnaya, WIDF Secretary, visited the *WMR* office. They discussed *WMR* coverage of the theoretical aspects

of the women's question, the practical activities of the women's broad democratic movement, and cooperation with its national and international organisations.





THE BOOK SCENE



THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PERESTROIKA

LA POLITICA ESTERA DELLA PERESTROJKA. L'URSS di fronte al mondo da Breznev a Gorbacev (The Foreign Policy of Perestroika. The USSR from Brezhnev to Gorbachov), Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1988, 256 pp.

The Foreign Policy of Perestroika. The USSR from Brezhnev to Gorbachov, a collection edited by Lapo Sestan and published in Rome, is the best of the books on the new Soviet policy to have appeared in Italy and Western Europe in general, highlighting as it does the substance and directions of the new Soviet course in international affairs. The book is devoted to the field of activity where the changes—those attracting close attention, and being judged on their merits, in the West—are most apparent.

In the introduction Giuseppe Boffa reveals the genesis of new political thinking and points out that the elements of continuity in Soviet foreign policy do not in any way overshadow the conceptual innovations of the past few years, such as the priority of common human interests. There is a "programme" of changes, the implementation of which is still at its initial stage. Further manifestations of its ability to demonstrate its worth are to be expected.

The historical insight and sheer attention to detail in Giuliano Procacci's piece go to make it one of the most significant in the book. He traces the evolution of the concept of peaceful coexistence, noting that Lenin's present-day followers have received a contradictory legacy. On the one hand, Lenin

spoke of wars as inevitable so long as capitalism exists, viewing peaceful coexistence therefore mainly as a "breathing space". On the other, in a political afterthought that characterises his last works, Lenin assessed the "truce" not as a temporary need, but as a permanent factor. Bukharin was the main advocate of drastic steps towards the most open recognition of a "breathing space", and later also a convinced supporter of the "struggle for peace". By contrast, Stalin looked at the issue of war and peace from increasingly narrow positions. After Bukharin's defeat, he imposed his own concept, which remained in force after World War II. The thesis on the inevitability of war became a dogma, and peaceful coexistence was seen exclusively in the context of confrontation between the two "systems"—socialist and capitalist.

Procacci refers to this as the "theory of Soviet isolationism", a concept which ignored the new character of international relations in the postwar period. After Stalin's death, first Georgy Malenkov and then Nikita Khrushchev began to review this crude and narrow doctrine. The idea that war is inevitable was abandoned, but the "traditional system of coordinates" remained intact and there was no talk of de-ideologising international relations. Under Leonid Brezhnev, this narrowness became even more pronounced in a rigid concept of world bipolarity.

The essay points out that only with the acknowledgement of interdependence has there come a new concept of peaceful coexistence which no longer confines itself to the military-diplomatic sphere, has no ideological strings and is in line with the characteristics of the modern world.

Overall, the book scans a wide range of Soviet foreign policy activities. The article by Lapo Sestan, for instance, takes a close look at Soviet-American relations. He regards the detente of the past decade as essentially a flop because, as the cited evidence of the sharp tension in the early 1980s reveals, no ade-

quate basis for long-term ties between the two powers was laid. There were many reasons for this, but the responsibility is mutual. On the Soviet side, it was Moscow's overemphasis on security, reflecting a purely military approach, that undoubtedly played a negative role. This resulted in a concentrated drive for strategic parity, as well as in new causes for conflict with a United States loath to limit its role as international arbiter. However, the crisis of detente was really also a crisis of its key prerequisite—bipolarity. A resumption of positive ties between the two countries had to be preceded by an acceptance of modern world realities.

Adriano Guerra's article explores the current Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, suggesting that Gorbachov's main object of concern appears to have been a recognition of the threat there of possible destabilisation resulting from internal reforms. Hence a very cautious and prudent policy.

The Soviet approach to Western Europe looks more innovative and dynamic. Examining this question, Heinz Timmermann suggests that Moscow's attention to the continent's western part, still bound by its relations with the USA and the preservation of its positions in Eastern Europe, should considerably increase in the near future.

Marta Dasso's essay is devoted to the Asia-Pacific region. Here, she notes, Moscow has launched a genuine "diplomatic offensive", believing in the region's growing world importance and desirous of playing a major diplomatic and economic role, and not just in terms of military power as under Brezhnev. I would add that normalised relations with China, culminating in Gorbachov's visit in May, hold out the greatest promise for the USSR there.

The book closes with another small article by Adriano Guerra, "The USSR and the Third World", in which he notes Moscow's clear urge to rethink its hitherto militarily-inclined ties with the Third World. This is already influencing favourably the climate of international relations as a whole.

The Foreign Policy of Perestroika helps towards a better understanding of the important and qualitative shifts in Soviet foreign policy, whether already effected or still in the process of accomplishment.

Silvio PONS

research worker, Centre for the Study of the Socialist Countries, Italian Communist Party

* * *

GUARDED TESTIMONY

Joaquin Balaguer, *MEMORIAS DE UN COR-
TESANO DE LA "ERA DE TRUJILLO"*
(Reminiscences of a Courtier in the "Trujillo
Era"), Editora Corripio, Santo Domingo, 1988,
477 pp.

The Dominican Republic is a small country, but in its history there are pages familiar to the entire world and characters who have become household names. This particularly applies to the so-called "Trujillo era"—a despotic regime which arose as a result of the first US military intervention and spanned more than 30 years¹, a period when the Dominican people were deprived of all freedoms and when a large part of national wealth was appropriated by the dictator. The book *Reminiscences of a Courtier in the Trujillo Era*, written by Joaquin Balaguer, an eminent politician for over half a century and the current president, relates some of the circumstances of that rule. This is not the work of an historian, but the memoirs of a man who considered himself a courtier and was at the very heart of the monstrous system created by Trujillo. This is what lends the book its particular interest: an eyewitness account of one of its most odious figures allows us to understand better the phenomenon of Latin American dictatorships.

You would think that Balaguer knows everything, since he entered the political stage when the "Trujillo era" was just beginning. Maybe he does, but he does not reveal all in his reminiscences. Many mysterious events in the political life of that period remain hazy even after reading the book. Of course, this is not accidental. Balaguer has written much in his life, but this is perhaps the first time he has mentioned his part in national government under the dictatorship (see pp. 97 and 100). He

has already publicly and scathingly criticised the despotic regime retrospectively, but he has never censured himself. This manoeuvring and "measured" approach is a characteristic feature of his memoirs.

General Trujillo succeeded in a coup attempt on February 23, 1930, overthrowing the lawful government and relying on a "civil movement" to give respectability to the actions of an army rebel. Among his followers was the young lawyer Balaguer, who "in terrific haste drew up a manifesto, explaining to the country the motives for what had happened" (p. 61). This document substantiated the coup by pointing to the need to unify the country in the face of anarchy and turn it into a strong state in spite of the interests of private groups.

A significant portion of the book is devoted to a "moral X-ray" of the dictatorship. According to the author, "the entire political system of the regime revolved around Trujillo's personality cult... he subjugated not just the will, but the very thought of the Dominicans" (p. 73). This idea, whereby the majority of citizens are responsible (through fear or meanness) for the consolidation of despotic power, is consistently pursued throughout the book. Again, this is no accident, since personal responsibility is diluted in the general mass. Although Balaguer refers to his own moral guilt for supporting the dictatorship, he manages at the same time to blame everybody else as well (see p. 108).

Like the other figures of the regime who rushed to occupy places at the helm of new power after Trujillo's death, the author of the book had a magnificent record of subservience to the tyrant. Quite unexpectedly he succeeded to the presidency. In order to consolidate his government and persuade the Latin American countries to withdraw the sanctions against the Dominican Republic,² Balaguer had to struggle against the dictator's clan. It was then that he delivered a speech at the UN in which he railed against the dictatorship.

But all his attempts to retain power were in vain. Justly ac-

cused of being the heir of "Trujillism", and under pressure from a broad popular movement in which the Communists, Christians, conservatives and other anti-dictatorial political forces took part, Balaguer was forced to leave the country.

Subsequent events ran as follows. In the December 1962 elections Juan Bosch, leader of the populist Revolutionary Dominican Party, won. His clearly reformist government lasted only until September 1963, when it was overthrown as a result of a Pentagon-planned coup.

The inept and corrupt rule of conspirators led to a popular uprising in April 1965, which was quelled by about 40,000 US marines who landed on Dominican soil ostensibly "to save North American lives and property".

Soon after these dramatic events Balaguer, who had been living in New York, returned home. A year later he was back in the government, the simple reason being that, having tarnished their name by collaborating with the occupiers, the rightwingers had no credible leader to offer. They required a suitable figure.

Balaguer's new presidency lasted for "twelve years and 45 days" and the book claims that it bore a "democratic character" (see p. 182). This obviously contradicts the truth. Disregard for elementary human rights and brutal counterinsurgency actions were the aftermath of US military intervention. Admittedly, the authorities carried out some reforms after 1973, adopting agrarian laws and legalising the communist party, for instance, but violations of rights and freedoms continued. Incidentally, the chapter on this period is called "Blood on the Streets". It deals specifically with two crimes perpetrated by "uncontrolled forces", as Balaguer calls the paramilitary squads active during his "democratic rule", but the title is also symbolic in a broader sense.

This chapter tells the story of journalist Gregorio Garcia Castro, who was killed one night in March 1973. Balaguer

portrays him sympathetically, regretting that he was unable to "establish for sure" who exactly gave the order to kill (see p. 330). But he devotes a mere eight lines to the murder at about the same time of the Communist journalist Orlando Martinez. It is worth reproducing these lines in full: "This page of the book is almost empty. For many years it will be silent, but one day history will hear its voice. It is silent as the grave, but the day will come when time will remove the stone under which the truth lies, and the secret will speak in a voice of accusation. A friend of mine is in on this secret. He is younger than me. When I am no more and a couple of years have passed, he will tell everything to the world" (p. 333). The author obviously knows the truth, but tries with beautiful words to protect those who organised the crime.

For three years now Balaguer has again been at the head of the Dominican Republic. His present style of government differs from the previous one, at least with regard to political freedoms. Swimming with the tide, as it were, he is somewhat constrained, he has to manoeuvre, because the old problems remain as burdensome for our people.

He also manoeuvres in his memoirs.

Sully SANEAX
Dominican publicist

¹ The US intervention of 1916-1924. Rafael Trujillo ruled the country from 1930 to 1961.

² Introduced in 1961, following Trujillo's attempt to have the Venezuelan president killed.

* * *

HE PREFERRED DEATH TO BETRAYAL

Fatima Meer, THE TRIAL OF ANDREW ZONDO, Baobab Books, Harare, 1988, 181 pp.

This book has come out in the Republic of Zimbabwe. Its author is a professor at the University of Natal, in Durban, South Africa. But before telling about this work, let me say a few words on the background to the events described.

Apartheid in South Africa is now universally condemned; the struggle and protest continue to grow. However, there is the thorny issue of the pros and cons of violence which crops up with surprising regularity. Some would dogmatically condemn it, others think it's an absolute necessity. The illegal liberation movement African National Congress (ANC) is waging an armed struggle against the racist Pretoria regime. Nelson Mandela refuses to condemn violence against apartheid even though it would seem an easy enough thing to do to gain his release from jail...

Many on this side of anti-racist barricades support such a

position. Take Andrew Zondo. In 1985 the 19-year-old black lad from South Africa placed a bomb in a white resort which killed five persons and injured dozens. He begged forgiveness for the lives taken but just before his execution he declared: "What I had to do I did."

Examining the political and moral issues connected with the problem of violence in the liberation movement, the author of the book pays much attention to the actual court proceedings. As the case unfolds she reveals before the reader the social situation in South Africa and shows the motivating factors behind the popular struggle.

Zondo was brought up in the family of a priest. His parents wanted their son to get an education and spared no efforts to that purpose. The lad excelled in his academic pursuits. But to what end? The Bantu education system devised by the apartheid regime for the black population is intended to make him servile. What is the value of such an education?

The youth cannot understand the Christianity of his parents, and the professed humanism of that religion, when his neighbour, a good man, is arrested and jailed for no apparent reason. It leaves a scar on his mind but his parents wouldn't answer his searching questions. Zondo does not understand Soweto and the burning of schools or the attack on his own school by police while the children were praying. He loves his parents dearly and

it hurts him to know he is drifting away from them and their seeming obliviousness. He has to face the issues. Apartheid not only oppresses him but destroys his relationship with his family.

The ANC activist who contacted Zondo gave him the Freedom Charter. The liberating effect it had on him was revealed during the court proceedings:

Zondo: I went through the programme of the ANC and found it was appealing. It was something far better than what I could see around me.

Judge: What was better about the ANC than you had seen around you?

Zondo: The Freedom Charter says South Africa belongs to all who live in it. To me that was much better than what was happening, where South Africa belonged to the whites (see p. 110).

Still in his teens, Zondo took his political work seriously and was trained in politics and armed struggle in neighbouring countries where the ANC had camps. He returned to his homeland and carried out various assignments. One day, just after the security forces of South Africa killed some innocent people in Lesotho claiming there were ANC terrorists, Zondo is told to retaliate. He understood the instructions to mean hitting back at the regime.

Thus came the decision to place a bomb in a white resort. He had violated the ANC rules by killing civilians, and soon he actually gave himself up and admitted to the killings. He convinced himself that his intention was not to kill. He insisted on this position in court, something which the prosecution used against him. How could he argue that he had no intention to kill when he placed the bomb to go off in bright daylight in a busy area?

Professor Meer retraces Zondo's life, his milieu, his upbringing, and his evolving emotions. Without justifying his terrorist act as such, she told the court: "I find that he, at a very early age, became permeated with a sense of contradiction. In the first instance there were his parents, devoutly Christian, silenced into compliance and acceptance of the status quo... Black parents throughout the country confronted the terrible events of 1960 which resulted in the banning of the ANC..." (p. 135). Meer speaks of black youth as constituting a moral force with its own values outside the white officialdom. When asked

in court about the role of violence and its impact on young minds, Meer replied: "I want to emphasise that black youth do not see violence as a norm in that they are not committed to violence for the sake of violence. Black youth are really striving to be themselves, to have the kind of normal opportunities that white children have... Andrew Zondo said to me that they organised boycotts and they really believed that these boycotts would bring Bantu education to an end; that they would have a new educational dispensation that would put them on a par with white children. We may consider this to be over-optimistic, but this is what they believed. Their first choice is non-violence, but..." (pp. 137-138). The responsibility for his act, the professor concluded, thus ultimately lay with his society (p. 141).

Andrew Zondo received five death sentences on five counts. And as if to rub salt into the wound, the judge added another 10 years to the sentence.

Zondo had the opportunity on several occasions to denounce the ANC and save his skin. But he refused to be broken. A rank-and-file soldier of the liberation army, he preferred to die.

The book encapsulates the agony and tragedy of South African society. Fatima Meer must be commended not only for her evidence in mitigation but for enriching the world's understanding of the evil system as shown through the prism of Andrew Zondo's life. In a way this is another cry for an end to apartheid.

In conclusion, I would like to cite an episode from the book which appears symbolic to me. Catholic priest John O'Burne told his congregation at a time when the ear-splitting explosion was still fresh in the memory: "Whites had a responsibility for the situation which gave rise to these terrible murderous attacks, and should start taking steps to change the situation. It's not just a question of something that happened on that day. The circumstances that led to that must be changed. If you treat me like a dog, I will bite you." One member of the church gathering walked out but the 700 others stayed, listened and congratulated him...

Kellawan LALL

representative of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana on *WMR*

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URUGUAYAN TRADE UNIONS: ORIGINS AND MATURITY

Enrique Rodriguez, **URUGUAY. UN MOVIMIENTO OBRERO MADURO** (Uruguay: A Mature Labour Movement), Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, Montevideo, 1988, 319 pp.

The well-known Uruguayan trade unionist Enrique Rodriguez, the author of two major sociopolitical publications, *The Labour Movement: Sources of Maturity and Democracy and the Class Struggle*, has now published a new work, *Uruguay: A*

Mature Labour Movement. Together with the former two books, it makes up a trilogy devoted to the courageous struggle of the Uruguayan workers and pervaded with a firm belief in the strength of the working people. As a leader, Rodriguez has his roots among the people, and has been steeled in hard-fought social battles both at home and in exile for the emancipation of labour and for people's happiness.

Since the 1940s he has been working to forge unity of action among Uruguayan and other Latin American unions. He writes from personal experience, analysing from Marxist positions both the achievements and the setbacks of this struggle. Looking at national developments from an international perspective and drawing historical parallels, he is able to draw up an authentic picture of the growing influence of the trade unions.

"The maturity of the Uruguayan proletariat springs from its

struggles, from the experience accumulated since the very birth of the movement, and from a responsible leadership growing wiser with every long stage, oriented to and closely involved with the mass of the working people, and equipped with a concept of a new world in which the working class must be made the principal protagonist" (p. 243). These words keynote the entire trilogy.

The book under review offers a panoramic picture of the rise of the country's militant trade unions, which emerged onto the national scene in the 1930s and 1940s. An important role in shaping the ideological and organisational principles of the movement was played by the Communist Party, which "clearly showed the way of struggle, helping workers to unite in the unions; to articulate their demands, and to create conditions for legal unionisation" (p. 48). The proletariat was gaining strength at the time, and the unionists were working among the people to win recognition and support. Postwar developments demonstrated, however, that in spite of the movement's significant achievements, it had not yet reached maturity: ideological confusion and elements of strong-man leadership persisted, and the declared principles of democratic guidance were not followed in practice. The unions failed to embrace the whole gamut of currents in the working class in order to unite them in a single flow of struggle. It took ten more years to lift the movement to a qualitatively new level.

The rise of the labour movement reached its peak in 1966, when the Broad Front was established. Along with major trade unions, it united many other public forces which advocated far-ranging social change and represented the interests of various sections of the population.

Unity would have been impossible to achieve, the author notes, if the National Convention of the Working People of Uruguay (CNTU) had not been set up (in 1966) "in response to the aspirations of different generations of the working people" (p. 141). A special chapter in the book is devoted to that combative trade union force, and the situation in the country before the 1971 elections is analysed in particular detail. People were in resolute mood, and pinned their hopes on the victory of the Broad Front. This mood spread even to those who supported the *tupamaros* (urban guerrillas). But the *tupamaros* themselves refused to see that their armed operations, such as bank holdups and hostage-taking, ran against the spirit of the election campaign. Reaction used these as a pretext to unleash bloody repression against all the left forces, including the unions. However, united action by the working people, including demonstrations and strikes, blocked the imposition of martial law. The Broad Front slogan "Peace for change, change for peace" prevailed.

"Everyone who witnessed this turbulent period realised," Rodriguez recalls, "that only a movement having a solid ideological base, clear strategic and tactical objectives, and a practical ability to mobilise the mass of people could, in so short a time, have neutralised the danger of the working people's gains being taken back, something which the pro-fascist elements sought to do" (p. 213).

The author's thoughts on the unions' attitude to the army are quite instructive. In Uruguay, as in other countries, part of the army is populist-minded and cares for the people. Even some high-ranking officers' ideas of their patriotic duty and sense of honour differ from those of the reactionary military, who believe that only an army keeping its distance from democratic principles can maintain "order" in the face of im-

potent politicians and the people's excessive demands. On the contrary, the patriotically-minded military try to understand the people's aspirations and identify the reasons behind social discontent and conflicts in order to cure society and save the nation from a catastrophe. These differences were once ignored, and simplistic assessments made of the alignment of forces within the army, which was viewed as a staunch guardian of the interests of the dominant class. This was brought out during the 1973 tragedy, when the right wing in the army established a dictatorship.

A general strike in June and July of that year was the workers' answer to the challenge of the military and a demonstration of the people's political strength and their resolve to stand up to a dictatorship which had crushed bourgeois democracy.

The CNTU did not panic or fall apart, but went underground and organised clandestine work under the slogan "Not a day of respite to the dictatorship" (see pp. 249-263). Despite ruthless reprisals, regular protest actions, though of varying scope, chipped away at the tyranny's foundations. The merger of the CNTU and the Intersyndical Plenum of the Working People (PIT) was a signal event of the period, and the authorities' attempt to set up "official" trade unions failed. The unions fought on unwaveringly. Rodriguez describes the massive May Day demonstration in 1983 and a large strike the following year, which left the Right no room for manoeuvre and actually set the stage for the self-legalisation of left organisations, including the Broad Front and the trade union amalgamation. The regime, which had hoped to last for at least half a century, had to leave the political scene.

The struggle entered a new phase: "The working class has always had a vital interest in supporting and consolidating the democratic system because it paid dearly for the defeat of fascism... The road to emancipation lies in establishing and mastering democracy and in its development" (p. 274).

The huge external debt, the inroads made by the transnationals into the economy and the resolve of the bourgeoisie to keep its privileges make it necessary for the working people to forge new forms of unity, and for the trade unions to strengthen their links with the masses. Rodriguez stresses that the changed conditions of struggle call for the further evolution of the concept of democracy, primarily for real guarantees of workers' rights, including the right to strike. It is the latter that is under constant attack from the government, which claims that industrial action destabilises the economy, disrupts political life, and narrows opportunities for eradicating the vestiges of the dictatorship. The book gives the lie to such allegations and forcefully shows that the strike is an effective means of defending the interests of the working people.

One of the dangers the trade union movement faces today is that various parties would like it to embrace their political philosophies, and this could provoke splits. It is therefore all the more important that decision-making in large organisations, which unite tens or even hundreds of thousands, should be based on sound and crystal-clear norms of worker democracy (see p. 309). The extraordinary congress of the PIT-CNTU in 1987 made good progress in that respect and demonstrated anew that the Uruguayan trade unions are a solid guarantee of the consistent democratisation of society.

Antonio PEREZ

THE MUSLIM WORLD'S CONCERNS

L. I. Medvedko, A. V. Germanovich, *IN THE NAME OF ALLAH... The Politicisation of Islam and the Islamisation of Politics*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 255 pp. (in Russian)

The dramatic events which followed the publication of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* are still fresh in the memory. The unprecedented scandal surrounding the book has revealed the two extremes: free speech may involve insulting a faith, whilst freedom of action may involve condemning a writer to death. This new book, prepared by Soviet scholars, is written in a different spirit. The authors have taken an objective look at Islam, exploring its role in the Muslim peoples' struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism for freedom and for social and economic progress, at the same time exposing the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction which seek through religion to exploit and enslave the countries of the Middle East.

The authors have managed to illuminate most of the events in the contemporary Islamic world, including the heroic uprising of the Palestinian people, the tragedy of the occupied sacred city of Jerusalem, the Lebanese crisis, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and Pakistan's undeclared war on Afghanistan. Before analysing the book's strengths and weaknesses, I have to say that I think it will come to occupy a worthy place among the studies of Islam.

The book opens with an interesting historical survey of this religion, describing movements and sects and the Muslim clergy's role in Eastern societies, and shows it to have permeated every sphere of life, to have transfused each man and woman. Reading this part of the book, I recalled an episode from my own childhood. One day at school the man who taught Islam began to shout at me and beat me. He then dragged me by the ear to the headmaster for stricter punishment. "This little devil seeks my death!" he screamed, "I am a graduate of Al-Azhar,¹ a *qadi* in a *sharia* court, I hold an important post in the Ministry of Education... And he wants me to read the Koran over the deceased like those old men who live off it and walk the streets with nothing else to do." I had not suspected that he would take my question, whether he had ever read the Koran over a deceased person for a fee, as such a great insult.

The Muslim peoples' liberation struggle took on a religious character because Islam in its various forms acted as a political force. Was this a reaction to the policy of the colonialists, who had tried, ever since Napoleon's famous expedition to Egypt, to establish dominion? Or was Islam politicised at its very birth, even before Ali and Muawiyah² fought it out near Siffin under the protection of the Koran? And what has Islam become? "Today, Islam is not only a religion in the true sense of the word, not only a way of life, a distinct civilisation with its own traditions and culture", the book replies, "but also often a politico-religious ideology with all its varieties and contradictions—ethnic, religious, social and economic" (p. 71). They correctly stress that "putting forward political slogans with a religious colouring is not a monopoly of Islam" (see p. 109).

The "Islamic explosion" has been characteristic of major social and political cataclysms, such as the liberation war in Algeria and the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan. As already

mentioned, this book analyses almost all the important events in the Muslim world in which Islam has become not only a banner for progressive social transformations, but also a political screen for the activities of reactionary governments and organisations. Therefore, it stresses, "in any Muslim movement ... there are two sides: the progressive, anti-imperialist and the reactionary, anti-communist" (p. 74). Within these extremes is an extensive spectrum of other Islamic trends.

To a considerable extent, the authors have succeeded in describing such trends and it's worth touching briefly on some of their appraisals of the principal theses and characteristics of "Islamic socialism", whose proponents "proceed from the assumption that the fundamental ideas of socialism do not contradict the Koran" (pp. 130-131). The book's claim that "the models of 'Islamic socialism' offered... most often seek to 'perfect' the exploitative system with regard for Muslim specifics only" (see p. 132) would seem therefore to be wrong.

The scholars analyse Libya's "natural socialism", a variant of "Islamic socialism", and conclude that although Muammar Qaddafi's social reforms are not bourgeois, nevertheless they are not hindering the emergence of a capitalist sector in agriculture (see pp. 143, 144). It seems to me that in examining the problems of Libya, the authors' assessments of its political evolution are often too simplistic.

The use of Islam for political, economic and cultural progress is examined through the prism of Algeria, Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. For example, the Syrian leadership has declared that the basic ideological guidelines of the republic are in "full agreement with the demands for freedom, equality and social justice which are contained in the Islamic religion" (p. 148).

Islam is not the only religion to have been used by various forces for political ends. However, judging by recent events, Islam, perhaps more than any other faith, has shown a broad political adaptability to the divergent socioeconomic structures and great political upheavals of the late 20th century. One of the most striking proofs of this situation and the contradictoriness of the Islamic factor is the revolution in Iran and the events that followed the April 1978 revolution in Afghanistan.

According to the researchers, "the anti-monarchic and anti-imperialist revolution in Iran may have been the culmination of what could be called the politicisation of Islam. It is in Iran that Islam has tried to project itself not only as an independent, but also as an elite political force" (p. 108). The book examines these events stage by stage, tracing the clergy's political role in Iran since Musaddeq's 1951 revolution and rightly concluding that it was the anti-monarchic revolution's religious face that ensured it a mass, almost national character. But the clergy seized the initiative and used the popular revolt to consolidate their power. The authors thoroughly analyse the results of the actions of the new Iranian leadership in the economy, domestic policy and culture, actions which have placed the country on the verge of a catastrophe.

Laws based on religious ideas have been adopted in Iran, and this has caused many researchers to attach a negative assessment to the role played by the Islamic factor. The idea that Muslims possess an "innate fanaticism" also serves this purpose and has, incidentally, been used to explain the steadfastness of the people in the Middle East in the anti-colonialist struggle. In this way certain forces have tried to paint a global picture of Islamic nations as unable to see peace as a form of human existence. The neocolonialists would also like to "see a widespread

apathy among Muslims towards the arms race and towards the prospect of a nuclear war" (p. 245).

Entirely different conditions obtained after the revolution in another Muslim country—Afghanistan. This provoked fierce resistance from the deposed exploiter classes and neocolonialists. With US financing and the Muslim reactionaries' support, the opposition forces set up combat units on Pakistani and Iranian territory. The researchers correctly point out that the almost total illiteracy, the religiousness and the traditional obeisance of the people before the mullahs and tribal chiefs enabled the enemies of democracy to draw ordinary Afghans into these units with false slogans about defending Islam (p. 174).

Medvedko and Germanovich accurately describe the position taken by the counterrevolutionary leaders in calling for a struggle for the triumph of Islam. Accusing the authorities of attempting by force "to impose on the people a Marxist way of life" instead of the traditional, Muslim one, they urge believers to accept the need for a revival of an Islamic state. The book is critical of the authorities' mistakes in carrying out social reforms. Opposition leaders have taken advantage of this, referring to the Koran in order to prove that the measures undertaken by the government are incompatible with Islam and blaming the country's worsening economic position on the results of non-Islamic rule. The British researcher B. Male, quoted in the book, argues convincingly that the new regime's opponents have been trying to lend the class conflict a religious guise in order to win mass support (p. 176).

By analysing the events in Iran and Afghanistan, the authors have laid good ground for further discussion. Serious questions are raised which will be hard to answer without new research into whether, for instance, the politicisation of Islam has reached its peak in these countries or in the Muslim world as a whole. (It is not simply a systematisation of the course of events I have in mind, since social scientists still find it difficult to classify the processes occurring in many Islamic states.) We also need to ask in which of them the stage of transformation has been completed, whether it has been completed by way of revolution or reforms, and whether it has followed the direction of capitalist development or socialist orientation. Or which alignment of class forces determines whether the fundamentalist or the modernist current wins out in the "Islamic revival".

Whenever I encounter the term "Islamic revival" (in definitions of the essence and tendencies of Islam; in description of the weakness of its positions in sub-Saharan countries or its strengths in most of the other Islamic states) I follow the profound analysis of this phenomenon offered in the book in

understanding it as a "bourgeois revival". In actual fact, the bourgeoisie of the Eastern countries is out to use Islam to divert the working people from socialist and communist ideas and rid itself of its dependence on imperialism.

Perhaps in the last of the Islamic monarchies—Saudi Arabia—changes may evolve out of religious reform; perhaps certain countries (Turkey, Syria, Egypt, the Sudan, Libya and Palestine, for example) have passed the critical point of an "Islamic explosion"; perhaps others like Jordan, Pakistan and a number of Persian Gulf states are still waiting for changes.

External signs of an "Islamic revival" are often associated by many regimes with the events in Iran, and this leads some of them to see certain parallels. Rather than raising such questions directly, the authors have tended to scrutinise the chronological sequence of events. Nevertheless, the book's analytical character does provide much food for thought on these and other issues.

The book emphasises that Islamic peoples need peace, the settlement of regional conflicts and new political thinking. Since World War II, so-called "minor wars" have affected more than 60 developing countries, almost half of them Muslim (p. 243).

It is impossible not to agree with the book's argument that "in this nuclear age, when the problem of life and death has become a matter of the survival of human race itself, religions cannot remain aloof from the vital issue of war and peace... A religion which influences millions can affect politics..., by ennobling and humanising it" (p. 245). This fully applies to Islam, the "most political" of faiths.

"Allah akbar!"—with this cry soldiers went to battle on the fronts in the Iran-Iraq war. "Allah akbar!"—exclaimed people in Teheran and Baghdad when the war ended. What is it to be—war or peace in the name of Allah?

Said SALEM

representative of the Communist Party of Jordan
on *WMR*

¹ The Muslim university in Cairo.—*Tr.*

² Ali ibn-abi-Talib (d. in 661)—the fourth caliph, cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed. He was assassinated by those who resented his attempts to compromise with the Ommyads after their defeat near Siffin (657). Muawiyah I (?—680)—the founder and first caliph of the Ommyad dynasty.



IN MEMORY OF OUR COMRADE

Ib Nørlund, a prominent figure in Denmark's communist and working-class movement and the representative of the Communist Party of Denmark at *World Marxist Review*, died on June 14, 1989.

Comrade Nørlund was born in Copenhagen in August 1917. After graduating from the university, he worked as a teacher and as a researcher at Niels Bohr's Institute for Theoretical Physics. The 1930s saw him helping to organise the youth and student movement and leading the Youth League Against Fascism and War.

From 1936 to 1941 he served as secretary and later as chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League. In 1938 he became a mem-

ber of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Denmark. During World War II he fought in the resistance against the Nazis and was arrested several times. In 1949 he was elected to the Executive Committee and then to the Secretariat of the CPD Central Committee.


He became editor of *Tiden* magazine in 1954 and was the author of many works on political science—*Marxism in Our Age*, *Communists and Today's Problems*, *The Communist Viewpoint*, *The Party and the Class Struggle*, *Internationalism* and others. As *Land og Folk*, the Danish communist newspaper, said, "for 50 years, the work of Ib Nørlund greatly influenced the shaping of our party's policy. His relentless energy was an inspiration and he was the first to act

when new ideas were required."

During his two terms of office as a member of parliament, he invariably upheld the interests of workers, the cause of peace and international cooperation.

Ib Nørlund's vast store of knowledge and experience, his skills as an organiser and his fine human qualities were clearly evident in his many years of work as an Editorial Council member at our journal. He did a great deal to cement the Danish Communists' ties with *WMR*, to cover the issues of the working-class movement in its pages and to strengthen the international solidarity of Communists.

The memory of Ib Nørlund will live forever in our hearts.





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